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Volume 1: Ground Systems


Chapter 1: Reconnaissance

Chapter 1 Effective Ranges of Selected Reconnaissance Assets.png

Reconnaissance represents all measures associated with organizing, collecting, and studying information on the enemy, terrain, and weather in the area of operation. Aggressive, continuous reconnaissance allows the timely accomplishment of combat missions with minimum losses. Poor reconnaissance can lead directly to failure.

The OPFOR term that addresses the totality of reconnaissance activities is RISTA (reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition). Therefore, RISTA DOES NOT equal the US term, C4ISR (command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). For information on OPFOR command and control (C2), see Chapter 9.

The OPFOR commits significant resources to reconnaissance. Prior to hostilities, the OPFOR will already have developed an intelligence picture and expected military courses of actions. While the OPFOR practices similar intelligence and reconnaissance disciplines (HUMINT, SIGNINT, IMINT, etc.) as the US, the OPFOR conducts RISTA with different assets, focuses, and methodologies. Reconnaissance platforms must be able to operate in all spheres: ground, surface, below surface, air, space, naval, and littoral areas. The OPFOR fields reconnaissance assets at all echelons and products derived from those assets are used for actions on the battlefield.

This chapter describes ground maneuver forces and specialized ground troops (special purpose forces-SPF) reconnaissance assets. The most basic sensors are lasers/optics/electro-optics used by infantry units (see Chapter 2). When linked with a radio, these basic sensors can be used for unit reporting and other HUMINT reports. There are also dedicated reconnaissance assets with data sheets in other chapters.

  • Aerial reconnaissance (Rotary-Wing and Fixed Wing aviation chapters in Volume 2)
  • Air defense reconnaissance, early warning, and target acquisition (Air Defense chapter in Volume 2)
  • Artillery target acquisition (Artillery chapter)
  • Engineer reconnaissance (Engineer chapter)
  • NBC reconnaissance (Chemical chapter)
  • Signals reconnaissance (Information Warfare chapter)
  • Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV chapter in Volume 2)

The reconnaissance effort depends upon sensor technologies for location, surveillance, and acquisition. Most units will employ a mix of older and newer systems, with recon vehicles, portable sensors, and man-portable sensors. The most prolific sensor on the battlefield is the human eye. Range is a critical factor. The table below gives general range capabilities.

The most prolific reconnaissance discipline is HUMINT reports generated by ground units. Much of this reconnaissance effort consists of tactical recon missions executed by maneuver units in their operational area. Any unit can generate reconnaissance. The OPFOR will exploit civilian information and acquisition assets for reconnaissance purposes. While OPFOR units may operate reconnaissance vehicles, most will have possess the ability to operate dismounted observation posts (OP). These dismounted OPs may possess similar capabilities as vehicle mounted patrol vehicles. The OPFOR will used many types of vehicles for reconnaissance including motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles, or civilian vehicles. The OPFOR will use equipment such as multi-spectral concealment materials, navigation equipment, light-weight laptop computers, and long-range communications/digital transmission systems while conducing reconnaissance.

RISTA Key Technology Trends

Military forces continue to field new RISTA systems and upgrade old legacy systems. These systems can be found in both reconnaissance, tactical, and fir support units.



Technology Trend Vol/






Ubiquitous Handheld RISTA


Remote electronic optics (EO)/3d generation thermal sight, 30x zoom precise location, video

link, & graphic net

V1/1-17 Sophie MF V1/1-32
EO bionics with forward looking infrared (FLIR) camera, laser rangefinder (LRF), and

goniometer for precise target location

V1/1-19 ADAD V1/1-23
LADAR optical augmentation scans & detects

enemy weapon sights

V1/1-21 Mirage 1200 V1/1-21
Robotic hand-thrown camera with PDA display,

& robot/ball mount

V1/1-25 Macroswiss V1/1-18
Camera grenade (rifle, RPG, AGL) remotes in-

flight image to display

V1/1-25 SPARCS V2/4-8

Dismount Team Assets

Man-portable II camera net to display monitor

& alert system

V1/1-17 Nighthawk V1/1-18
Site spy cameras with remote-display images

on monitor

V1/1-18 NG-30 V1/1-17
EO Laser target designator guides laser homing

round to 10+ km

V1/1-20 DHY-307 V1/1-20
Man-portable radar with 24 km range and LPI


V1/1-22 Squire V1/1-22
Multi-sensor unattended ground sensors with

remote monitor display

V1/1-24 CLASSIC 2000 V1/1-24
Hand-launch UAVs/micro-UAVS for infantry,

SPF, RISTA, AT, etc.

V1/1-26 Zala 421-08 V2/4-6
Masted 50+x EO, 3d generation thermal sights

& other sensors for real-time nets

V1/1-6 ATM V1/4-9


Integrated weapons with sensor pods for

combat reconnaissance vehicles

V1/1/6 BRM-3K V1/1-11
Mast-mounted motorized LPI radars & real-

time digital transmission

V1/1-7 HJ-62C V1/1/13
Remote add-on turrets & radar modules for

vehicle conversion

V1/1-7 Stalker V1/1-7
Aerial RISTA Systems Powered airship or aerostat with video camera

or other sensor arrays

V1/1-23 TAOS/Sky Media Pro V2/7-2
Helicopter/weapon-launch UAV munitions for

real time intel/targeting

V1/1-26 R-90 V2/1-8
Helicopters & FW with real-time MTI; synthetic

aperture radar

V2/2-21 Horizon V2/2-21
Other RISTA Assets INFOWAR, UAV, aerial & HUMINT assets

tactically linked & fused

V1/1-7 HJ-62C V1/1-13
Handheld & embedded GNSS receivers for in-

view displays

V1/1-14 Magellan GPS V1/1-14
EO laser RF weapon sights with 3d generation

day & night capability

V1/1-14 IS-2000 V1/2-30
Acoustic sensors quickly detect vehicles,

weapons & aircraft

V1/1-21 HALO V1/1-21
Trip-wire charges, mines, or sensor-fused

grenade launchers

V1/1-23 AJAX V1/1-23
Artillery/aerial-delivered & hand-emplaced UGS

display in intelligence net

V1/1-24 BSA V1/1-24
Weapon launched sensor munitions for aircraft

& artillery

V1/1-26 R-90 V2/1-7
Laptop display data transmission systems, encryption, and satellite communication


V1/1-30 Kredo-M1 V1/1-30

Reconnaissance Vehicles

The OPFOR conducts continuous and pervasive reconnaissance activity in all phases of military operations. To accomplish their reconnaissance, the OPFOR uses a variety of vehicles based on the enemy threat and the mobility desired. The spectrum of reconnaissance vehicles range from old systems ill-suited for modern requirements to mobile, lethal, and survivable systems equipped with complex sensor arrays and communication equipment. Some vehicles may work alone or as part of a patrol.

The vehicle most used for reconnaissance is an unarmored 4 X 4 wheeled rive tactical utility vehicle or TUV (see the Infantry chapter for examples). The US M151 or Jeep was originally designed as a reconnaissance vehicle and many countries still favor a similar system due to their small size, speed, and maneuverability in a variety of terrain. Some countries have upgraded their reconnaissance vehicles to something similar to the US HMMWV or British Land Rover.

Reconnaissance vehicles are designed or other vehicles are modified to fit the role desired, force requirements, and the terrain in which the vehicle needs to operate. The vehicles may be unarmed except for small arms carried by the personnel in the vehicle or other larger weapons such as a machine gun or automatic grenade launcher (AGL) may be mounted on the vehicle. Many TUV chassis are poorly suited to adding additional armor for protection of the crew. The additional weight compromises the other positive aspects of the vehicle.

The armored scout car is sometimes better suited for reconnaissance than the TUV. These wheeled vehicles offer good road mobility, and better all-terrain off-road mobility than other vehicle types. The vehicle can be based on a truck, armored personnel carrier, or indigenous chassis to handle the added armor requirements while maintaining good mobility. Many of these vehicles may resemble a TUV, but are designed from the ground up for reconnaissance missions. The armor is often light and the wheels are vulnerable to nearly all weapons. Other improvements may be amphibious capability such as with the French VBL and VBR and larger caliber weapons. Examples of these vehicles include the British Fox, Hungarian FUG-66, and Russian BRDM-2.

In heavy combat or when a larger number of soldiers is needed, the OPFOR will often use modified Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) or Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) as a reconnaissance vehicle. Other countries have produced specialized combat reconnaissance vehicles (CRV) designed to operate ahead of the forward line of troops (FLOT), not to initiate combat, but survived if attacked. These CRVs often sacrifice space for soldiers to gain increased mobility, additional sensors, or increased C2 capacity. Many CRVs use tracks instead of wheels, but the wheeled vehicles have amphibious capabilities the tracked vehicles do not. Examples of CRVs include the Russian BRM-3K, the British Scimitar, and the Austrian Pandur RECCE vehicle.

A newer generation came about with the addition of mast mounts and multi-sensor suites to create a sensor reconnaissance vehicle. These vehicles are not designed to operate forward of the FLOT, but behind the lines using cover while providing continuous data to ground forces. These vehicles feature powerful multi-sensor arrays using masts from five to 10 meters high provide longer-range surveillance with less vulnerability to enemy fires. Most of these sensor vehicles are built on an IFV or APC chassis provides the space for three to five work stations. These vehicles can also serve as an intelligence coordination and analysis center. These vehicles are likely to move less often than a CRV. Examples of these sensor reconnaissance vehicles include the Czech Snezka and Chinese Type 85 with HJ-62C radar. There are also sensor vehicles available for specific branches such as the Russian PRP- 3//PRP-4M for artillery units and the Russian Sborka for air defense units.

Many countries are not using their limited defense dollars not on producing new reconnaissance vehicles, but on improving the sensor suites and mounted them on other vehicles such as the Israeli Rafael Stalker or the French VBL. Some countries are going as far as putting sensors on motorcycles or all-terrain vehicles. See the Infantry chapter for various types of these vehicles are available.

Since reconnaissance forces often operate far away from other friendly units, they need to defend themselves. Some countries have developed vehicles for such purpose with enough firepower, but still can complete the reconnaissance requirements. Examples include the British Saladin Armored Car and the Austrian Pandur Fire Support Vehicle. The main guns on thse vehicles can range from 57 mm to 105 mm on the South African Rooikat. These vehicles are often modified versions of a basic IFV, APC, or other armored vehicle modified to make the vehicle most suitable for reconnaissance vehicles. Some of the more common reconnaissance vehicles are on the following data sheets.

Sensor Technologies for Tactical Ground Forces

Chapter 1 Magellan Blazer 12 Commercial Handheld GPS Device.png

Reconnaissance units use a mixture of high and low technologies. As noted in TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics, forces may perform tactical reconnaissance using designated reconnaissance units/soldiers or maneuver unit soldiers. Sensors span an increasing wider segments of the electromagnetic spectrum while integration C2, navigation systems, data processing, and fusing technologies. Developers offer more compact packages, platforms, sensor integration, and mobility systems for greater situational awareness, better operational security, and shorter response time than ever before.

Reconnaissance starts with location and navigation. Instruments include survey instruments (i.e, Bulgarian PAB-2A theodolite), aiming circles or goniometers, GPS receivers, maps, compasses, terrain data, and inertial guidance systems. Commercial equipment such as the Magellan handheld GPS units are sufficient for most forces. Other more advance equipment such as navigation data for laser rangefinders (LRF) and improved communications with digital interface ensure precise navigation.

The primary battlefield sensor is still the human eye, but human vision receives much help. Weapons sights are often used. See the Infantry chapter for day and night weapon sights. Almost all reconnaissance forces use optics such as sights, binoculars, or telescopes to increase viewing capacity. Most of these sights operate in the visual light (0.4-0.75 µm) electro-magnetic  (EM) spectrum.  Binoculars  can vary  in  features and

magnifications and usually zoom from 7-12 (x) power. For longer-range day acquisition, the OPFOR uses spotting telescopes (Celestron and Swarovski models) with 60 x zoom capability. Other features could include anti-fogging lens coatings, camouflage netting, tripods for better stability or binocular periscopes (German RWDL) for covert viewing.

Night-time observation systems which operate in the visual band spectrum are all daylight observation systems similar to the human eye and therefore require visual light illumination to see. The Infantry chapter discusses the capability of using starlight, moonlight, or street lights to enable the average soldier to see greater distances. Illumination support equipment includes spotlights, flashlights, or pyrotechnics (grenades, illumination rounds) to bring light to dark spaces. Specialized devices are available, such as the Universal Tactical Light, which can be mounted on weapons and is located near the weapon’s trigger. Fires or other improvised lighting offer illumination support. To ensure operational security, the OPFOR will usually not use artificial illumination until the fire fight is underway.

Chapter 1 Universal Tactical Light mounted on a pistol.png

Reconnaissance personnel on today’s battlefields have increased their use electro-optical (EO) systems to convert an image into a digital electronic signal that is sent to a display circuit (i.e., photocathode tube or micro-channel plate) for viewing. While optical zoom lens are still critical, EO cameras require almost no focal length or mirrors reducing their size and bulk. Polymers and composite material produce ergonomic devices that are easier to hold with image processing/transmission capabilities for rapid exploitation and dissemination. Zoom capacity can reach 84 x or more allows rapid detection at 10 km or more in distance for selected targets. Day and night EO technologies include TV cameras can convert video imagery into an RF signal to transmit it to a receiver/display unit. Tripod-mounted or aircraft sensor pods can acquire targets at 10-30+ km in distance. Larger systems allows vehicles and aircraft to mount sensors with even longer ranges, better resolutions, and longer transmission ranges.

Light Band Alternate Name Microns Technologies
Ultraviolet UV/Black Light 0.01 – 0.40 Mercury Arc
Visible Light Daylight 0.40 – 0.75 Eye, Optics, TV, Charged- Coupled Device (CCD)
Near Infrared NIR 0.75 – 1.30 CCD, Image Intensifiers (II), Active IR
Shore-Wavelength IR 1.30 – 3.00 Active IR
Mid-Infrared Mid-Wavelength IR 3.00 – 6.00 Thermal
Far Infrared Long-Wavelength IR 6.00 – 15.00 Thermal/Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)
Chapter 1 Charged-Coupled Device (CCD).png

All night-time observation systems that operate outside of the visual spectrum are EO systems. CCD offers some capability during dawn and dusk and periods of adverse weather that create low light levels. Sub-component improvements offer night vision devices that are clearer, more compact, more resistant to glare, require less power, more time between service, with new features including laser pointers, better zoom, greater magnification, or electronic zoom capability. Commercial grade viewers offer affordable alternatives to military systems. Electronic zoom (EZ) can expand images to multiply the optical zoom by a factor of 3-8 x resulting in magnification of 60-100+ x in affordable systems. This doubles or triples the acquisition range, but could reduce image clarity in the highest EZ modes.

One inexpensive digital technology is the charged-coupled device (CCD) used in many video camcorders and some cameras operate in the near IR

(0.75 – 1.3 µm) band. These CCDs generally lack ability to see in absolute darkness, but most (Bushnell Night- Hawk) offer superior day vision, video capability, and can be used in “low-light-level” (LLL) conditions. There are some 20-80 x CCD binoculars claim a day acquisition range of 10 km (8 km for man-sized targets).

The following table notes the evolution and variety of viewing sensors meld EO with other technologies used by reconnaissance as well as other ground force units.

Surveillance and Observation Added Technology Weapons Target Acquisition
Binoculars Theodolites


Optics (Lenses and Reticles) Day Sights (Telescopes & Collimators)
Day/Night Viewers Digital Cameras Video Recorders Electro-Optics Day Sights Night Sights
Laser Rangefinders (LRF) Laser Technology Laser Aiming Sights & Pointers
Laser Illuminators “Radars” FCS Optical Augmentation
Digital Survey Sets Navigation/Unit Location

(GPS, Computer, LRF, Goniometer)

LRF Fire Control Systems


Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV)

Rocket Motor/Airframe Fiber-Optic Guided Missiles Attack UAVs

Laser-Homing Missiles

Micro-UAV; Canister Launch UAV Artillery/Rocket Launch UAV

TV Recon Grenades, Projectiles, or Rounds

Artillery/Grenade/Canister Launcher Attack UAVs

Laser-Homing Munitions, Rockets Laser Target Designators

Unattended Ground Sensors (Cameras)

Multi-Sensor Pods (Vehicles/UGS) Passive IR (Autotracker) Alerters

Remote Cameras/Acoustics (Motor Drive Actuator/Controls) Side-Attack Mine Sensor Units

Unattended Anti-Tank Grenade Launchers (ATGL) Sensors

Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) Robotic Cameras (Robotic Chassis) UGVs with guns, ATGLs, or ATGMs Robotic Mines
Chapter 1 Night Vision Goggles.png

Night Infrared Viewers operate in the 0.75 – 2.00 µm band employ active light sources such as IR spotlights and this technology is easily detectible by adversaries with night vision systems. Therefore, the use of this technology has declined as the passive mode range is limited creating limited practical value. Passive night technology such as II can be found in the Infantry chapter. This technology is now in its 3rd generation, but some companies are claiming a 4th generation technology. This technology continues to expand due

to requirements from hunters, police, and the military. Night vision goggles (NVGs), such as the Malaysian NG-30, allows for hands-free operations such as for driving with many affordable ($200+) for the Nighthawk. The cheaper NVGs, however, may not offer as many features as those designed specifically for the military. Some cameras fuse II and CCD together for effective and affordable day/night use. Many night scopes, night views, and NVGs are not weapon’s sights, but can be used to improve accurate firing. These devices can be used to detect targets or queue new targets for weapons. An assistant with an NVG could use a visual light pointer to designate targets for the weapons operator to engage.

A newer night vision technology called thermal imagery (TI) is now challenging II in popularity as it surpasses the former in range and resolution. TI can “see” any object with temperature different than the background objects so TI can operate in absolute darkness. TI, however, does possess some limitations.

  • Shapes are sometimes converted into images not readily recognized based on the human’s visual frame of reference.
  • At certain times of the day, the temperature changes may alter shapes or render objects invisible.
  • Lack of heat from selected targets means the TI may not see objects in the foreground or background, which helps to provide contrast and context to the observer.
  • Generally TI are bulkier than II and require bulky and noisy coolant bottles or power supplies.
  • TI sensors are usually more expensive than II sensors.
Chapter 1 Handheld Thermal Imager.png

TI does offer several significant advantages as TI is particularly sensitive to temperatures of warm-blooded animals, vehicle engines, solar-heated metal surfaces, and running gear from moving vehicles. Even after a vehicle stops, the residual engine heat renders a clear TI image for an hour or more. Second, TI usually provides faster and easier detection than II. Many TI systems use cameras operating in the mid-IR band (3.00 – 6.00 µm) with ranges up to 2 to 3 km. FLIR, operating in the far-IR (6.00 – 15.00 µm) band, offers superior clarity and range (3-4 km) for most applications making it the preferred technology. Due to increased production and competition, the cost has declined so TI is affordable for priority weapons such as ATGM launchers, tanks, and IFV. In Tier 1 and Tier 2 forces, TI is commonly used in reconnaissance vehicles.

Chapter 1 Shakhin Thermal Imaging Scope.png

Over the years, TI has improved so it can be categorized by generation like II. The current proliferation of mercury- cadmium-telluride and SPRITE detector staring arrays increased ranges to 5+ km while improving the discrimination of the images. A recent development is the uncooled TI

that eliminates the bulky coolant bottle. An even more recent 3rd generation system combines II and FLIR to fuse them into one clear image. Reduction in the size of parts including microcircuits and imagers have produced portable TI viewing systems. In Tier 1 and 2 reconnaissance units and selected other units, key sensors and dismounted personnel will possess Sophie thermal binoculars with the II/FLIR upgrade. Some reconnaissance units may employ ATGM thermal sights for battlefield surveillance. The larger the system, the longer range and better clarity of most IR systems.

The     miniaturization     of    camera     technologies     through CMOS

(complementary metal-oxide semi-conductor) transistors and the spread of commercial products offer fertile ground for new military reconnaissance applications. EO systems, such as the Bushnell Nighthawk CCD Viewer and Digital Imaging System 22 x 60 spotter scope offers video output could be transmitted to computers or goniometer systems. These cameras allow remote viewing options. “Nanny-cams” such as the XCam2 or British Spy Vision can monitor close-in areas such as urban streets and then transmit the images. Tactical applications could include hand-thrown cameras such as the Macroswiss. Other off-the-shelf technology such as digital cameras, camera cell phones, and binocular CCD imagers possess military applications.

Chapter 1 Leica Vector Laser Rangefinder (LRF).png

Lasers are important for measurement, location, and target acquisition. The most important of these is the laser rangefinder or LRF. The LRF is used to measure distances to targets, surveying, or self-location—all important in firing both direct and indirect fire weapons. Many fire control systems on crew-served weapons or on combat vehicles include  an in-viewer  LRF that provides  data into the  FCS computer for target acquisition. Dismounted

soldiers can used a hand-held LRF as as the Leica Vector or Aselan LH-7800 binoculars can precisely measure ranges out to 10 km. Some binocular LRFs, such as the Eloptro LH-40C and Russian 1D18, can range targets to 20 km limited only by line-of-sight and the subject’s size. Some of these hand-held systems such as the Bushnell Lytespeed with a 1 km range cost less than


One of the biggest benefits of lasers integrated into EO systems is increased responsiveness as the optics, EO, acoustics, radars, and other sensors can provide accurate location without the need for a second azimuth to solve an intersection problem. The time required to obtain the second azimuth could allow the target to escape if they are moving. Targets can be precisely located and engaged with only one azimuth, a laser snap, and a simple ballistic computer.

The goniometer uses LRF technology and is similar to the old aiming circles used in artillery and mortar units to fire indirect fire. The goniometer surveys itself  into  position  on  a  tripod  base with an azimuth viewer. Most

goniometers are illuminated for night-time use, carry a GPS mount, and a simple computer (or programmable calculator) to determine self-location, directions, and elevations/deflections. Some goniometers are linked to a digital transmission system or have one built right into the system. A binocular LRF could be mounted on top to sight and range objects, targets, and registration points. Night sights can be added for 24-hour operations. The system can be referred to as a goniometer system, a fire control system (Vetronix Mortar FCS-MORFIRE), a forward observer system or FOS (OIP Delft), an observation station (Leica Digital), a targeting system (Sure Strike), or other names. The modern goniometer-based LRF FOS for the OPFOR is the SG12 with GPS, Leica 21 LRF with 12 km range, thermal night sight, computer interface, and digital data transfer. The entire time to emplace the system is under two minutes.

Chapter 1 Aiming Circle.png

An aiming circle can be used for similar purposes with the same accuracy, but only when all of the separate components (LRF, GPS, computer, digital transmission system) are present. Often, a goniometer-based system can be more responsive, move more quickly, and produce greater accuracy than an aiming circle. Any OPFOR aiming circle should be regarded as the base for an observation system. Most dismounted forces worldwide will use an aiming circle or goniometer-based system. Due to its size and ability to be broken down, the goniometer system is portable and easily carried almost anywhere on the battlefield. In the past, 100 meters was considered accurate. With the new systems, accuracy is now one to five meters creating the ability to call in precise fire against a target.

Multi-sensor suites fuse together a variety of recent technologies to create sensors that integrate day/night detection, location, and target acquisition. Most suites are found on vehicles, but suites can be created by dismounted personnel in observation posts (OP) linking the various systems together. The Eloptro LH-40C LRF can link GPS with a computer link for the viewer image to determine range,

bearing, and elevation before sending the data through a digital transmission. The LH-40C does not need a goniometer base for precise target location.

Chapter 1 French DHY-307 Laser Target Designator (LTD).png

The laser target designator (LTD) is the next step in laser evolution. The LTD can guide semi-active homing bombs, artillery, naval gun rounds, mortar projectiles, rockets, and ATGMs directly onto their target. The seeker on the munitions directs the round onto the “laser splash” aimed on the target. Some LTDs, such as the Russian 1D26, can be carried by a single operator. Most LTDs include a tripod mount with other sub-assemblies such as a built-in LRF or night sight, for easy carrying by a team of two to three soldiers. It is likely that as technology increases, lighter materials will be used to create LTDs making them lighter weight and more easily carried for use by dismounted units. There have even been laser-homing grenades developed for squad ATGLs for well over a decade.

In some LTD-based FCS such as the French DHY-307, the LTD replaces the goniometer for an OP. The LTD FCS may contain such features as an encoded beam to ensure only one hit per target, counter-measures against the enemy looking for lasers, GPS, night sights, and the other sub-components found in a goniometer- based FCS. Most laser munitions can be used with most LTDs. Tier 1 and 2 OPFOR observers will operate the DHY-307 with a designation range of 10 km instead of goniometer-based system. OPFOR recon and AT observers possess the ability to call in laser rounds through man-portable LTDs with a night range out to 5 km with an accuracy of 1 m.

Chapter 1 PEQ-15 Laser Aimer.png

The laser aimer as discussed in the Infantry chapter or laser pointer are used by ground units to shoot direct fire weapons or point out targets to other personnel. The pointers, however, emit light and offer a risk of exposure to a prepared adversary. Thus, the pointers are only used when the fire fight

begins when the using unit possesses fire superiority.

A recent laser technology is the laser locator (also known as the “laser radar” or LADAR or when linked into a weapons fire control system as “optical augmentation) that uses light detection and ranging (LIDAR) to

Chapter 1 Leica HDS-3000 LIDAR.png

detect and measure ranges. LIDAR can operate in the active or passive mode. In the active mode, it employs a laser to scan in the observed sector, scanning in a band pattern similar to radar. The aligned IR viewer then looks for IR light generated by laser light reflected by optics and sights. Although the LADAR operating in an active mode creates a narrow laser beam, it limits the beam spread beyond the scanned target. Passive use of LADAR is more difficult because it depends on the use of light close to or behind the viewer in the right frequency with sufficient brightness and the right angularity for the viewer to detect down-range reflections. An example

of LADAR is the Mirage 1200 hand-held “lens detector” with a range up to 1200 m. Laser filters on optics can reduce the effectiveness of detection by LADAR. Reconnaissance vehicles and aircraft employ LADARs for day and night imagery.

Chapter 1 Ground Vehicular Laser Locator Designator.png

For many years, reconnaissance units have detected the enemy through the process of “triangulation.” When 2 or more azimuths are obtained from known locations of a particular target, the target’s location can be determined by drawing the lines on the map to determine where the lines intersect. This intersection is the target’s location. The system previously had some limitations as the time delay from receiving the two locations with azimuths could provide faulty information, especially if the target was on the move. Recent technology can exploit this old methodology. Precise self-location with GPS, computers, digital map displays, and digital data links from different sensors can provide the two locations with the azimuths in a matter of seconds, providing both sensors are aimed at the same target.

Acoustic sensors are also found on the battlefield including multi-directional microphones, directional microphones, sound-ranging arrays, vehicle arrays, which intersect azimuths to locate sound sources including guns, helicopters, and combat vehicles. Artillery sound-ranging systems include the Russian AZK-5 and AZK-7, Swedish Soras 6, and the British HALO all use microphones digitally linked to automated processors for rapid calculation of enemy firing locations. Sensitive microphones on various Israeli Helispot systems, including autonomous acoustic vehicles, enable them to detect and locate enemy helicopters in flight. Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) units also use acoustic sensors to determine target locations.

The military continues to find new applications for radar systems, whether they are battlefield surveillance systems mounted on tripods, carriages, weapons, vehicles, aerial platforms, or even trees. New technologies such as miniaturization, millimeter-wave (MMW), improved power supplies, links to laptop computers offer other new applications. Compact radars such as the Fara-1 offer man-portable carrying capability and attachment to weapons, such as automatic grenade launchers (AGL) for fire direction. Slightly larger systems include the Thales Squire two-man radar system with a 24 km operating range that is portable in packs. Tripod-mounted radars such as the Credo-1E can link to digital nets with the ability for easy emplacement or displacement.

The major disadvantage of radar is the system actively emits a signal the enemy can locate through Electronic Warfare (EW) or other systems making the radar vulnerable to attack. Squire is a low probability of intercept (LPI) radar due to its extremely low peak power. Other LIP features include phased array with lower power levels for detectors, reduced side lobes, and operating frequencies outside of most radar intercept system bandwidths. The most common frequency bands for land radar systems have been the I and J bands. In recent years, new radar technologies have been field to add LIP features to reduce intercept vulnerability. Airborne radar such as Horizon use moving target indicator (MTI) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and Doppler processing with secure stand- off for missions. MMW radars (30+ GHz) offer precise acquisition and fire control, compact size antennas, and lower signal detectability.

Two other technology trends are on the rise—remote sensors and robotic sensors. Remote sensors are generally immobile, although they may be able to change their field of view in order to see as required. A simple remote sensor is a side-attack mine, such as an anti-tank disposable grenade launcher placed along an expected advance for vehicles and linked to an autonomous acoustic sensor unit, such as AJAC. As the enemy approaches, usually along a road, the device will launch a grenade, thus audibly signaling the vehicle’s approach. Robotic sensors can relocate to perform their mission. Civilian applications have led to a wide variety of remote cameras, remote actuators on robotic systems, and the use with unattended ground sensors including acoustic, IR, seismic, tripwire-

electronic, and magnetic. Key technology constraints include detectability shortfalls, power supply and battery limitations, and signal transmission inadequacies, but the issues are in the process of being resolved. Use of fused sensors means more accurate, timely, and complete reports. Rechargeable batteries, acoustic.IR wake-up, miniaturization, and increased sensor sensitivity all make the use of remote sensors and sensor suites practical as well as marketable.

The British Radamec 1000L system is an example of a remote camera with limited operator presence to detect targets. Other applications include cameras tethered from concealed vehicles and operated through the vehicle power system. New technologies include passive IR scanning cameras with auto-track and alert algorithms such as the French Sirene or British ADAD IR units emplaced on the battlefield to link into sensor nets and monitor sensitive avenues of approach and unit flanks. Early systems include air defense sensors such as ADA, Sirene, or the hand-held Swedish IRS-700. A tethered aerostat balloon can hold a remote camera platform to increase surveillance beyond the line-of-sight. The Israeli TAOS system uses a gimbaled, stabilized, multi-sensor platform with a CCD and thermal camera for day or night use. Radar and laser illuminator applications are optional with the ground station mounted on a trailer. Ground forces are also adapting commercial camera network technologies to create a surveillance camera network that can monitor wide areas on the battlefield. These systems include the CELTICS, TACS, and Gamma 2000—all produced by Israel.

Chapter 1 Robot with Camera.png

The use of an unattended ground sensor (UGS) by the US dates back to the Vietnam War where the UGS units were placed to detect enemy presence and movement. Some of these sensors were “break-wire” that generated a signal when broken. While the most common UGS is acoustic, other UGS units can monitor seismic, magnetic, infrared, or RF activity. Some UGS units can sleep to save energy and the size can vary from a few centimeters to a few inches in size. Relay systems may be required to forward the signal to the monitoring station. By analyzing the location and pattern of signals, the operator is cued to initiate additional battlefield surveillance activities in selected areas. Examples of UGS units include the Thales Miniature Intrusion Sensor (MIS) and Rafael. Current technology reduces false alarms such as from animals wandering in the area. Emplacement is important as if placed in too open of an area, the UGS can be seen. If placed in an urban or defilade position, the signal may not reach the monitoring station. Larger UGS units may be placed at road junctions, river crossing sites, and other important locations. Examples of the larger UGS units include the ATE UGS, Steel Eagle, Gateway, and Boden- Sensor-Ausstattung (BSA). The Thales CLASSIC 200 has been sold t over 39 countries for military, border control, police, and commercial purposes with a complete network with monitor, acoustic, cameras, and other sensors. Possible roles for the UGS include perimeter protection, route monitoring, and point surveillance. Emerging UGS technologies include linking to other sensors, mine activation, remote weapons system operation, and autonomous cueing to conduct precision targeting. A subset of the UGS is the remotely-delivered sensor that delivers reconnaissance rounds through a weapons system such as artillery or mortars. These rounds, once fired and activated, can provide target location, acquisition, and post-mission battle damage assessment. Cameras provide a low-cost method to obtain immediate view beyond the line-of-sight, over the hill, or behind the foliage, with a reduced risk of being seen. The Israeli IMI recently debuted a Refaim rifle grenade containing a camera that can transmit pictures back to the launching unit as the round descended on its target. A 40-mm under-barrel rifle grenade launcher can fire the Israeli Firefly that transmits video and sound back to a digital radio and laptop computer. In addition to their anti-tank role, fiber-optic ATGMs can use their camera to provide video footage for analysis by reconnaissance units.

Robotic sensors consist of single or multiple sensors mounted on robots or unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) chassis. Previous applications include the exploration of the ocean floor, other planets, and inaccessible areas

such as caves or volcanoes. The police often uses a robotic sensor for surveillance in hostile situations as well as examining contamination areas such as the Chernobyl nuclear plant. A military version is the tracked Matilda with a day TV camera used in Afghan caves, clearing minefields, and checking for potential IEDs. The OPFOR can use robotic sensors for surveillance and patrols in urban or open terrain to reduce troop vulnerability. A simple application is to use robots controlled from reconnaissance vehicles or nearby personnel. A robotic chassis features EO viewers for guidance and surveillance, such as a TV camera with an RF or cable link; GPS in-view readouts; a thermal or II night channel; and LRF. A robot can carry other sensors including acoustic microphones, NBC samples, radar, or weapons. Other robotic examples include the British tracked Wheelbarrow mine detection system or the Giant Viper wheeled line charge launcher vehicle that tows its own charge trailer. The German company, Telerob, produces tracked robots for industrial, police, and military applications. The Russian SPC robot can employ a number of sensors.

Chapter 1 American RQ-11 Man-Portable UAV.png

The earliest robotic sensors on the modern battlefield were unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). See Volume 2 for additional information on UAVs. UAVs can perform pre-programmed (drone) or operator control (remotely piloted vehicle—RPV) missions. The on-board TV camera and its ability to transmit the images to a ground station are the core of the UAV mission. In the last few years, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) have appeared to attack located targets. A UAV ground station can consist of only a notebook computer or PDA as a terminal. Due to the high cost of airplanes and the training required to become a proficient pilot, UAVs are an excellent way to work through budget constraints and lack of an efficient manned air force. Recent or expanded technology for UAVs include the following:

  • Man-portable UAVs are light weight and can be carried in a backpack and launched by hand such as the German Carolo, Russian Pustelga, or French K100.
  • Micro-aerial Vehicles (MAV) use radio-control (RC) model plane technology where some of these are not larger than a man’s hand.
  • Improvised UAVs using RC aircraft.
  • Vehicle/robotic launch UAVs including canister launchers such as the Israeli Skylite UAV or the UAV the French are looking for their next LeClerc tank upgrade.
  • Weapons-launched UAVs such as the Russian R-90 300- mm launched by the 9A152-2 MRL can loiter for 30 minutes while transmitting imagery to an artillery command and reconnaissance vehicle (ACRV).
  • LTD UAV where the UAV substitutes as the laser designated in lieu of a soldier or vehicle.

Battlefield monitoring systems require the use of cable links or RF data transmission equipment, and display arrays such as those found in vehicles modified into ground stations. These systems can fuse various technologies, including commercial equipment, together to obtain the best situational awareness possible for the user.

Technology limitations will continue to challenge reconnaissance operations, but solutions will be found. Commercial applications will continue to cross over into the military as forces with limited budgets will continue to use off-the-shelf technology for military purposes. The OPFOR will supplement new technology with low technology to conduct their reconnaissance operations. Innovative military forces can use niche technologies and aggressive manned reconnaissance units to conduct battlefield surveillance operations. The battlefield surveillance networks will consist of personnel, organic sensors, vehicles, UGS, remote sensors, UAVs and any other reconnaissance assets available. Effective equipment, sound organization and planning, commitment to the OE variables, and effective reconnaissance tactics can enable the OFPRO to gain greater situational awareness within their operational area, and to challenge enemy capabilities to achieve tactical surprise.

Chapter 2: Infantry Weapons

Chapter 2 provides the basic characteristics of selected infantry weapons either in use or readily available to the OPFOR and therefore likely to be encountered by US forces in varying levels of conflict.

The chapter is divided into two categoriessmall arms and recoilless weapons. Small arms covers, in order, assault and battle rifles, sniper/anti-material rifles, automatic grenade launchers, under-barrel and hand held grenade launchers, light machineguns, general-purpose machineguns, and heavy machineguns. The second category, recoilless weapons, contains the most proliferated disposable launcher rocket propelled grenades and reloadable launcher RPGs and recoilless rifles.  While originally limited to shoulder-fired unguided antitank weapons such as the Russian 40-mm Antitank Grenade Launcher RPG-7V, the utility of shoulder-fired weapons has expanded to include multi-purpose systems such as the Swedish 84-mm Recoilless Rifle Carl Gustaf M2, and many other systems. This field of weapons is often labeled “antitank” and also includes “bunker-buster” warheads, and weapons which can be fired from within confined spaces such as the German 67-mm Disposable Antitank Grenade Launcher (Armbrust) due to no or minimal back blasts. New, disposable launcher Tier 1 anti-armor systems such as the RPG-28, 32 and 30 have also been added. The RPG-30, in particular, is designed to defeat both Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) and Active Protective Systems (APS) via a sub-caliber device that upon firing reaches the target milli-seconds before the main 105mm HEAT tandem warhead rocket. The RPG 28 is a heavy, 125mm tandem warhead weapon that will penetrate in excess of 1000mm of rolled, homogenous armor (RHG), after defeating ERA. Both are formidable anti-armor systems, which can be easily employed by the individual Soldier or insurgent.

An enduring battle-tested, lethal, shoulder-fired weapon is the Russian Infantry Rocket Flame Weapon RPO-A Series (RPO-A/D/Z) capable of firing either a smoke, incendiary, or a thermobaric warhead to 600 meters. At 200 meters it is accurate to 0.5 m2. The thermobaric warhead has a blast effect corresponding to a round of 122-mm HE artillery. Due to the relative low cost, availability, versatility, transportability, trainability, and lethality of this category of infantry weapons, trainers should expect to encounter these systems in larger numbers with increasing levels of lethality, penetration, and utility.

Updates and changes also include the following:  the SMLE and Moisan-Nagant bolt action rifles have been deleted from the WEG.  The Heckler and Koch G3 and Fabrique Nationale FN battle rifles have been added due to their proliferation throughout parts of Africa, South America, and the Indian sub-continent.  Additionally, the Chinese bull pup assault rifle QBZ-95 has been added along with the Russian Federation’s SV-98 sniper rifle.

Crew-served infantry weapons which require a vehicle, or which limit mobility, have been moved to the Antitank and Anti-Armor chapter (6).

Chapter 3: Infantry Vehicles

Infantry vehicles include all military vehicles designed for use by infantry and other tactical units. They vary from unarmored multi-role vehicles to specialized armored vehicles. Mechanized infantry units often use light armored fighting vehicles (LAFV) designed as infantry squad carriers. Infantry units use large numbers of vehicles, armored and unarmored, for support missions. Due to budgetary constraints, some forces also use commercial vehicles or military vehicles considered obsolete by other militaries. The US Army will likely encounter infantry forces with a mix of older, newer, and upgraded infantry vehicles in their next battle.

Vehicle Classification: The infantry can use LAFVs, multi-purpose support vehicles, specialized vehicles or commercial vehicles to transport soldiers. In wartime, the OPFOR will use all systems available to execute the mission. This chapter is divided into three sections: armored infantry carriers, fire support vehicles (FSV), and combat support vehicles (CSV).

Armored infantry carriers, also known as armored fighting vehicles (AFV) are normally divided into two types: armored personnel carriers (APC) and infantry fighting vehicles (IFV). In both types, a small crew of two or three soldiers stay with the AFV while a dismount team of five or more soldiers can conduct missions on foot. Normally, most AFVs carry a total of ten soldiers, but some AFVs can carry more while others less. The difference between the APC and the IFV is the APC is a “battle taxi” that dismounts the soldiers outside of direct fire range while the IFV is designed to fight with soldiers onboard to and through the objective. To qualify as an IFV, the vehicle must be able to carry a team or squad; contain enough armor to protect the occupants from light machine guns; feature a medium cannon or automatic grenade launcher (AGL) that can defeat enemy armor vehicles; shoot on the move; possess the mobility to stay with tanks while traveling on roads or across country. Many manufacturers call their vehicles various names to make them sound like an IFV, but are not. The addition of a medium cannon to an APC does not make it an AFV unless it possesses the other characteristics. Some AFVs may be dropped from the air to be used by paratroopers on the ground. Some sources will describe a vehicle as a medium armored vehicle (MAV) or a heavy armored vehicle (HAV). The term MAV will not be used in this chapter and HAVs are often AFVs built on the same track system as a tank so they can stay up with the armor. The term heavy infantry fighting vehicle (HIFV) or heavy armored personnel carrier (HAPC) refers to the vehicles protection capability, not the vehicle’s weight. For information on HAVs mounted with some type of cannon, see Chapter 4.

AFVs normally are differentiated based on three categories: mobility, survivability, and lethality. Some AFVs travel on wheels while others travel on tracks. While not a necessity, most IFVs operate on tracks in order to travel the same terrain as tanks as the tracks more evenly distribute the vehicle’s weight. Wheeled vehicles are more likely to succumb to mobility kills than tracked vehicles as tires are susceptible to punctures. Two flat tires on the same side of the vehicle may bring the vehicle to a complete stop. Survivability is the ability of the vehicle to protect its occupants and remain operational. Survivability is based on the vehicle’s armor thickness, type (modern such as reactive armor), and style (slope). Adding armor to an AFV may reduce its mobility and creates a dilemma between survivability versus mobility. Lethality is based upon the AFV’s weapon systems and the weapons’ ability to penetrate other vehicles’ armor. Increasing the size of a main gun on a vehicle, however, often reduces its mobility. Some AFVs may feature a turret, 1-man or 2-man, but others will not. AFVs often operate auxiliary weapons such as coaxial mounted machine guns (fire in the same direction as the main gun), turret-mounted machine guns, AD machine guns, or an AGL.

Many infantry units also field FSVs featuring air defense (AD), anti-tank (AT) weapons, or mortars to guard their formations against aerial or armor threats. These vehicles may be used by chemical detection teams, field artillery forward observer teams, or Many of the AT systems are discussed in Chapter 5. The OPFOR may use civilian four-wheeled drive vehicles, sport utility vehicles, or commercial vans adapted for military roles. This chapter has been reordered to put vehicles with similar characteristics together.

Selection Matrix for Infantry Carriers in a Military Force: Facts which impact the selection of the right vehicle for use in a military force may vary based on budget constraints, industrial base limitations, or political-military-industrial alliances. The following table offers engineering and employment considerations for use in selecting vehicles. An OPFOR squad is 9 to 10 personnel, counting the vehicle crew. Team size is 3 to 4, counting the vehicle crew. Infantry in this context includes SOF, insurgents, criminals and any other maneuver forces.

Factor Tracked IFV Wheeled IFV Tracked APC Wheeled APC Light Wheeled APC Armored Tactical Utility Vehicle Light Strike Vehicle
Role Fight with Squad onboard/ dismount; provide lethal fires Fight with Squad onboard/ dismount; provide lethal fires Carry Squad to dismount point; give covering fire Carry Squad to dismount point; give covering fire Carry Squad to dismount point; provide fire protection Team carrier and multi-role functions; fire protection Team carrier and multi-role functions; fire protection
Costs (1-10

with 10

being high)

9 to 10 8 to 10 3 to 5 4 to 7 1 to 3 1 to 3 1 to 3
Weight (mt) @ 20 to 35 @ 20 to 25 @ 11 to 13 @ 10 to 15 @ 6 to 8 @ 4 @ 1.5
Time Deploy & Movement Fast dash; slow over distance Slow dash; fast over distance Fast dash, slow over distance Medium dash; fast over distance Medium dash; fast over distance Medium dash; fast over distance Fast dash; fast over distance
Terrain Good off- road; most swim Poor off- road; some swim Good off- road; all swim Fair off- road; all swim Medium off-road; most swim Good off- road; most swim/high ford Good off- road; most high ford
Threat to Vehicle (Frontal Protection) Aircraft, AFV, AT

weapon, mine/IED, artillery, flame, some obstacles

20 mm rd

Same as left; 5.56+mm

MG to tires, obstacles

14.5 mm rd

Same as left; some obstacles

12.7 mm rd

Same as left; 5.56+ mm MG to tires; many obstacles

12.7 mm rd

Same as left, some obstacles

7.62 mm rd

Same as left; a few obstacles

7.62 mm rd

Same as left; almost no obstacles

5.56 mm rd

Targets for On-Board Weapons All targets; 30-mm gun; ATGM; AGL; MG All targets; 30-mm gun; ATGM; AGL; MG Aircraft; LAV; 12.7

to 30 mm gun; MG; personnel

Aircraft; LAV; 12.7

to 30 mm gun; MG; personnel

Aircraft; LAV; 12.7

gun; MG; personnel

Aircraft; LAV; 7.62

to 12.7 gun; MG; personnel

Aircraft; LAV; 7.62

to 12.7 gun; MG; personnel

Support Required High fuel use; load limits for


Medium fuel use; load limits

for aircraft

Low fuel use; most aircraft


Low fuel use; most aircraft


Low fuel use; most aircraft


Low fuel use; most aircraft


Low fuel use; most aircraft


Social Impact Road size; noise; maneuver


Road size; block traffic if


Road size; road noise Road size; block traffic if


No major No major No major
Example BMP-2M BTR-90M Type 85 BTR-80A Otokar Cobra VBL Spider

Chapter 4: Main Battle Tanks

This chapter  contains  a representative  open  source sample  of  main battle  tanks  (MBTs) in regions

covered by US combatant commands. This MBT selection is not comprehensive; however, the capabilities of vintage and modern tanks are significant indicators of organizational capabilities that adversaries can array against the United States.

A unit commander, scenario developer, curriculum developer, and/or other leader can use the WEG to configure a required level of Threat capability in an opposing force (OPFOR) as described in US Amy Regulation 350-2, Operational Environment and Opposing Force Program (2015). Practical application includes U.S. Army training, professional education, and leader development. The spectrum of WEG characteristics is descriptive―not prescriptive―and facilitates creating robust, realistic, and relevant Threat conditions in U.S. Army learning and capabilities development (CD) initiatives.

Many modern MBTs have a four-person crew of tank commander, gunner, loader, and driver. When an autoloader is part of the main gun system, the MBT has a three-person crew of tank commander, gunner-loader, and driver. Most modern MBTs mount a 105-mm to 125-mm main smoothbore gun, although limited types of MBT mount a rifled gun rather than smoothbore gun. Some MBT also have the capability to launch antitank guided missiles from their gun. Most tanks can typically stow at least 40 main gun rounds in the tank. Those tanks with an autoloader allow for immediate automatic loading of about half of the on-board ammunition.

As an integrated system of systems, evaluation of a main battle tank [some professional descriptions compare and contrast tanks as medium tank or main battle tank based on tonnage] analyzes efficiency and effectiveness from a holistic perspective. Capability and vulnerability can be evaluated in several ways depending on context and intended purpose. The WEG descriptions employ three functional categories of major subsystems to gauge overall MBT effectiveness:

  • Mobility.
  • Survivability.
  • Lethality.

Mobility considers the relationship between improved automotive performance efficiency and the combat-load weight of a MBT. Vehicle fuel cell capacity and the type of terrain traversed affect expected norms for cruising range. MBT with on-board fuel cells can typically run for distances between 450 and 600 kilometers (km). Diesel is the norm for engine fuel among modern MBT; however; some tanks have a multi-fuel engine which can run on kerosene, diesel, and/or specific types of benzene. Vehicles with an auxiliary power unit (APU) improve MBT fuel economy during temporary halts or operating in stationary positions. Improved diagnostic upgrades alert the crew for corrective actions needed to sustain availability of an MBT subsystems.

Vehicle weight for an MBT can range from 40 to 70 tons. Several tanks described at times as medium tanks are included in this sample as main battle tanks. For example, the T90A is approximately 47 tons, the Leopard 2A6 is approximately 55 tons, and the Challenger 2 approaches 70 tons. Improvements to suspension systems, transmissions, and tracks complement automotive performance. Upgrading systems with modular components reduces inoperative time for repair and maintenance.

Survivability combines functional improvements to composite or spaced tank hull armor that include mine-protection appliqué, active-reactive and/or passive appliqué armor for the turret, glacis, flanks, and rear, and various forms of stand-off caging or mesh screens that degrade the effect of antitank weapon hits and armor penetration. Appliqué armor and explosive reactive armor (ERA), now a norm  for improving protection, substantially increases vehicle weight.

Camouflage systems include methods for reducing detection by optical, infrared, and radar  technologies. On-board sensors can include mine detection and laser or radar acquisition warning receivers that automatically activate MBT defense and/or interception systems. Some MBTs mount  television cameras for crew 360-degree visual awareness of near surroundings and enhance local security.

A pressurized nuclear-chemical-biological (NBC) system provides crew protection in upgraded tanks for the modern NBC-contaminated battlefield. Air conditioning in some MBTs enhance systems readiness and sustainment of crew readiness in heat-extreme climates.

Other survivability enhancements can include entrenching blades for MBT self-emplacement in defensive positions, mine-clearing plows and rollers, vehicle smoke emission systems, and aerosol or smoke-obscurant grenade launcher systems. Tank survivability considers the context of operating as a combined arms team. Some upgrade suites include an external intercommunication telephone on the MBT’s exterior for coordinating with infantry operating alongside the MBT. Armor and infantry typically operate as a team to optimize the tactical advantages that each element provides the other team member.

Lethality considers more than the main gun and auxiliary weapons systems. In addition to weapon efficiency, lethality is related to the MBT’s ability to acquire and track a target, its weapon system effective engagement range, and crew situational awareness of multiple concurrent targets available for engagement. Improved command and fire control systems can include integrated thermal viewfinders for tank commander and gunner, laser rangefinders, and digital communications. Integrated command and control interconnects a network of sensors, imagery, navigation, and information systems that facilitate situational awareness and tactical understanding of an operational environment (OE).

Upgrades to lethality can include main gun and/or gun-missile capabilities, improved stabilization and fire control systems, and improved ammunition effects. Critical considerations to these upgrades include linking fire-on-the-move capability to MBT stabilization systems, rate of fire, integrated sights, target acquisition ranges, and weapons ranges to include maximum effective and maximum ranges. Lethality incorporates factors relevant to gun sights, gun precision, type of gun mount, and specific round caliber ballistics as components of maximum aimed range and maximum effective range.

Improved main gun munitions addressed in the WEG incorporate ongoing research and development of kinetic energy (KE) rounds with a dart-like penetrator (armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot (APFSDS) and/or high-explosive antitank (HEAT) multi-purpose rounds that use a shaped-charge for armor penetration. The WEG reflects a variety of ammunition capabilities, such as electronically-fuzed rounds for use against helicopters, or canister rounds for use in close combat. HEAT-multipurpose (MP) rounds can also be used against anti-materiel and antipersonnel (AP) targets. In comparing tank-on-  tank main gun ammunition lethality, kinetic energy rounds are more lethal against composite or spaced armor than high-explosive antitank rounds gauged at the same penetration value. Ammunition upgrades are trending toward more efficient propellants with improved effects and armor penetration.

In terminology, ready rounds are stored for easy retrieval either inside the turret or in bustle compartments, to sustain a consistent rate of main gun fire. In listing available ready-rounds in the tank turret, the number of rounds does not typically include the ability to add an additional round in the breach. Stowed rounds are rounds that are either outside the tank's autoloader, or in compartments  that preclude immediate retrieval during a main gun engagement. For an OPFOR MBT, the typical mix of main gun rounds on board a tank is 50% antitank and 50% for use against other targets. The OPFOR ammunition unit basic load and ammunition combat load will vary based on tactical and operational considerations of a particular training, education, or leader development condition.

A heavy machinegun auxiliary weapon in or on the tank turret trends toward a remote-controlled weapon station (RCWS) configuration to provide the ability to fire the weapon while the crewman remains protected inside the turret. Auxiliary weapon mounts often allow high-angle fire for air defense and use in built-up urban areas and/or highly inclined slopes in rural terrain. Armor shielding for the loader’s machinegun, when mounted on the turret, improves protection when the machinegunner is exposed outside a turret hatch.

Summary. Improvements in MBT capabilities are typically upgrade packages rather than new tank models for production. Current evidence underscores increasing fiscal costs for research and development, testing, and production of MBT systems. Visual identification of MBT capabilities is often difficult due to the variance in upgrades to internal systems of an MBT. However, a significant decision  in obvious MBT development is the ongoing field trials of the Russian Federation Armata family of armored chassis vehicles. The T-14 MBT within this modernization initiative provides major improvements to MBT capabilities that were constrained previously due to the vintage T-72 series hull, turret, automotive, and weapon system configurations. Professional observers in the near future will witness if the Russian Federation fields a T-14 fleet as a significant main battle tank adversary.  The principle states with major indigenous tank production industry are analyzing how a fielded T-14 fleet affects their future research and development for MBT upgrade programs to counter such a threat.

The MBT WEG tier tables present examples of state-of-the art to vintage MBTs with capabilities and vulnerabilities based on upgrades to basic tank model functions of mobility, survivability, and lethality. For example, selective main gun capabilities in some models can be augmented with an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) capability to achieve extended range and effects beyond the main gun effective range.

Leaders adapt data in the WEG to tailor an OPFOR with robust, realistic, and relevant Threat conditions for  a challenging environment to U.S. Army learning and capabilities development (CD) initiatives.

Chapter 5: Anti-tank and Anti-Armor Systems

As armored combat vehicles added more protection and ascended in importance on the battlefield, so

did systems designed to stop them gain importance. The umbrella term antitank (AT) originally denoted systems specifically designed to destroy tanks. Today it is more broadly constructed. Modern combat is combined arms combat. Mechanized forces include other armored combat vehicles, such as armored reconnaissance vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, etc. In order to address the whole spectrum of threats on the modern battlefield, new systems are being developed and older systems redesigned. Examples are heavy armament combat vehicles (HACVs) and heavy combat support vehicles.

Tank armor protection continues to increase, but another way to defeat them is to defeat associated systems. Tanks cannot survive or achieve their tactical objectives without support from other armored systems. The more recent term anti-armor may supplant the current term because antitank weapons which cannot penetrate tank armor can still be effective threats to defeat or damage more lightly armored fighting vehicles. With upgrades and innovative tactics, even older, seemingly obsolete weapons can be used as opposing force (OPFOR) anti-armor weapons.

The OPFOR places a high priority on destroying enemy vehicles. It will use all available assets (organic and improvised) for the effort. The spectrum of AT and anti-armor weapons includes aircraft, artillery, NBC assets, sniper rifles, and air defense systems. Many OPFOR countries employ antitank weapons for roles other than antitank, including AT guns against personnel and soft targets, and ATGMs against personnel and rotary-wing aircraft.

Critical factors for destroying vehicles are abilities to slow, canalize, and stop them by engaging them with lethal fires and ambushes. Mines, explosives, IEDs, other obstacle systems, and terrain restrictions can be used in concert with AT weapons.

Antitank guns (AT guns) include towed and self-propelled AT guns (aka SPAT or tank destroyers). A number of guns were designed as field guns, with multi-role capability as both artillery and antitank guns. The modern focus on maneuver warfare has brought a slight decline in development of uniquely antitank guns. Thus, the 85-mm D-44 gun, which can be used as artillery, is effective for use in an antitank role. Although recent systems have been developed, the number fielded has not kept pace with production of armored combat vehicles. Nevertheless, their effectiveness and selected armies' continued reliance on linear positional battles and protracted defenses have kept a large number of these systems in inventories. Based on numbers fielded and likelihood of their threat to US forces, only towed antitank guns were included.

Upgrades for towed guns are available. These include night sights, such as passive image intensifier sights and thermal sights for the Russian 100-mm MT-12. This is a robust antitank weapon with a high rate of fire and rapid mobility. Note the Russian innovation in the MT-12R AT gun with a radar-directed all- weather fire control system. Improved ammunition is critical for continued effectiveness of antitank weapons. The MT-12 and its variants can fire a variety of modern ammunition, including the Russian gun- launched antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), Kastet and Arkan.

The ATGM is the singular greatest threat to tanks today. These systems are distinguished from other antitank weapons in that they are guided to the target. Most employ SACLOS guidance (see Glossary). An operator holds crosshairs on the target, and the missile tracker directs the missile to that point. There are a wide variety of countermeasures (such as smoke and counter-fire, due to long flight time and operator vulnerability) for use against ATGMs. Thus, a 90% probability of hit is a technical figure, and does not mean a 90% probability of success. On the other hand, there are a variety of counter-countermeasures which the ATGMs, launchers, and operators can use to increase the chance for success. Tactics, techniques, and procedures in the antitank arena are critical to mission success.

Armor protection for many modern tanks has outpaced some older AT weapons. However, ATGMs offer improved size, range, and warhead configurations to destroy even the heaviest tanks. Notable trends include increased proliferation and variety of man-portable and portable ATGM launchers. These include shoulder-launched, short-range systems, such as the French Eryx, and copies of former Soviet systems, such as the AT-3/Malyutka ("Suitcase” SAGGER). Some so-called portable launchers (AT-4/5, TOW, and HOT) have outgrown portability weight limits, and must be carried in vehicles and only dismounted short distances from carriers. But newer compact systems are being fielded, e.g., Spike-MR and Kornet-MR.

Although there are special-built ATGM launcher vehicles, the most numerous launcher vehicles are common chassis adapted by adding a pintle mounted, manually loaded and launched ATGM. Adaptation is simple, so they are not described here. Nearly all ATGM launchers are high-level threats to vehicles and rotary-wing aircraft in the US Army. They can also be used against personnel and materiel targets. The variety of launch platforms is increasing. UAVs are being adapted to launch ATGMs for responsive attacks against NLOS/BLOS targets.

Recent trends include new ATGM technologies for increased range and lethality. The most common type of lethality upgrade is the addition of a nose precursor or tandem warhead. Recent options include missiles for wider battlefield lethality—BLOS/NLOS systems, and long-range ATGMs to attack targets previously considered invulnerable. NLOS guidance technologies include fiber optics (to see through the missile eye BLOS) and semi-active laser homing (for dismounted soldier/vehicle/aircraft/UAV-mounted laser target designators to select targets). Others have "fly-over, shoot-down" mode to fly behind a hill and fire an explosive-formed penetrator (EFP, in the shape of a cannon kinetic-energy penetrator round) downward through the relatively soft top of armored vehicles. Improvements include improved guidance, resistance to countermeasures, reduced smoke/noise signatures, and increased range. Night sights are common, including thermal sights. Many countries are looking at active protection system (APS) CM systems. Already, some ATGM have counter-countermeasures to defeat all APS.

The chapter groups systems in order of mobility and unit level, from dismounted or man-portable weapons, to ground-mounted or towed weapons, to tracked or wheeled vehicle-mounted weapons. Weapon systems in this chapter represent likely or possible threats against US Army forces.

Antitank and Anti-Armor Systems:  Key Technology Trends

Military forces worldwide continue to field new anti-armor systems and upgrade legacy systems. Modern tanks can be fitted with increased armor protection, countermeasure systems, and survivability support systems. Thus new antitank systems and upgrades are being fielded to challenge those protection upgrades. Most weapons on the battlefield have some anti-armor capability. A variety of multi-role (MR) weapons have been fielded with lethal AT capability. Similarly, many AT weapons are used to defeat other targets.

System Category Technology Trend System


Recoilless Weapons Electro-Optical LRF fire control system (FCS) with II/thermal sight Precision munitions and missiles for recoilless crewed weapons New munitions (tandem HEAT, longer range, multi-purpose use) Small light launch tubes and disposable canisters to extend length

Rapid disassembly into components for dismount team portability

Simrad  LP101 M40 with LAHAT SPG-9M Rcllss gun RPG-29 Mtd ATGL

M79 Rcllss gun

AT Guns New FCS can include radar-directed fire control

New munitions include homing round and gun-launched ATGMs Auxiliary propulsion units for local moves

Increased protection for AT gun vehicles (see HACVs)

HACVs with similar weapons lethality to tanks

MT-12R AT gun

2S25 AT gun MT-12/MT-12R

Type 63A light tank

2S25 SPAT gun

ATGMs EO/thermal FCS with LRF and encoded beacon to counter jammers Missiles include thermobaric multi-use, improved tandem, top attack New guidance modes extend range for missiles to BLOS and NLOS Back-blast reduction for use in confined spaces

KE missiles/rounds with short time-of-flight to defeat active protection Light man-portable medium-range high-lethality ATGMs

Remote add-on vehicle turrets with EO optics and multi-launchers

Konkurs-M (AT-5B) AT-13

Spike-LR Eryx Starstreak MILAN-ADT


Multi-role Weapons Multi-role systems and munitions in other units to defeat armor Multi-role (AD/AT) missiles for air defense and anti-armor use Multi-role missile vehicles for AD,  AT, and infantry units

Multi-role gun/missile systems and heavy combat support vehicles

Strix IR Mortar rd Starstreak BMP/Kliver


Other AT Weapons Mines and IEDs include remote controlled and scatter mine systems Flame weapons for use against armor and vehicle subsystems Improvised weapons for use against vehicles and personnel

Wide variety of weapons to defeat wheels on armored vehicles

RPO-A grenade Molotov Cocktail PKM machinegun

UMZ Mine scatter

Spectrum of Weapons and Munitions Effective Against Armored Vehicles

Military forces will use a wide variety of weapons to defeat armored systems and degrade their operations. The WEG describes MR weapons in various locations. Common weapons in combat units will engage various targets, including armored vehicles. With emphasis resulting from modern urban combat; demand for improved weapons and munitions against armored vehicles is increasing.

The challenge in defeating modern tanks is extremely difficult, with their high amount of armor protection and high mobility. Antitank subunits/units are found in infantry and armor battalions, brigades, and divisions, and in other combat units as needed. AT units are specially designed to support infantry, armor, and other units in combat, and are often task organized in combined arms groups. With limited armor protection and vulnerability to ground weapons, AT systems do not separate from supported maneuver units. AT unit weapons include the following:

  • Crewed recoilless guns and launchers
  • Towed AT guns
  • HACVs (aka SPAT, etc.)
  • Man-portable and shoulder launch ATGMs
  • Portable and ground mount ATGMs
  • ATGM launcher vehicles, and
  • NLOS ATGM launcher vehicles

The most prolific anti-armor and antitank systems are in units other than AT units. By number, most are found in infantry, mechanized infantry, tank units, and in special purpose forces units, but can also be in irregular and hybrid forces. They include the following assets.

Branch System Type Example Lethality

D/K if hit*

Infantry, ATGL Pzf 3-IT600 Tk and LAV=K Tandem HEAT, HE, Bunker-B
SOF, etc. Tandem HEAT


or, hybrid


Shoulder ATGM



Tk and LAV=K

Tk and LAV=K

Tandem HEAT, HE IR/seismic sensor, RF/wire
forces) ATGL/IED remote fuze SIRA sensor, LAV=K, Tk=K cmd
Infantry Vehicles

and other

IFV main gun and ATGM AMX-10P/MILAN LAV=K, Tk=K APDS round, ATGM Tandem
LAVs Infantry fire spt BMP/Kliver LAV=K, Tk=K Gun, ATGM, MANPADS
vehicle BMP-3M LAV=K, Tk=K See also HCSV
Tanks Main Gun and ATGM T-90S LAV=K, Tk=K Rounds and ATGM

Maneuver units receive support for various combat missions and phases. ATDLs are treated as ordnance stored with other ammunition, then disseminated as needed to infantry and other users depending on mission and battle conditions. Engineer assets and units will support maneuver units in the defense and conducting ambushes (by delivering or laying mines to slow or stop enemy forces, so that they can be engaged with AT/anti-armor weapons). Infantry companies and battalions may have organic weapons platoons for AT/anti-armor fire support. Combat units can call for AT unit support, anti-armor mortar/artillery fires, and aircraft strikes.

A shift to using more light armored vehicles (LAVs) has led to production and deployment of a wide array of anti-armor and multi-role weapon systems for use against LAVs. Threats to mobility are also greater with wheeled LAVs. The table on the next pages shows some of these.

Multi-Role (MR) and Anti-Armor Weapons and Munitions to Counter Armored Vehicles

Branch System Type Example Lethality

D/K if hit*

Infantry, SOF, etc.

(also irregular and hybrid forces)

Rifle, Machinegun

Hand grenade

Grenade Launcher

Anti-materiel rifle



Air-to-Surface rkt lchr

Improvised explosives

Multi-role missile

SVD with AP rd

Molotov cocktail

QLZ-89 with DP

Barrett M2A1A


Shmel-M reusable lchr

C-5K (S-5K hand lchr)

IED, “sticky bombs”












Vs tires, optics, engine, etc.

Blind optics, secondary blast

Penetrate/damage tires/wheels

Calibers from .338 to 23 mm

HE or thermo with penetrator

RPO for napalm, RPO-A FAE

Improvised and shop-made

Designs and fuzing vary widely

Infantry Bn, also AT, AD units

Support Vehicles AD/AT fire spt vehicle

Combat recon vehicle

Flame unit spt vehicle

ASR launcher vehicle

Armored Starstreak BRM-3K

BMO-1 with 30 RPO-A

BMD/Aviaagregat S5K





Weapon priority - self- defense

Also BMO-T on tank chassis

RS, 12x rkts, poss SAL PGM

Artillery/Mortars Frag/HE round/rkt Flame/FAE rocket Dual-Purpose ICM

SAL-homing rd/rkt

IR fuzed/homing rd/rkt

MMW-homing rd/rkt

Scatter mine rockets/rds

Jammer rockets/rds

152/155mm and others

9A152 FAE rocket

152/155 mm and others

120-mm Kitolov-2


Universal sub/others

122-mm 9M28K

122-mm 9M519







LAV=K, Tk=D Effectiveness K

Near miss or hit can destroy

More heavy MRLs have FAE.

Top atk, duds vs tracks/wheels

Cannon, mortars, MRLs, others

120 mm mrtr, 122 mm MRL

120 mm mrtr122/220/300 MRL

For BM-21 MRL

For BM-21 MRL

Engineers Mines/IEDs

Side-attack mine

Mine scatter vehicle

Line-charge vehicle

Other obstacles

Controlled minefield esp.

TM-83 fuzed plate mine

UMZ vehicle or pods

MTK-2, ZRP-2 dismount

Concertina, trenches, etc.






Effectiveness K

Large IED EFP, etc.

Also TEMP-10 top attack

PKM for dismounts, 1/7-29

Cmd det, belly attack, esp whls

To stop, slow, divert vehicles

Flame Weapons Flame/FAE launch veh

Incendiary rounds

See Artillery/Mortars

TOS-1 with FAE rocket

API-T, thermobarics



Stationary targets behind cover

Ignite fuel tanks, engine, etc.

Aircraft Cluster bomb DPICM

/napalm bomb

SAL/TV guided bomb

SAL rocket

IR fuzed/cluster bomb

Air-launched missile

Aircraft guns to 30-mm

Mine scatter pod



KAB-500L, -500Kr

S-13Cor 122 mm


Kh-25 series

Fixed, pod, and turret










Also RBK-500U/PTAB

Also ZAB-500 napalm

195 kg explosive area charge

Also 57/68/80/240/320 mm

EFP top attack submunitions

Guidance TV, SAL, IR

Twin and Vulcan auto- cannon

Or mine ladders for TM-62

UAVs Attack UAV


UAVs for attack Spt


Hermes 450S/Mikholit

Camcopter S-100




Can also be a cruise missile

Guns, grenades, and ATGMs

LTD for gun rds, rkts, ATGMs

Theater Missiles Theater ballistic missile

Cruise missile





ICM= large APAM with Frag

UAV camera or GPS guidance

Air Defense AD guns and cannon

AD missile

Multi-role missile

57-mm S-60

Pantsir-S1-0 (SA-22)

Starstreak/Starstreak II




All can target ground vehicles.

2S6, Sosna, SA-11 FO also

Outfly/outshoot target, no CM

Others Heavy multi-role missiles

Naval gun rounds/rkts

Coastal gun SAL-H

Underwater mines


AK-130 130-mm guns

Firn-1 130-mm round

KPDM-4 anti-landing sys





UAV designates, SAL, IR

Can fire SAL-H vs shore targets

Bereg, also on ships (above)

Magnetic fuzed wide area mine

  • FAE (fuel-air-explosive) includes thermobaric HE, with high heat and overpressure effects similar to FAE.
  • ICM (improved conventional munitions are canistered submunitions. DPICM are ICM with AT shaped charge and Frag-HE effects.
  • SAL= semi-active laser-homing, guided round using a laser target designator operated by a dismount, or on a vehicle, RW, or UAV.
  • IR fuzed rounds hold sensor-fuzed submunitions which can disperse, each aiming at a vehicle, and firing EFPs into the vehicle tops.
  • IR homing munitions can lock onto vehicle hot areas to home in for top attack with a HEAT or large HE warhead.

Threats to Vehicle Mobility

Below is an unclassified listing of example organizations, weapons, and TTP which can be used to immobilize, disable, and destroy military vehicles. They can range from older, less effective systems, to modern Tier 1 or Near Term systems noted as upper range. Additional pertinent information is contained in other locations of the WEG, Ground Systems, Volume I:

  • “APC and IFV Trends”
  • “Kinetic Energy Threats to Light Armored Vehicles”
  • “Multi-role Weapons and Munitions Against Armored Vehicles”
  • “Emerging Technology Trends”

Enemy exploitation of tactical vehicle mobility limitations

The enemy will continue to capitalize on the single greatest vulnerability of most combat vehicles. That is limitations on their ability to transit terrain other than on hard surfaces (like a parking lot or road) and on other improved surfaces. That vulnerability and its cascading effects costs lives. Technical decisions in vehicle design may dictate weapons operability (shoot on move ability and speed), off-road speed, water crossing capability, and even weather considerations in mobility. Tactical decisions in using vehicles with limited road, urban, or off-road mobility can affect success and lives. A rational innovative enemy can be sufficiently informed to combine local knowledge with understanding of tactical and technical vulnerabilities for successful and lethal TTP.

Contrary to accepted beliefs, the inability of the vehicles to protect their occupants is not the primary cause of these deaths. Any protection, including any amount of armor, can be breached, bypassed, neutralized, destroyed, or otherwise mitigated. The greatest vulnerability is the ability of an enemy to determine the exact route troops will travel, define when it will travel, how it will travel, how fast it will travel, etc. This ability to define who, what, why, and where to attack provides the enemy enormous tactical advantages which are magnified in complex terrain. It not only allows an enemy to control the tempo and all aspects of attack, it allows them to attack at their own convenience. The analytical sophistication required to achieve this massive advantage is analogous to determining which route a train will take.

The primary purpose of a vehicle, any vehicle, is to transport something from point A to point B, when and where you need to. The primary purpose should never be to only protect. That’s not the reason for having a vehicle—mobility is. Previously the term “tactical” or “combat” was used only to describe vehicles designed to and capable of operating off-road and transiting cross-terrain under combat conditions. Obviously neither term is appropriate for accurately describing the current class of vehicles used by many modern forces today.

  • Machinegun (12.7 mm and up will penetrate many light armored vehicles above, and below, wheel wells, 7.624R/51 mm below wheel wells and wheels)
  • Machineguns can puncture vehicle tires (even those with run-flat) to immobilize or slow them. Most armored vehicles require repair with 2 or more tire hits per vehicle side.
  • Anti-materiel weapons (12.7 – 20-mm HE), ballistic computers (w/laser rangefinder), advanced thermal optics, 1-shot 1-kill capability (12.7 mm range 2,500+ m, 14.5-mm and 20-mm range 2,000+m).
  • Automatic Grenade Launchers 30/-35/40-mm. Ballistic computer, electronic fuzed air-burst munitions (ABM). Precise DP/HEAT fires out to 2500+ m. 35-mm Chinese QLZ-87 can penetrate 80 mm (3.2 inch) armor. HEAT round defeats 200+ mm armor. Delivers UGS, multi-spectral smoke, comms jamming grenades, robot option. Radar guidance linked (Fara-2 radar). Perfect weapon for neutralizing dismounted troops, which are especially vulnerable when dismounting from vehicles.
  • Most anti-armor weapons can disable/destroy most light armored vehicles. In use by over 25 countries, standoff 100m+, penetration 950mm+, IR sensor activation and detonation.
  • Off-route mines/Side-attack mines (AT or anti-vehicle). Panzerfaust-3T tandem, (penetrates 800mm+ at 400m+), w/SIRA sensor package w/fusing (acoustic/IR), Fire Salamander has 4 x Pzf- 3 series launchers on tripod with remote controlled TV camera and other sensors, also auto- launch. Others TM-83, TEMP-30 sensor-fuzed mine.
  • Ubiquitous shoulder-fired antitank grenade launcher /AT systems up to 125-mm, tandem-HEAT, Dual purpose, RPG-7V/Type 69, RPG-18/22/26/27/28/29/Hashim, CH PF-89/98, (from 300-mm to 1,100mm+ penetration-ranges from 200m - 800m),
  • Antitank Grenade Launcher (Long Range), 125-mm tandem HEAT 1000 m, 1,300+armor penetration, TV/thermal sights, laser designator 5 km range, GPS corrected rounds.
  • ATGM. Any antitank guided missile will destroy light armored vehicles - some from 8,000 meters out (AT-14 Kornet-E 5,500 to meters with 1,200-mm) and Starstreak II (dual-role

MANPADS/anti-armor system with hypervelocity, laser beam-rider guidance, auto-tracker, very high Ph, armor penetration to 120-mm + for all LAVs, out to 8,000 meters). The other end of the spectrum is the (infantry) light-weight (14 kg) shoulder-fired ATGM Eryx with a range of 600 meters and penetration of 900 mm.

  • Recoilless-rifles will destroy most light armored vehicles. Carl Gustaf M2/M3 84-mm, Type 65/65-1, M67 90-mm, B-10 82-mm, B-11 107-mm, Chinese PF-98 120-mm, M40 106-mm with tandem HEAT, ballistic computer sight, range to 2,000+ m, armor penetration 700+ mm, upgrades in progress. High PH/PK. R&D to add ATGM capability.
  • Antitank Disposable Grenade Launchers 67 - 80mm HEAT to 300 m and 630 mm armor, HE anti- personnel effects. Some low signature, no smoke/flash, fire from enclosed spaces (rooms, sewers, etc). To 125-mm tandem HEAT 350m range, 1000+ mm tandem HEAT.
  • Multi-purpose and/or bunker buster weapons will destroy most vehicles. PF-89A, SMAW HEPD, AT8 Bunker Buster, C90-CR-BM (M3), TBG-7V, BASTEG, Carl Gustaf.
  • Any anti-tank hand-grenade has the capability to immobilize or destroy light armored vehicles. It is dependent of placement and angle of attack of the grenade.
  • Improvised Multi-role Man-portable Rocket Launcher (AD/Anti-armor). Improvised 57-mm air- to-surface high velocity rockets (formerly aircraft rocket pods). Range 1,500m+ 400mm armor penetration, proximity fuze, and 20m lethal radius.
  • Robotic weapons platforms and tracked grenade launchers and ATGM launchers
  • Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft
  • CBRN attack. Some vehicles use collective protection, whereas others require masks.
  • Thermobaric systems or warheads. Any hit by one of these warheads can disable or destroy a vehicle. The thermobaric warhead on RPO-A, RShG-2, WPF-89-1 and 2, Shmel-M, or TBG warhead on RPG-7V and RPG-29 have demolition effect equal to a round of 122-mm or higher HE artillery. The complex blast/ overpressure is particularly lethal in enclosed spaces such as building, tunnels, sewers, and even vehicles with hatch open (or other blast access), etc. The GM-94 is a smaller hand-held thermobaric launcher. Some mine-clearing systems (UR-77) use thermobarics for clearing lanes and are particularly effective in clearing streets (of enemy) in urban areas. The use of thermobaric warheads is proliferating and has expanded into rockets and artillery.
  • Flame/napalm and other incendiaries. The trend is away from flame throwers to encapsulated weapons, bombs, bomblets, etc. RPO-Z, RPO. At a very minimum these weapons will disable sensors, optics etc externally mounted on the vehicle. Any flammable material, POL, packs, fuel lines, ammo on a vehicle exterior may cause it to catch fire. Field expedients are very easy to manufacture and use, such as fougasse.
  • Lasers to blind/damage both vehicle (electronic optics, and sensors) and crews (eyes).
  • Use of robotics and other remote-operated platforms proliferates significantly by 2015.
  • Corrosive cloud or micro-fiber cloud munitions can corrupt and damage vehicle engines.
  • The greatest obstacles remain natural and man-made terrain features. Their impact is also compounded by weather effects. Thus rain can turn a field impassible to wheeled vehicle units and mud can immobilize tracked vehicles with high ground pressure.
  • Conventional mines, controlled minefields, IEDs, and other explosive devices. They include mines, EFP, and sensor fuzes, also undetectable materials (e.g., plastic/alloys).
  • Multi-spectral smoke/obscurants (e.g., Russian ZD-6 grenade), dust from HE fires, etc.
  • Some examples of adaptive obstacles are:
    • Communications (or other electric) wire and concertina as an expedient obstacle. Both hinder or stop wheeled and tracked vehicles by wrapping around axles and tangling up tracks and road wheels. Det cord is also very effective. Once it wraps around portions of the vehicle, it is then detonated.
    • Improvised obscurants (grass, trees, POL, buildings) smoke can screen the enemy and defeat or degrade vehicle sights.
    • Local population as civilian shields to hide infiltrators, attackers, or just to swarm U.S. units looking for water, medicine, or food, etc. and slow movement.
    • Improvised mobility obstacles. Rubble, civilians, holes, disabled vehicles.
    • Defilade and side slope restrictions as sites for front/rear vehicle attack, or to utilize non- lethal slippage measures (grease, oil residue or mud troughs), and ambush attack.
    • IED or body decoys to slow unit and conduct ambush.
    • Flooding or alter the flow of water (rivers, dams, etc.), open fire hydrants etc.
    • Punji stakes (innovation--place punji stakes and/or det cord in a ditch. When the enemy arrives ambush them from the same side of the road/trail. The enemy will turn towards the fire and jump into the ditch to return fire. When they enter the ditch and land on the stakes, blow the det cord). Boulders rolled or blown into valleys.
    • Abatis (fallen trees, telephone poles, wrecks, etc.).
    • Debris (vehicles, rubble).
    • Trenches, craters, or ditches (dug by hand or blown by demolitions).
    • Blow (or cut) a hole in a frozen river. Put tree logs in the water, cover with sticks and tarp and camouflage (snow). The logs continually agitate the water to keep it from freezing.
    • Armored vehicles drive across the frozen river and fall in the ice hole.
    • Prepare (and camouflage) the frozen river with demolitions prior to the arrival of the enemy armored column. Detonate when the armored vehicles are in midstream. Artillery targeting with MRLs will have the same effect (or use both).
    • Induce avalanches in snow covered passes.
    • In extreme cold, put water on dangerous portions (or steep grades) of mountain roads.

For information on conventional or generic obstacles see FM 90-7, “Combined Arms Obstacle Integration,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/90-7/index.html and FM 90-7 (Army Field Manual), Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (10 Apr 2003) (Change 1) or http://www.everyspec.com/ARMY/FM+-+Field+Manual/ FM_90-7_14502/.

RISTA (UAV/UCAV, Robotic radars and camera, UGS, Manned FOs, and SOF)
  • RISTA selects ambush/obstacle sites, target tracking and selection, priority target attack.
  • Target acquisition and links to Integrated Fires Command, direct/indirect fires, ATGMs.
  • SOF/UAV/FOs with NAI/TAIs and sensor-shooter links to artillery, mortars, ATGMs.
  • Laser designators guide artillery, naval, aerial, ATGM, mortar rounds to moving targets.
  • Direct attack by attack UAV/UCAV w/ATGM or precision homing submunitions.
  • The ease of operation, size, and simple design of tactical UAVs lends itself to field expedient modification. Converting this UAV into a munitions delivery system (improvised attack UAV) is not difficult and offers several tactical advantages.
  • Improvised (remote control aircraft-based) attack UAVs, with IED/munition attached.
  • Robotic cameras locate close to mine/IED detonation points to precisely trigger them.
Information Warfare

For additional information see Chapter 10 and TC 7-100.2

  • Information Attack. Alter or deny key information, Data manipulation (navigation, tracking, weapons, sensors, timing, etc). Disinformation.
  • Computer Warfare: Disrupt, deny, or degrade the enemy’s computer networks and information flow. Hacking, denial of service, malicious software (including adjusting clocks), etc. Insert viruses, spurious digital data, or hacking to manipulate computer information.
  • Exploit reliance on extended communications and data links. Disrupt communications and data links (LIWA). Jamming communications connectivity (input and output).
  • Electronic Warfare
    • Exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum, especially C2 and RISTA. Wide area radar jammers.
    • GPS jamming. A 4-25 W power portable jammer has a 200-km radius. Can be delivered by artillery and/or mounted on UAV, civilian vehicles, or virtually anywhere including people, and/or farm animals.
    • Communications and data link jamming. Artillery and mortar rounds for local jamming. Wide area comms jammers.
    • Electronics vulnerable to “smart dust” which destroys electronic circuitry (computers, C2, sensors, navigations, etc.) by airborne penetration and short-circuiting the system. Delivered by rocket, UAV, other aircraft, possibly artillery. Access through computer cooling system.
    • Graphite Munitions and “blackout bombs.” 400-500 kg cluster bombs/warheads with graphite strands to short out transmission stations and power grids. Can be delivered by UAVs, aircraft, rockets, and cruise missiles.
EMP and High Power Microwave.
  • Use EMP (esp. non-nuclear) and High Energy High Radio Frequency Weapons (HERT) to target circuit boards. Circuit boards are the most vulnerable component of modern electronics.
  • EMP/HPM. Missile, artillery, and UAV delivered EMP. This is will destroy all intravehicular electronics and battlefield digitization functionality in vehicular weapons. The specific target is circuit board systems, the internal connections of which require little EMP to disrupt and/or destroy. Electrical power is shared among propulsion, survivability, lethality, and auxiliary systems, along with multipurpose sensors, and all fusion and integration functions of each type of system.
  • Tactical EMP. Enhanced warhead consisting of a hybrid EMP/HEAT warhead employed on ATGM, 70-mm rockets, and MRL rockets. This hybrid warhead will knock out a tank even if it does not penetrate armor, ignition, communications, or other electronics. Power output will be measured in hundreds of megawatts for microseconds. The e-warhead would also knock out other electronic systems. Applications may extend into infantry shoulder-fired rockets that could cause an electronic “soft kill” of armored vehicles.
Enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures

To degrade vehicle mobility, the enemy will:

  • Always use (appropriate) portions of several basic principles. 1. Quick concentration (dispersed to avoid detection then come together for the attack, 2. Surprise, 3. Violent attack, often only three to four minutes, 4. Quick clearing and securing, 5. Quick withdrawal/dispersion, often disappearing back into the population from which they came.
  • Attack with numerous hunter-killers teams (up to 10 per vehicle), approximately 4-5 persons per team armed with 1 or more AT/Antiarmor weapons, sniper rifle, 7.62-mm GPMG, RPO-A/TBG- 7V (thermobaric and/or flame weapons), AT grenades, assault rifles.
  • Attack fixed sites prior and set ambushes (often complex) along the relief (quick reaction) force’s likely avenues of approach.
  • Attack units when they temporarily halt to refuel or conduct other activities. Attack tactical refueling operations whenever possible. The optimal attack occurs during transfer of fuel from tankers/refuelers to vehicles. This may set fire to both the tanker and the combat vehicle, also catching the combat crew outside their vehicle. Attack as units (squad and above) return to garrison, as they will be short of fuel and ammo, the troops lax, tired, and complacent after days or weeks of searching for, and not finding, the enemy.
  • Use other “swarming” attacks (often involving civilians timed with complex attack).
  • Halt or slow movement (obstacles, decoys, feints, remote weapon) to facilitate attacks.
  • Use snipers to force crew members to operate “buttoned-up”, instill tenacity, and impede mobility while dismounted.
  • Whenever possible use complex attack composed of several synchronized elements. Example is anti-armor (ATGM and/or AT guns) ambush in conjunction with mines, artillery, and small arms fires.
  • Converge attacks, probes; events from multiple directions, and possibly multiple dimensions, by numerous elements on a single target (and/or location or sensor) overwhelm the sensors ability to provide accurate data.
  • Create conditions forcing vehicle troops to dismount prematurely, into infantry ambush.
  • Attack vehicle beneath, above, or beyond weapons’ platform ability to elevate or depress (high or close-in). CQ swarming effective and lethal.
  • Exploit the high (elevation), low (close-in, depression), and rear “dead” spaces of the vehicle. These are areas that either cannot be observed, and/or, fired upon by the crew. Examples of the high dead space is the inability of the crew to view and/or bring fire on the higher floors of a building, or the enemy firing from the high sides of valley walls, enemy attacking from the rear of the vehicle.
  • Focus light weapons attacks on most vulnerable areas of vehicle, rear, tires and very light armor below wheel wells and between tires, lightly armored top. Wheels are extremely vulnerable and
  • easy to damage/disable. Without the wheels (especially the front steering wheels) the vehicle is disabled. External fuel tanks, flammables, ammo are vulnerable.
  • Attack logistic supplies and support elements critical to operation of the vehicle (class IX parts, Fuel delivery means, vehicle mechanics and technicians, etc.)
  • Kill/attack contractors maintaining/servicing/fueling vehicles or disrupt their operations
  • Target power generation systems supporting all C4I systems, forcing operations in a degraded mode, and challenging analog backup skills.
  • Manufacture events, riots, or demonstrations staged to block or impede vehicles used in (medical) evacuation or redirect response forces.
  • Capture vehicles to exploit situational awareness through tactical internet intrusion.
  • Use night vision devices, flares, and IR screens to offset enemy night vision advantage.
  • Utilize poor visibility (smoke, sand, weather) conditions to offset superior vehicle optics.
  • Change the nature of the conflict. Prime example is from political to religious.
  • Hug enemy forces to offset their indirect fire and precision strike advantage.
  • Create shortages or overloads by continual attacks on convoys, LOCs, MEDVAC, etc. and/or planting mines. All of these must then be secured by escorting units.
  • Neutralize or destroy external antennas, optics, and sensors.
  • Numerous synchronized attacks designed to overwhelm or over-saturate the enemy’s ability to successfully deal with the attack.
  • Prioritize targeting of low density specialty vehicles such as ambulances, mine- and/or route clearing and water/gap crossing (mobility/counter-mobility), POL vehicles fire support, etc. The elimination of these impacts the entire unit capability.
  • Mimic Battlefield Combat Identification Systems to find, fix, close with, and destroy vehicles. Same with “friendly markings.”
  • Exploit the vehicle inability to traverse obstacles, roadblocks, rubble piles, holes, ditches, wrecked vehicles, and mines.
  • Exploit vehicle inability to self-extract or to reposition other U.S. vehicles off the route.
  • Exploit the large turning radius of the vehicle. This facilitates successful rear and rear-oblique attacks as well as trapping two or more vehicles together.
  • Use multi-spectral smoke, especially in difficult terrain with poor road, surfaces, recognizable terrain, or in target rear areas during onset of attack.
Vehicle considerations which translate directly into either tactical strengths or weakness.
  • Most considerations relate to mobility subsystems, apart from other subsystems. Mobility includes many specific automotive capabilities, e.g., road speed, cruising range, and swim capability. Stopping in high threat areas means increased P-hit, and likely troops dismount. One hit means more strikes follow; so mobility is critical, and speed is critical. Acceleration ability permits a vehicle to react to perceived threats, especially in close terrain (e.g., urban). High road speed can permit vehicles to emplace before threats appear.
  • Navigation ability facilitates choice of fastest, most open, and safest route.
  • Ability to operate in multiple differing physical combat environments. Turbine engine operates better in temperate-cold terrains. Diesel is better in temperate-hot. Turbine engine has problems with sand clogs, and requires more fuel. Diesel fuel is less flammable. Some engines are designed to accept varying grades and types of fuel.
  • Military forces must be able to operate effectively in rivers, swamps, hilly terrain, snow, and coastal areas which fall into its area of operations. Ground pressure is less important on paved roads; but low ground pressure is critical for trafficability on wet, icy, or loose soil and uneven terrain. Tracks have lower ground pressure than wheels. More wheels mean less ground pressure (e.g., 10x10 vs 4x4). For tracked vehicles, six road wheels mean less than 5. Wider tracks reduce ground pressure. Some vehicles can lower auxiliary wheels (BRDM-2). Others can add rubber tracks for periods of off-road use.
  • Wheeled vehicles with armor have higher ground pressure. They are limited in off-road capability and speed, and in soil composition usage. They are more subject to failure on tire loss, or in uneven terrain with ditches or bumps. They are more limited in soft soil, such as areas where vehicles have preceded them.
  • Front/rear tire track too wide (wide track). While a wide tire track is efficient in desert and in other open terrain, it is not suitable in areas that are terraced for farming or have dikes, etc. For example, HUMVEEs do not work off-road in terrain such as South Korea/South East Asia/Philippines, agricultural regions, etc. The tire track is too wide causing the vehicle to slide off the side of the paddy path/road or to bottom out. These “wide “vehicles are virtually useless in some areas of the world such as some forests of Europe, jungles, and other close terrain areas.
  • Factors such as side slope, gap crossing capability, etc. may seem esoteric; but those limitations cause accidents that kill and injure soldiers when moving off-road around hills and across ditches and rubble, trees, disabled vehicles, etc., and on roads as well. Limitations deny movement areas or slow movement and increase vulnerability time.
  • Side-slope angle capability (reduces roll-over). This threat limits movement and may kill crew members. Factors for high slide slope capability include a low profile and low roll center (pivot point between the wheels), low center of mass (usually dictated by the height of the armor on the vehicle), wheel/track width of the vehicle, and tire characteristics. If the center of mass is much higher than the roll center, the vehicle can roll more easily if the vehicle slips to road shoulders, ditches, or holes. If the vehicle is wider, roll is less likely. Wheeled vehicles are generally higher than tracked counterparts, more limited in side-slope capability, and more subject to tipping or roll-over when off-road. Stiff, higher pressure, low profile tires offer roll resistance. Vehicles with heavy high turrets, like many western main battle tanks, have poorer side slope capability. Older low profile tanks have superior capability.
  • Tracked vehicles, especially smaller ones, are more suitable on forest trails.
  • Self-extraction, with winches facilitates greater use in areas with rubble and streams.
  • Lighter vehicles are more deployable, for air insertion and water transport closer to their destination, limiting surface travel distance and the associated vulnerability to threats. Vehicle height and width are critical functions for moving rapidly and safely through urban areas, forests, jungles, and through tunnels. Dimensions and weight must be considered in crossing bridges, and for air deployability. Wheeled vehicles are generally higher than comparable tracked vehicles. They may have higher ground to hull clearance for mine resistance, and higher freeboard for swim capability. Also, wheeled vehicles may be lighter, which permits operability over bridges with weight restrictions.
  • Tire vulnerability, especially steering tires, to small arms, ditches, det cord, etc. Avoid overloading with too much added armor, ammunition, etc., which reduces mobility.
  • For fording operations, amphibious tracked vehicles are generally better-suited in conditions of high water speed and uneven surface. Some vehicles have high-ford design for deep-fording, even underwater. Some vehicles have winches to assist in fording.
  • Wheeled vehicles with central tire inflation system (CTIS) operate better off-road. Vehicles with run-flat tires plus CTIS may puncture tires from inside when hitting bumps.
  • Turning radius, (high radius requires backing). Tracked vehicles can pivot on one track, for vehicle-length turning radius, even in defilade areas.
  • Wheeled vehicles may be able to swim in areas where tracked vehicles cannot. But they may be challenged in entering and exiting water, due to lack of traction in low water and wet/muddy shores. Vehicles with hydro-jets swim at higher speed. A few vehicles with bowplanes and hydrajets can hydroplane at high-speed in amphibious landings.
  • 360 degree 3-dimensional visual and/or electronic (rear TV, etc.) observation. Inability to see 360, especially rear view (for high speed backing/and threat) can challenge movement and limit situational awareness in. Optics must elevate declinate sufficiently close-in and distant awareness. They must also be able to operate in obscurant conditions.
  • Reduced movement noise (especially engine and tracks) reduces warning time for threats. This factor is less significant in open terrain, more in closed (e.g., cities and defilade).
  • Reduced visual/IR signature during movement (conformal nets, side skirts, screens, etc.), will reduce detectability and vulnerability to weapons in open terrain.
  • Power/battery augmentation aids stops and moves. Solar or auxiliary power units add power for less noise and IR signature. Hybrid drive adds power and rapid acceleration.
  • Weapons elevate and depress sufficiently to handle targets four stories high and very close-in enemy. If they cannot they may move behind infantry during movement.
  • Communications compatibility (host country, digital vs. analog, frequency management).
  • Collision and fratricide avoidance require IR marker lights and paint, and BCIS networks.
  • CBRN protection system (Overpressure, vehicle mask system, or individual masks).
  • Mine-clearing or neutralizing capability can cause speed reductions or stops enroute. Advance clearing requires electro-magnetic decoys, unmanned vehicles, and engineer assets.

Kinetic Energy Threats to Light Armored Vehicles


Military forces worldwide generally recognize that LAVs are increasingly being used not only as armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, but as chassis for expensive and specialized systems critical to success of the mechanized ground force. Despite a variety of efforts to increase armor protection and adapt countermeasure systems for LAVs, most munitions considered to have anti-armor effects will continue to be able to defeat light armor. Recent developments in guns, munitions, and mounts add new weapons and upgrade capabilities of older weapons to challenge LAV protection.

LAV vulnerabilities

All armored vehicle designs, light or heavy, are compromises among competing requirements for mobility, survivability, and lethality. Designers of LAVs must accept armor protection limitations further than with heavy armored vehicles to meet additional requirements such as reduced cost, swim capability, and light weight for air deployability. From their inception, LAVs have been vulnerable to a wide array of munitions from antitank weapons to aerial munitions, artillery Frag-HE rounds, vehicle main gun/machineguns, mines, air defense munitions, and infantry munitions.

In the last decade, a variety of countries including the U.S. have redesigned LAV armor packages to  resist shaped charge and high-explosive threats. But such measures exact a high cost in weight and at best only reduce the chances of penetration and vehicle system kill. These munitions (especially mines and improved shaped-charges) remain a threat to LAVs. The single munition type that is most effective against LAVs will continue to be High-Explosive (HE); because that term is generally shorthand for Fragmentation-High-Explosive (Frag-HE). Most Frag-HE and HE artillery, mortar, and heavy gun rounds have sufficient fragmentation to damage a tank or destroy most LAVs with a near miss. It is generally expected that in a Frag- HE near miss of an IFV, fragmentation effects will cause some type of kill (firepower, mobility, or catastrophic). That same near miss will usually destroy a lighter APC.

Energetic armors (such as ERA), and countermeasure systems have less effect against kinetic energy munitions. The best counter continues to be more armor, and the weight constraint  limits protection. All LAVs have surfaces that can be penetrated by 12.7 -mm rounds, and all have equipment  vulnerable even to  infantry small arms.

A general rule on the battlefield is that a stopped vehicle in close combat has a short lifespan. The greater the vehicle mobility, the better chance it has to escape a kill  zone .  Adversaries train  to target armored vehicle engine locations. Well-aimed fires can damage the engine from side or rear, for a  mobility kill, and initiate fires and secondary  explosions .

A recent shift toward wheeled LAVs exposes the vulnerability of wheels . Tires of wheeled vehicles are vulnerable to all weapons, from rifles to fragmentation. Tires can be penetrated by any small arms.  Rubble,  abatis, and  other loose  materials  can  halt  wheeled  vehicles,  as  Russian  BTR -80s

experienced in Chechnya. Trenches, scattered nails, caltrops, spike strips, etc. can initiate KE tire blow-outs. Run-flat tires and added wheels (6x6, 8x8, and 10x10) can reduce but not eliminate mobility problems. Tires on steering wheels are critical; one or  two penetrations can slow or  stop the most modern vehicle, especially off-road. Rounds aimed at wheels can be effective even when they miss. Wheel well areas expose crews and passengers, and are rarely protected beyond 7.62 - mm rounds.

Military forces worldwide recognize the difficulty in directly engaging heavy armored vehicles, and the risk in exposing themselves to obtain a catastrophic kill. An increasing variety of weapons for dismounted infantry and vehicles use KE munitions to penetrate the armor of LAVs. New specially designed weapons are being developed to attain lesser kills (mobility, firepower, communications, and function) to degrade effectiveness of the vehicle as a "system of systems". Due to limited room, much of the crew's gear may be stowed on the outside of the vehicle, and is vulnerable to fires. A favorite tactic is to attack sensors (sights, remote sensors, radar, or links to them). Remote weapons and external boxes are vulnerable to a variety of fires. Sniper fires and even rocks can damage sights to blind weapons of the most modern LAFVs.

Another vulnerable part of the LAV system is personnel. Personnel may ride outside of the vehicle, where they are exposed and vulnerable to all weapons. Drivers and personnel operating open weapons can be targeted, especially from higher angles. Concussion from munitions impacting on vehicles may not seriously damage the vehicle; but they can cause armor pieces or mounted equipment to rebound inside and kill or injure personnel. Blasts underneath vehicles can transfer shock through floor-bolted seats and break the backs of crew and passengers. Therefore, a critical part of vehicle design is in securing seats and materiel in vehicles. Also KE hits to ammo compartments and external tanks may not penetrate hull armor, but can start catastrophic fires. Hard jolts can injure soldiers inside. Thus, concealed trenches, slides from "non-lethal" road slimes, or deliberate collisions are kinetic energy threats to personnel in LAVs.

Weapons for dismounted infantry

They include sniper rifles and machine guns (7.62 mm and 12.7 mm). Machine guns and sniper rifles can be used with obstacles to slow the vehicles and deliver sufficient fires to vulnerable areas to obtain a kill (mobility, firepower, or catastrophic), or to kill crewmen and degrade its effectiveness. A variety of general-purpose machine guns can be dismounted and can penetrate some armors, tires, and exterior materials on LAVs. Mini-guns, such as 7.62-mm man-portable type, can swarm rounds at 1,200 rounds per minute. New ammunition includes sub-caliber sabot rounds for 7.62 and 12.7- mm weapons (such as the .50-cal SLAP), and improved armor-piercing rounds such as the Chinese tungsten alloy-core round. These traditional technologies defeat all current active protection systems.

Anti-materiel sniper rifles (12.7 mm or .50 cal). These rifles are integral to any modern battlefield. Although often categorized as sniper rifles (and capable of being used against personnel), they are generally employed as anti-materiel rifles. The most widely proliferated of these rifles are: the U.S. Barrett M82A1/M95 .50 cal semi-automatic rifle, the Croatian MACS M2-1/M3 (12.7-mm bolt action), and the Russian V-94 (12.7-mm semi-auto). The Barrett M82A1 is employed by all U.S. military forces as well as forces of 27 other countries, including Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and UK. The Saboted Light Armor Penetrator (SLAP) round fired from the M82A1 can penetrate 19 mm (.75 in) of armor @ 1,500 m. It can also fire a multi-purpose round (See M82A1 data sheet). Approximately 25 variants of 12.7-mm sniper/anti-materiel rifles are available.

Larger-caliber Anti-materiel Rifles (14.5 to 20-mm). A trend in the past ten years has been towards larger- caliber anti-materiel rifles. The Croatian RT20 20-mm “hand cannon” is the most prevalent (range 1,800 m). It can chamber either an HE or API round. The RT20 was developed primarily to penetrate the armored casing around the thermal sight head on M84 tanks (a 20-mm round was the smallest caliber that could penetrate the casing). During the war in the former Yugoslavia, M84s were frequently deployed to detect Croatian infantry moving at night, so a method of removing their night-vision capability was found with this RT20 “hand cannon”.

Other anti-materiel rifles readily available are:

  • US M98 cal .338 Lapua Magnum (1,400 m and twice the penetration of 7.62-mm)
  • NTW 14.5-mm (range 2,300 m)
  • Hungarian Gepard M3 14.5-mm (range 1,000 m)
  • Austrian Steyr IWS 2000 15.2-mm (range 1,000 m, 19 gram tungsten carbide dart)
  • South African NTW 20-mm (range 1,500 m)
  • Finnish Helenius APH RK20 20-mm bolt-action gun
Guns for light vehicle applications (7.62 mm to 23 mm)

Several countries mount guns on light carriers, such as motorcycles, fast-attack vehicles, and light utility vehicles such as HMMWVs, UAZ-467, and Land Rover. The Russians advertise the Gear-Up motorcycle with mounts for a variety of auto grenade launchers and machineguns. Several combat support vehicles for military security patrols have weapons mounted on light mounts, such as a pick-up truck or a possible towed or ground mount. Guns ranging to

14.5 mm (such as Russian Arzamas GAZ-53971 van for use of internal and other security forces) may also be mounted.

Recently China displayed a "dune buggy" with a 23-mm chain gun mounted to the overhead roll bar, for manual aiming and operation. The gun fires standard antiaircraft ammunition and recent APDS rounds, and has a thermal night sight. This gun could also mount on remote vehicle turrets, for use against air and ground targets. Oerlikon went one step farther with an infantry application for the KBB 25-mm auto- cannon. The break-apart mount actually permits infantry pack carry. It did not catch on. However, the very low profile weapon can also be towed, carried in an all-terrain vehicle, or off-loaded for ground mount. The profile is so low that the firer should dig a pit to operate it. This is a developed potential threat to all LAVs.

LAV main guns

Armored personnel carriers and combat support vehicles (7.62-mm to 30-mm). There is an increasing variety of APCs with 7.62-mm, 12.7-mm, and 14.5-mm guns, designed for the traditional "battle taxi" role. A parallel trend is for the increased use of wheels vs tracks. But on selected APCs and on combat support variants, many countries are replacing those guns with 20, 23, 25, or 30-mm guns; and the number of drop-in turrets available has exploded. Improved Oerlikon APDS and APFSDS ammunition has extended the life of 20-mm and 23-mm gun applications. The Vulcan mini-gun and modern auto- cannons in 20-mm can overwhelm a specific area of LAV armor at a high rate of fire. Multi-barrel 23-mm cannons can do the same thing. New cannon for 30-mm rounds (in several round designs) include the Ukrainian KBA-2, Russian 2A72, and Bushmaster II. Improved 30-mm rounds offer 100+ mm penetration at 1000 m (120 mm for 8-rd burst). Recently German Mauser displayed the RMK-30 recoilless gun. The light recoil gun permits accurate high-rate aimed fire to a range of 3,000 m, with a variety of ammunition including APDS and APFSDS on very light vehicle mounts.

Infantry fighting vehicles, Tanks, and fire support vehicles (20+ mm). Most IFVs feature auto-cannons in the 20-30 mm range, with a rate of fire of 500-700 rd/min, but a practical rate of fire of 100-250 rd/min. Aimed fire is generally confined to bursts, with a substantial dispersion. As armors have increased, the current trend is a shift in gun size toward 30-50 mm. A number of 35 mm guns, including the South African EMAK auto-cannon or Swiss Oerlikon 35/1000 revolver cannon (1,000+ rd/min rate of fire) have been offered for use in IFV upgrade turrets.

A 35-mm round doubles the penetration of 30-mm rounds. Swedish Hagglunds went a step farther with the 40-mm cannon on the CV9040 IFV. Italian Otobreda offers the T60/70A 60-mm gun turret for the Dardo IFV. The cannon features precision semi-automatic fires rather than automatic, but fires as rapidly as the target can be acquired. Penetration is well over 150 mm at 2000 m. The next trend (by around 2010) is cased-telescoped ammunition (CTA), which permits a 30-mm gun to achieve KE effects comparable to that of a 35-mm or 40-mm gun.

Tanks and heavy armored combat vehicles (HACVs)

Any KE round of a 57+mm gun will damage and probably destroy a LAV. Canister and APERS (anti-personnel) rounds fired from tank guns, antitank guns, or HACVs guns can damage or destroy LAVs.

Other KE threats

Mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Belly attack mines can include kinetic energy penetrator mines, which defeat even mine-resistant vehicles. Side-attack sensor-fuzed mines include Russian plate mines with aimed directional fragmentation. Other mines and IEDs have warheads which produce an explosively formed penetrator (EFP, shaped like a sabot penetrator), to defeat light to heavy armor, depending on design. Such mines include the Russian TM-83 and TEMP-30 sensor-fuzed mine. Other mines and IEDs (e.g., PD Mi-Pk) can produce multiple EFPs. Even blast effects from mines and IEDs can cause severe kinetic energy damage by flipping over vehicles, causing material to toss about inside and killing or injuring personnel.

Frangible rounds. The frangible armor-piercing discarding sabot (FAPDS) round design uses a brittle rod which can penetrate armor, then shatter after penetration, to spread varying sized fragments within the target. It flies with similar ballistics (including range and high velocity) to a KE round, but with effects of a Frag-HE round. Although most are currently designed for anti-aircraft use against thin armors, some are effective (with tailored brittleness, size, and design) for use against improved LAVs, such as IFVs.

Programmable fuze rounds. The Swiss Oerlikon 35-mm AHEAD round for use against aircraft uses an electronic fuze that is calibrated by a laser rangefinder, the fire control computer, and an electronic setter within the gun. At the pre-set time, the round fires a volley of KE sub projectiles forward (in the manner of 00 buckshot), with overall range to 5,000 m. Technology variants are being tested against ground vehicles. The AHEAD technology is available with other sizes of rounds, such as 30-mm PMC308. Russian HEF rounds for BMP-3M (100-mm) and T-80K tank (125 mm) employ the same technology, with range to more than 7,000 m. Russian rounds also permit an adjusted trajectory, in which they over-fly the vehicle and blast fragments outward and downward against the thin top armor of armored vehicles.

Artillery-delivered KE munitions. Artillery rounds include Russian 122-mm and 152-mm cannon rounds with  top-attack flechettes, which  can cover a wide  area.  They can damage  and penetrate most LAVs.

Sensor-fuzed artillery rounds, e.g., Russian Motiv-M, German SMART-155, and US SADARM can fire an EFP into the vehicle top for a sure penetration and kill.

Kinetic energy missiles. Prototype KE ATGMs are in various stages of development. High-velocity missiles (HVMs) offer a heavy armor overmatch against the heaviest armors with long range (5-7 km) and short flight times (4 km in 1-2 seconds). One HVM system that is a current threat to LAVs is, in fact, Starstreak (MANPADS and multi-role missile, page 5-52 below). Starstreak uses laser-beam rider (LBR) guidance and shoulder, vehicle, or helicopter launch. Lethal mechanism is 3 darts - each a LBR Mach 4 HVM with high- penetration (125 mm) and HE blast. These can slam a helicopter target out to 7 km in 2-7 seconds, and have been successfully tested against light armored vehicle targets. A vehicle launcher version, Armored Starstreak, uses the Alvis Stormer LAV chassis and 8 launchers. Any Starstreak launcher is a threat to LAVs. The missile defeats almost all known countermeasures, including APS.

Future Developments in KE Attack

For the 40-mm CTA gun on the aborted US FSCS/ British TRACER programs, there was a proposal to modify the Starstreak dart into a KE missile round to fit in the autoloader, as an ATGM for use against LAVs and aircraft. The gun is fitted on the recently displayed Lancer proposed for reconnaissance vehicle and IFV and designs.

ATGMs exist with fly-over top-attack mode and EFP for target kill. The US Javelin is a successful fielded example. Other fly-over (Swedish Bill, Bill-2) ATGMs and top-attack (Israeli Spike/Gill) ATGMs with shaped- charge warheads have been fielded. The British fly-over sensor fuzed MBT-LAW ATGL employs a HEAT warhead. These designs are steps toward future soldier systems with fly-over EFP warheads for KE attack.

Attack UAVs and Micro-UAVs are being developed. A French proposal for Leclerc 2015 includes tank- launched attack micro-UAVs. The UAV kill mechanism is a top-attack EFP, which would easily penetrate LAV top armor.


Fighting vehicle developers have found a variety of upgrades to improve light armored vehicles. However, they are more useful in protecting the vehicle during travel to the combat zone. All of these innovations offer marginal increase in protection against modern anti-armor weapons in close combat. Even expensive high-technology approaches, such as active protection systems, will not protect against many KE munitions which threaten LAVs. In close terrain, high defilade and urban areas, combat vehicles (including tanks and LAVs) are very vulnerable on their flanks and rear. Many modern IFVs have lost their firing ports and have limited awareness or firepower to address those directions.

Technical Implications: The vehicles need weapons and sensors to address all threats for 360°, and at high and low angles of fire. Remote weapon stations and periscopes for the dismountable infantry can be added. Additional protection can be added, for use against selected high lethality weapons, such as antitank grenade launchers. Other assets are gun shields for crewmen which are partially out of vehicles, or remote fire control systems which can be operated from the inside. Side skirts and better mine/wheel well protection are needed.

Tactical Implications: Technical AT considerations may force changes in tactics for mechanized infantry and crews of combat support systems. Tactics must exploit firepower, integration, and protection in the combined arms force as well as adaptive use of cover, concealment, and deception. Assaults across open areas against light forces can lead to disaster. Movement must employ speed, cover/concealment, and mutually supporting fires. Once a squad dismounts, it may have to precede the vehicle to protect it from

anti-armor weapons, not follow and use it for protection. Although some tacticians differentiate IFVs from APCs, claiming that IFV squads can fight from the vehicle, that distinction is insignificant in close terrain, and in the face of modern AT weapons. These are only some of the responses to the spectrum of threats to light armored vehicles today. See Chapter 15, Upgrades, for additional responses.

Recoilless Weapons for Modern Warfare

In past decades, recoilless weapons were considered lethal and formidable antitank assets. Recoilless antitank grenade launchers (ATGLs) for squads have seen tremendous improvements (see Chapter 1). But, as tank armor has improved, most of the crewed systems for use by AT teams operating above squad level have seen fewer upgrades. Today, many of those crewed AT weapons are considered obsolescent. However, upgrades are available; and new weapons are now fielded. With more changes, crewed recoilless weapons can be effective.

One advantage of recoilless systems is their utility. They offer a variety of munitions, including HEAT, HE, flechette, and others, to service most battlefield targets. Some recoilless launchers (aka, recoilless guns or rifles, or mounted grenade launchers) are light enough for easy transport in light vehicles, with ability against infantry while outranging most infantry weapons. A well-proliferated example is the SPG-9/9M, with HE range beyond 4,000 m.

Recoilless weapons are limited by certain design and operational considerations. The bore size limits size of rounds and their ability to penetrate modern tank armor. However, many offer sufficient penetration to defeat other armored and unarmored vehicles (which outnumber tanks on the battlefield). Those systems are best used to augment other forces in a fight.

A key value is in their general lethality. With a higher rate of fire than most antitank guided missile (ATGM) launchers at 5 or more rounds per minute, they are useful as a fire support asset that can augment fires of other weapons against various targets. Most lack the range of ATGMs. All lack the precision. But these multi-role systems can digest various rounds to defeat vehicles, then kill exiting personnel with large HE blast munitions. In a close fight or ambush, many of these weapons can kill any vehicle other than a main battle tank (MBT) from any aspect. Some can also damage or kill MBTs from the side or rear. As we have noted for infantry antitank grenade launchers (ATDLs), crewed weapons include new ones, and upgraded munitions with tandem HEAT warheads which can kill all tanks from the side or rear (see table).

A number of features have improved precision of these weapons. A variety of electro-optical sights can be mounted on these weapons. SPG-9M and SPG-29 Mounted can use the Russian 2Ts35 laser- rangefinder sight or a widely marketed lightweight ballistic computer sight such as the Simrad IS2000. Adaptable night sights include II sights like Simrad KN250F, and various compact thermal sights. A challenge to all grenades is their relatively slow velocity, which reduces hit probability (Ph) against moving vehicles. Some have high velocity (600 m/s for Italian Folgore, 700 for SPG-9) and flat trajectories to increase Ph vs movers.

A few manufacturers are looking for improved accuracy munitions. The ultimate solution is to add ATGM launch capability to recoilless launchers. Israeli IAI has offered to produce a version of the LAHAT for use in the 90 mm M40 recoilless rifle. Even the best recoilless round cannot kill a modern tank from the frontal aspect. Any ATGM exiting a bore of <150 mm has a low probability to defeat MBT front armor. But a top- attack tandem warhead missile,  e.g., a 90 mm version of LAHAT  for the M40  launcher offers  probable

major damage (or catastrophic kill) against an MBT turret or hull. Other vehicles would expect a catastrophic kill. Israeli IAI has offered development of the ATGM variant. In a beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) environment, ATGM capability dramatically increases effectiveness of this type of weapon.

Another limitation for recoilless weapons is their detectability. Most have high smoke and noise signatures in the backblast. Most are fairly tall and must be hand-loaded from a standing or kneeling position, which exposes the team to counter-fires. Older weapons are heavy enough to require breaking down and loading into vehicles for moves, limiting their ability to shoot and move quickly. One example of poor mobility is the old Russian B-10 (at 85 kg towed carriage, 72 without). With an anti-armor range of 400- 1,000 m, the first shot had better be accurate and lethal, or the crew is in serious trouble. Thus many users only employ these older weapons in combined arms defenses and ambushes, to augment other fires.

Some old launchers have been modified to reduce weight, plus break down into components for dismounted moves. The Chinese Type 65 is a lighter weight version of B-10, at 28 kg, and uses improved ammunition. The Serbian M79 variant also weighs less than 30 kg. With improved sights, it has an anti- armor range of 670-1,000 m. Better range aids survivability.

Several newer recoilless weapons have been designed for reduced weight, lower operating profile, and reduced move and setup times. Examples include RPG-29 Mounted (next page) and the Serbian M90. The best of the modern lightweight crewed launchers may be the Chinese 120-mm PF-98. Although it operationally resembles RPG-29, it is actually an amalgam of features from a variety of modern systems. Like the RPG-29, it comes in shoulder-launch version or tripod-mount crewed version. The launcher appears to be directly derived from the Montenegro/Serbian 120-mm M90. However, they followed the Russian design by adding a lightweight tripod, and a canistered grenade which attaches to the launcher to extend its length. The ammunition is another amalgam, with warheads which could be derived from recent Carl Gustaf rounds, and a rocket motor that resembles a scaled up RPG-29 motor. The sight is a modern EO/LRF ballistic computer sight. The result is a state-of-the-art launcher with 800/2,000 m range, 800+ mm penetration, light weight (<18 kg loaded), and competitive precision.

Rapid mobility, as noted earlier, is a critical factor for survivability and utility of these weapons. Since most legacy systems cannot be easily adapted for mobility, an alternative use is to mount them on vehicles. They offer good lethality to protect vehicles; and the vehicles facilitate launch-and-move operations, without downtime for disassembly. Examples include fire support versions of BTR-50 and Czech OT-21 APCs, and various weapons on the BTR-152 armored transporter. They have also been fitted on a motorcycle and on boats.

A good weapon for ground and vehicle mounts is the Russian SPG-9, which has been seen pintle-mounted on a UAZ-469 TUV. The launcher is well proliferated, and seen several upgrades. On the SPG-9M upgrade, 2Ts35 or other more modern LRF ballistic sights are available. AT ranges are 1,300 m for improved HEAT, and 1,000 for tandem HEAT. The best of these weapons for vehicle mount is the US M40 106 mm recoilless rifle. The Bofors Retrofit Kit updates it into a modern and effective fire support weapon. Sights include the CLASS laser sight, and others. Munitions include flechette, HEP-T, and tandem HEAT. Addition of the LAHAT ATGM (above) would greatly expand its lethality. With these and other expected upgrades, and with new designs in production, we can expect to see recoilless weapons employed against U.S. forces for many more years.

Chapter 6: Artillery Systems

This chapter provides the basic characteristics of selected artillery weapon systems, artillery reconnaissance, and artillery command and control (C2) systems in use or readily available to the OPFOR. Therefore, systems discussed in this chapter are those likely to be encountered by U.S. forces in varying levels of conflict. The selection of artillery systems is not intended to be all-inclusive, rather a representative sampling of weapons and equipment supporting various military capabilities.

This update is divided into the following categories¾artillery command and reconnaissance, towed cannon, self-propelled cannon, multiple-rocket launchers, mortars and combination guns, and artillery ammunition.

Artillery Weapons: Rocket Launchers

Compared to cannon, rocket launchers (RLs) are relatively uncomplicated, easy to operate and maintain, and are highly mobile. Single-tube RLs vary from 107 mm (Type 85) to 544 mm (Luna-M/FROG-7). Single- tube RLs of 122-mm or less are man-portable for use by dismounted troops.

The majority of RLs are multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). The OPFOR categorizes MRLs as medium-caliber (100 – 220 mm), and large-caliber (220 mm and larger). The OPFOR uses MRLs to deliver heavy fire on important targets at decisive moments in a battle. They offer an economical means to deliver massive, destructive fires on an area-type target in a very short period of time. The principal disadvantage of some MRLs is that excessive dispersion does not permit direct, close support to maneuver elements. For sudden massive strikes, MRLs may execute salvo fire from the launchers. These flexible assets may fire as battery and battalion groups or as platoons or autonomous weapons. MRLs can provide the initial area coverage fires, while cannons and mortars either maintain fire at a steady volume or attack high-value point targets. MRLs are also excellent weapons for counter-battery fire, especially when the enemy uses large-area dispersion for survivability.

The MRL is an excellent area coverage weapon, and its rapid ripple fire is an excellent delivery system for high-explosive (HE), volumetric explosive (VEX), and smoke projectiles; chemical agents; and submunitions. The OPFOR often dedicates some MRLs with scatterable mines to lay on-demand mine fields. Improved munitions, e.g., guided projectiles enable MRLs to fire multiple salvos strikes from autonomous platoons or launchers, with lethal results against point targets or small target nodes.

Chapter 7: Engineer Vehicles

Chapter 8 of the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) provides the basic threat characteristics for selected engineering equipment and systems. The engineer chapter discusses the following topics: landmines, minelaying systems, mine-clearing systems, route clearing systems, and “gap-crossing” systems either in use or readily available to the OPFOR and therefore likely to be encountered by US forces in varying levels of conflict in the future.

The list of engineer systems within this chapter is not meant to be encyclopedic. This chapter provides the US training community with a list of representative engineering (systems based) capabilities that allow scenario developers and the rest of the training community to create a dynamic threat to prepare today’s warfighter for tomorrow’s battlefield.

The chapter is divided into three major categories¾The Land Mine Primer, the Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) Primer, and WEG Sheets on mobility engineering assets. The Land Mine Primer focuses on counter-mobility and examines types of mines, minefields, emplacement or mine delivery methods. The UGV Primer discusses provides an UGV overview and of how certain systems are used for detect hazards and supporting the defeat of explosive devices such as mines. The third section consists of WEG sheets on mobility engineering assets such as but not limited to bridge crossing and mine clearing assets.

Land Mine Primer

The widespread proliferation and use of landmines on today’s battlefield can be contributed to a combination of a number of factors, which include the following: the ability to easily mass produce items, the development of plastic devices, improved battlefield delivery systems, and ongoing research with regards to sophisticated fuzes. The advances in mass production techniques and the associated reduction in per-item cost along with the simplicity of manufacturing/automated production make landmines extremely easy and relatively inexpensive to produce. Technological improvements have also affected landmines in the form of the widespread use of plastic in the construction of the devices. This development has rendered metal detectors mostly ineffective for locating newer plastic-cased mines (unless the manufacture intentionally places a mass of metal in the mine). Remotely delivered mines have expanded the capability for quickly changing the tempo of battle with relation to counter mobility tactical actions and reinforcing defensive positions.

1. Types of Minefields

The following are basic types of OPFOR minefields: antitank (AT), antipersonnel (AP), mixed, decoy, and antilanding. AT minefields are the primary types of OPFOR engineer obstacle and serve to destroy or disable armored vehicles. They are primarily established in belts consisting of multiple rows on avenues that are favorable for tanks in front of the forward edge and on the flanks. Where difficult terrain is available, minefield belts will be tied into terrain obstacles to reduce the mine requirement. The OPFOR sets up conventional AP minefields on the forward edge of friendly defensive positions, in front of AT minefields, or along dismounted avenues of approach. Mixed minefields consist of both AP and AT mines. Decoy minefields are a significant form of deception to slow movement or deceive as to true unit locations. Antilanding minefields prevent landings by amphibious, airborne, or heliborne assault forces.

Minefields can also be categorized by their technical method of activation—uncontrolled, controlled, and intelligent. Controlled minefields consist of landmines with electronic switches that allow the operator (controller) control over the operational status of the minefield. The operator can change the status of the landmines either by a direct hardwire link or by radio. An entire minefield can be emplaced and turned on or off, as necessary to best support OPFOR operations. On a smaller scale, select passages in a conventional minefield can contain controllable landmines, allowing for the option of clearing safe lanes. The addition of selectable, anti-removal, and self-destruct features to controlled mines enhance flexibility and overall effectiveness.

Intelligent minefields have advanced technology that allows minefields to switch on and off and to deactivate at a certain time. When used in conjunction with unmanned ground sensors (UGS) they can communicate via and communications link and be activated remotely. Other advancements include acoustic and infrared signature activated mines. While many of these concepts are in the developmental stage, the technological means are available and have the potential to deploy as needs arise. They will be composed of “wide area coverage” mines.

2. Types of Mines

Mines may be AT/anti-vehicle, AP, antihelicopter, or area mines. They may also be defined by the manner in which they are emplaced such as scatterable (remote), or side-attack (generally AT or anti-vehicle) or their area coverage. As noted earlier for minefields, the OPFOR makes distinctions between controlled mines (command-operated by hard wire or radio linkage) and uncontrolled mines.

Side-attack mines are autonomous weapons that attack targets from the side as they pass by. These include anti- vehicle, anti-personnel, and anti-helicopter mines. They vary among manufactured side-attack mines, side-attack improvised explosive devices, and mines created by attaching manufactured or improvised sensor units to anti- tank grenade launchers (ATGLs) and anti-tank disposable launchers (ATDLs). Some side-attack mines can be used

for multiple roles. For instance, directional fragmentation mines and IEDs can be used against personnel and vehicles. Some like the MON-100 can tilt upward for anti-helicopter use.

Current developments in side-attack landmines use mature technology from other weapon programs. Since side- attack landmines have increased areas of coverage, the number required to hinder mobility of enemy forces is greatly reduced. Uses for these landmines include harassment throughout the area of operation and reinforcement of conventional minefields to make "cleared" lanes unsafe. Special Purpose Forces (SPF) and security patrols can also use these mines to economically cover multiple avenues of approach to alert on enemy encroachments. These types of mines can be used in ambush’s kill zones.


Conventional antitank mines, such as the TM-62 AT mine, are those that are emplaced either by hand or by mechanical means. These will continue to be the primary landmine threat throughout the foreseeable future. They are readily available to armies and insurgency groups worldwide and are inexpensive and effective. These mines are normally buried just below the surface of the ground but can be surface laid or buried with up to 30 cm of cover. Antitank mines can vary in size from as small as 1.4 kg for a scatterable mine (PTM-1S) to over 20 kg for a side attack mine (TM-83). The category of antitank mines includes side-attack and anti-vehicle mines.

Side-attack antitank

Commonly called “off-route mines”, side-attack mines are an integral part of the adaptive battlefield and date back to the LGM trip-wire AT mines of the Vietnam War era. Today there are at least 18 different side-attack mines in use by 22 countries. Ten more side-attack mines are under development. Within the next few years these weapons will have proliferated to every combat environment. Some mines have been out fitted with acoustic and infrared signature detonation capabilities. The Polish Agawa comes in two variants, the legacy contact-fuzed MPB-ZK and the new non-contact, acoustic-activated MPB-ZN. Some mines and IEDs have warheads which produce an explosively formed penetrator (EFP), a metal sabot which penetrates light to heavy armor, depending on design. EFPs were used in the Iraqi theater against US and coalition forces. The majority of usage of such systems were by Shia Militias. Such mines include the Russian TM-83, and TEMP-30 sensor-fuzed mine. Sensor fuzed ATGL or ATDL based mines can also be effective. A shoulder-fired AT weapon placed on a tripod and fitted with an IR sensor can kill moving targets up to 100 meters away. Current warhead technology in these weapons allows penetration of up to 950 mm of rolled homogeneous armor.


Many smaller antitank mines, or larger antipersonnel mines, have been developed (or modified) to severely damage or destroy vehicles other than tanks with a few pounds of high explosives or fragmentation. These may be either trucks, tactical utility vehicles such as UAZ-469, or light armored combat vehicles such as BTRs.

Side-attack sensor-fuzed mines such as Russian platter mines direct fragmentation to damage or destroy vehicles. Other mines and IEDs (e.g., PD Mi-Pk) initiate multiple EFPs for KE penetration. Blast effects from mines and IEDs can inflict kinetic energy damage by flipping over vehicles, bending metal, and tossing material about inside to kill or injure personnel.


Antipersonnel landmines injure by either blast or fragmentation. The small antipersonnel mine contains no more than a pound (usually only a few ounces) of high explosive. Blast injures by the force of the charge. The loss of a foot or a leg is the common result. Fragmentation mines contain hundreds to thousands of pellets. Plastic-cased landmines pepper their victims with small particles of plastic that are not detectable with x-

rays, making complete cleansing of wounds extremely difficult and increasing the risk of infection and amputation. On the battlefield, the modern AP mine is used to—

  • Inflict personnel casualties.
  • Hinder soldiers in clearing AT minefields.
  • Establish defensive positions.
  • Deny access to terrain.

The modern attack helicopter, with increasing agility and weapons payload, is able to bring enormous firepower to bear on enemy forces. To counter this threat, a new type of mine—the antihelicopter mine—was developed. By borrowing technologies from the side-attack and wide-area landmines, antihelicopter mines may make use of acoustic fuzing to locate and target potential low-flying targets at significant distances. Their multiple-fragment warheads are more than capable of destroying light-skinned, non-armored targets at closer ranges.

A simple antihelicopter mine can be assembled from an acoustic sensor, a triggering IR sensor, and a large directional fragmentation mine. More advanced mines use a fairly sophisticated data processing system to track the helicopter, aim the ground launch platform, and guide/fire the kill mechanism toward the target. As the helicopter nears the mines, the acoustic sensor activates or cues an IR or MMW sensor. This second sensor initiates the mine when the helicopter enters the lethal zone of the mine. A typical large fragmentation warhead is sufficient to damage soft targets, such as aircraft. Alternate warhead designs include high-explosive warheads and single or multiple explosively formed penetrators.

Area Coverage

The terms “area” and “wide area” mines are often confusing and misleading. Mines classified as area mines range from antipersonnel “bouncing Betty” mines to side-attack mines, directional fragmentation mines “claymores”, and possibly antihelicopter mines. Wide area coverage mines with sophisticated fuzing and possibly a limited communications capability are weapons of the future and have not been fielded. The Polish Agawa MPB-ZN is a wide area coverage AT mine with an acoustic activated target detection range of around 150m and its EFP is described as effective against 100 mm of rolled homogenous steel armor at distances of 50 m.

3. Emplacement or Delivery Methods

In the past, landmines were generally emplaced manually one at a time. Mass mine delivery and distribution systems permit the rapid placement of large quantities of mines. Landmine emplacement vehicles are designed to automatically arm and bury a landmine every 3-10 meters. Landmines also may be placed with artillery, rockets, or aircraft at a rate of hundreds, even thousands, of mines per minutes. Emplacement means may be manual, mechanical, or remote. Manual emplacement is not possible when there is little time or during high-speed maneuver operations. Therefore, mechanical and remote means are more prevalent.


The OPFOR manually emplaces minefields when

  • There is no contact with the enemy.
  • Mechanical minelayers are unavailable.
  • It is inadvisable to use mechanical minelayers because of terrain restrictions.

OPFOR engineers rely extensively on mechanized minelayers. These can bury or surface-lay AT mines. The layout of mechanically emplaced minefields is the same as those emplaced by hand. Mines can also be emplaced by helicopters or vehicles with the use of chutes (slides). Mine chutes can also be used to assist manual burial emplacement or to surface-lay mines.

Scatterable Mines

Known as “scatterable mines” in the US, other countries call them “remotely-delivered”. They are landmines emplaced through a variety of means and are designed as such to be delivered by aircraft, tube artillery, multiple rocket launchers, missiles, ground vehicles, or they can be hand-thrown. Scatterable mines are not a standard item except in well-equipped armies of the world. While the number of countries possessing scatterable mines continues to increase, there will continue to be many areas of the world where scatterable mines are not a threat through the far term.

Minefield emplacement is progressing from manually and mechanically emplaced minefields to the more flexible and dynamic remotely, scatterable minefield. The ability to remotely deliver mines allows a rapid response with thousands of landmines at any point on the battlefield. Since many scatterable landmines feature self-destruct and anti-disturbance fuzing, they are well suited for operations that deny terrain for a specific period. After the allotted time has expired, the terrain can once again be used by friendly forces. Scatterable mines may be delivered by the following methods:


Multiple rocket launchers are the primary means of remote minelaying. The principal advantage of MRL mine delivery is its ability to quickly emplace large minefields in a single volley, while minimizing exposure to enemy targeting and weapon systems. Both AP and AT mines can be delivered by artillery (which may include cannon and mortar rounds).

Ground Vehicles

Within recent years the trend has been to mount scatterable-mine dispensers on ground vehicles. Both AP and AT mines can be launched from ground vehicles. This also gives the engineers the ability to re-seed or reinforce an obstacle without entering the minefield itself.


Lower level OPFOR infantry units may employ man-portable remote mine dispensers. These man- portable dispensers, weighing only a few pounds, are ideal for installing small, defensive, AP or AT minefields. Infantry-fired ground dispensers allow low-level units to remotely emplace minefields to protect their fighting positions, flanks, and boundaries between units, or to cover firing lines and gaps in combat formations. They can quickly close breaches in existing protective minefields and increase the density of mines on armor avenues of approach.


Both AT and AP minefields can be laid using aerial minelaying systems. Bombers and fighter-bombers can lay remotely delivered minefields in the operational depths. Ground-attack aircraft lay these minefields in the enemy’s tactical depths. Helicopter minelaying systems are used to emplace small mine belts or large barrier minefields in the execution of army or division offensive or defensive maneuver plans. This type of aerial minelaying is normally conducted over friendly territory along flanks or in rear areas.

When supporting an airborne or air assault landing, helicopters may lay mines on enemy territory. Helicopter mine chutes are a tool available to even low-technology helicopter forces for installation on a variety of helicopters by low echelon maintenance units and rapidly dispensing conventional anti-tank mines in areas inaccessible to even

rapidly moving ground vehicles. Placement of a limited number of side-attack or conventional AT/AP mines along likely movement routes allows the OPFOR to harass traffic, slow movement rates, cause casualties, and affect enemy morale.

4. Fuzes

Some types of fuzes, such as pressure fuzes, are used in both AT and AP mines while other fuzes tend to be linked to more specific types of mines. For example, acoustic sensors are generally used with antihelicopter and advanced off-route mines while magnetic, tilt-rod, or seismic fuzes are used with AT mines. Most AT mines are detonated by the pressure of a vehicle driving over a buried mine or by the movement of a tilt rod attached to the mine.

Pressure and tilt-rod AT mine fuzes (contact fuzes) are being complemented and in certain cases replaced by mines with magnetic, optical, seismic, and acoustic influence mines. Some mines have a second fuze well to facilitate the installation of an antihandling fuze. Conventional antihandling devices and target-sensing fuzes have evolved into sophisticated booby traps, which virtually assure grievous injury or death to the de-miner. Some landmines may be detonated by metal detectors; others explode when their fuzes detect light when lifted from the ground. One version of the “Bouncing Betty” is activated by an array of seismic detectors. Other mines, for example the US M18A1, will accommodate a variety of fuzes, including tripwire and command detonation. Other mines, especially antihelicopter mines use a combination of sensors/fuzes to acquire the helicopter and initiate the mine when the helicopter enters the lethal zone. The following is a list of fuzes:


The pressure fuze is the most common type of fuzes for both AT and AP mines. Also known as the contact fuze, it may require only a few ounces pressure to active the mine or as much as several hundred pounds. Trip Wire. Also called pressure release, these fuzes may be attached to a thin wire stretched across a path or route. When the victim or vehicle passes and breaks the wire, the mine is detonated. Trip wires are used mainly with AP and side-attack mines.


Most armored vehicles contain a large quantity of steel and therefore create large magnetic disturbances that signal their presence to a magnetic influence fuzed landmine.


An optical fuze, using a small infrared or ultra-violet transmitting diode on a

surface-placed landmine, sends a detonation signal with it senses light reflecting from the hull of a tank. Radar. A small, micro-electronic radar can sense the underside of a tank by the magnitude and location of the radar reflection.


Mines can be equipped with sensors that detect the vibrations caused by the weight and track movement of tanks or by the noise they make.


When a system approaches, antihelicopter or advanced off-route mines use an acoustic sensor to activate or cue an IR, seismic, or MMW sensor.


IR sensors are generally used against vehicles, ground and aerial.

Explosive Charge Minefield Breaching Systems

Minefield breaching explosive line charge systems are in use throughout the world. These systems provide the maneuver commander a method to expeditiously breach antitank or antipersonnel minefields. Once identified on the battlefield however, these systems can become a priority target. Some systems, single or double line, are mounted on tanks while others are mounted on trailers, armored vehicles, and trucks. Some other systems are man-portable. The larger vehicle and trailer-mounted systems are designed to clear lanes through minefields/obstacles, large enough for the passage of ground combat vehicles. Man-portable (infantry) systems clear passage for at least one person to transit. The explosive filled lines are usually connected to a launcher by a cable, fired over a minefield (within which it lands) and then detonated to create a breach through the minefield.

Standoff between the explosive charge and launcher varies. For instance, the Japanese CX has a standoff of 800 meters from the launcher.

Truck or Trailer Mounted Mine breaching Systems

Motorized and infantry units may have either wheeled or towed antitank mine breaching systems. While some of these systems can be dismounted, most are fired from the

back of cargo trucks or from trailers.

Name Country of  Origin Chassis System (or Shell) Weight (kg)





Range (m) Length (m) Standoff (m) Effectiveness

Lane Width (m):

Lane Length (m)

Lane clearing time (min)

Type Launcher/# Line Charges Rocket Diameter (mm) Operators Explosive Type /#/ Notes
UR-83P FSU Truck (ZIL-

131) or trailer

Dimensions (m) (ready for launch)
  • Length: 1.5
  • Width: 1.5
  • Height: 2.6

Launcher Wt (kg):

  • Total: 230
  • Packaged: 360
  • Charge: 1,380
440 114 LL: 115

LW: 6

Assembly time by engineer squad (min): 90

Line UZP-83 charge 2 portable dismountable
Type 81 CH EQ-240 Truck chassis Loaded: 5,112

Unloaded: 4,082

Exp: unk Exp/m: unk

3,000 na 2,900 + LL: 60+

LW: 10+

10 tube 2,530 3 HE, FAE

ea round clears 18 m radius in AP.

The Type 81 mineclearing rocket system consists of a 10-tube launcher mounted on the rear of a modified EQ-240 chassis. Rockets are loaded manually by three persons. The Chinese have stated that this system is effective against AP mines, but its effectiveness against AT mines is unknown. The range of this system is 3,000 meters, which provides the system with a maximum standoff of approximately 2,900 meters. Each round clears an 18-meter radius within an AP minefield. The Type 1987 has 24 launch tubes and is

mounted on a Type 59/69 tank chassis.

Tracked-Vehicle-Mounted Systems

Systems mounted on the rear of tanks increase the survivability of the platform and therefore increase the likelihood that it may be successfully employed prior to its destruction. The use of a tracked chassis as the launch carrier gives the system the same mobility and maneuverability on the battlefield as mechanized units; however, use of these systems does not allow tanks or mechanized vehicles to conduct a “Blitzkrieg” type rush across the minefield. Systems found in armor and mechanized divisions will generally be mounted on tracked vehicles due to mobility requirements. Although these minefield breaching systems may (or may not) be mounted on tanks they do not belong to the maneuver commander. They are engineer assets and are found in rather limited numbers. Two of these systems are in the Mine clearing Platoon, Mine Warfare Company, Division Engineer Company, and Engineer Battalion of a mechanized/armored division, engineer brigade, or Corps.  Further information on these elements can be found in TC 7-100.2.

Tracked-Vehicle-Mounted Systems
Name Country of Origin Chassis System                   (or Shell)

Weight (kg) Overall: Rocket: Explosive


Range (m) Length (m) Standoff (m) Effectiveness Lane Width (m): Lane Length (m)

Lane clearing time (min)

Type Launcher/# Line


Rocket Diameter (mm) Crew Explosive Type /#/ Notes
Type 84 CH Tank             or other armored vehicle OA: 800

Rocket: unk Exp: 400

Exp/m: 5

300 80 200 LL: 60

LW:   5

1 unk unk Line charge
The Type 84 mounts in a box on the rear of a tank or other vehicle. Inside the box is a rocket in a launch rail attached to the box lid, an 80-meter-long explosive hose, and a drag chute. The rocket pulls the explosive hose over the minefield or other obstacle, arming the fuze in flight. After a short delay, the hose explodes leaving a cleared path. The box is automatically discarded after firing. With a published range of 300 meters and a length of 80 meters, the standoff of the system is estimated to be

approximately 200 meters.

Type 762 CH Type 83, 152-mm tracked howitzer OA: unk Rocket: 760

Exp: 400

Exp/m: 3

1,000 130 800-900 LL: 130

LW: 12-22

2 425 unk line     charge.           32 charges 12 kg ea
The Type 762 is a twin-rail rocket launcher mounted on a Type 83, 152-mm tracked howitzer chassis. It carries two 425-mm GSL 211 mineclearing rockets. The warheads on GSL 211 rockets contain an explosive line charge that is extracted during flight. The line charge is composed of 32 fixed-interval explosive charges, each weighing 12 kg. When the explosive charge is at a specific height above the minefield, specially designed detonation fuzes at the head and tail of the line charge activate and simultaneously detonate the charges. The system is equipped with an ordinary rangefinder with questionable accuracy; it is uncertain how the system will perform when deployed over a


SVO CZ BMP-1 Shell size:

Length (mm): 1,457

Dia (mm): 246

Weight (kg): 42

LL: 100-120

LW: 5

Time btwn rounds (sec): 2.5


explosive rockets

fuze initiation rod length (m): .3
The Czech Republic’s SVO is an armored, tracked, mine clearing vehicle used for combat breaches of AT and mixed minefields. The breach is conducted by the launching of mine clearing shells in a specific pattern in order to detonate all the mines along a pathway through the minefield. The entire system is contained in a modified BMP-1 chassis. The turret on the chassis has been removed and exchanged for a rocket firing platform. The firing platform contains 24 launch rods angled at different elevations and deflections in order to provide full warhead coverage for a path through the minefield. The front half of the compartment is for storing and launching the warheads, the other is the operator’s position. The shells fit over the 24 launch rods and are projected into the air by the initiation of explosive cartridges. Piezoelectric fuzes located at the base of the fuze extension rods detonate the shells .3 meters above the ground. The SVO reportedly has a 95% probability of initiating single impulse, nonblast resistant, pressure-fuzed mines.
UZ-67 F S U 2S1


weight (kg): 2,400 93 200 and 350 LL: 75-


LW: 6

Time: 3-5

2 unk 2 basic load of 2 line charges
UZ-77 F S U 2S1


unk 93 200 and 500

water 200

LL: 80-90

LW: 6

Time: 3-5

2 unk 2 basic load of 2 line charges

Man-Portable Rocket Propelled Line Charges

Many countries and some insurgent groups produce small (1 or 2 man-portable) explosive line charges with a wide variety of capabilities and performance. Mechanized infantry units normally do not have these since the tracked vehicles clear a way for the dismounted infantry. The basis of issue of these systems for use by dismounted (or regular) infantry units is generally three per infantry battalion; nine per brigade/regiment; 27 per division. They are used only in the primary avenue of attack (or as a deception). Battlefield employment dictates that the line is fired and detonated. The infantry then moves as quickly as possible (probably under fire) along the cleared path ensuring they do not step on any uncovered/ unexploded mines. The line charges may be carried by one or more soldiers therefore the overall weight of the charges is important. The bullet trap line charge delivery method realizes a significant weight savings by eliminating the additional weight of a rocket. The soldier simply uses his standard issue weapon to deliver the detonating cord/hose across the minefield. This places limitations on the length and weight of the delivered charge. A typical “infantry explosive minefield breaching system” is the FSU ZRP-2. It is a mine demolition charge designed to blast lanes through AP minefields. The ZRP-2 consists of a detonating cable, powder rocket engine, connecting cable, fuze, braking cord, launching table, launching device, anchor and carrying pack. The charge is launched into an AP minefield with the aid of launching device UP-60 from a position prepared on the ground surface. The charge is detonated remotely by a mechanical fuze. The charge is straightened in the minefield manually with the braking cord while the fuze retarder is burning.

ZRP-2 (FSU) Mine demolition charge
Type extended, single-line, made of detonating cable DKR-150A
Weight of set (kg) 50 packaged, 34 in pack
Crew, men 1 or 2
Length of charge (m) 60
Charge launching range (m) 140-160
Size of passage through AP minefield (m) 55 length x 0.4 width
Launch preparation time (min) 5
Infantry Line Charges
Name Country Delivery Method Explosive Weight (kg/m) Length (m)
Type 73 China Rocket 2.40 106
Type 74 China Rocket 2.40 100
Type 81 China Rocket 0.10 100
Type 84 China Rocket 0.40 28
ODMIRA-60 Czech Rep Rocket NA 60
FATEH-1 Egypt Rocket 0.42 120
Comet No 3001 Germany Rocket 0.10 72
Comet No 3010 Germany Rocket 0.57 53
Ladder 80 Germany Rocket NA 70
Unknown Iraq Bullet trap NA 40
POMINS I Israel Bullet trap 0.27 50
POMINS II Israel Rocket NA 50
Type 70 Japan Rocket 1.41 136
Unknown North Korea Rocket NA 180
Clap/M Pakistan Rocket 0.05 300
M/60 Sweden Rocket NA 150
Unknown South Africa Rocket NA 35
Unknown South Africa Rocket NA 120
RAMBS UK Bullet Trap 0.02 40
RAMBS 2 UK Bullet Trap unknown 60
ROMANS UK Rocket unknown 50

UGV Primer

Figure 1: Inspector Mid-Sized Robot, Poland

Unmanned Ground Vehicles or UGVs have been in service for close to forty years, detecting hazards, marking and clearing roads, and supporting the defeat of explosive devices such as mines, and explosive hazards. This mission traditionally was performed by combat engineers such a Sappers and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), personnel and specialized police forces. The work can be extremely dangerous as it requires human contact with potentially lethal explosive devices, and hazardous materials. For this reason, UGVs have found a niche in identifying, disarming and disposing of explosives and other hazardous materials while providing combat engineers the standoff distance necessary to increase survivability. It is estimated that the global market for these types of devices will increase to $8.26 billion by the year 2020.

UGVs are credited with reducing ground troop’s exposure to danger through a combination of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used to leverage this new technology. Some of the new technology that is emerging from this sector includes UGVs that are self-aware, multi-functional, energy efficient, and can operate in a variety of terrain. There are a variety of systems on the market that are designed for explosive disposal ranging in size and capability. The categories are mini, mid, and large size UGVs. Most explosive disposal UGVs fall into the Mid-sized category, as they are easy to remotely control, have a small enough profile to provide access to an emplaced explosive device, while at the same time being large enough to manipulate the devices in order to disable them. Some larger UGVs are being used in other types of combat Engineer support activities such as route clearance, and logistics support. These UGVs can look like modified tractors or forklifts with a special sensors for identifying targets, rollers and scoops to defeat mines or remove obstacles.

Many UGVs have tracked belt and wheel system for driving over complex terrain in all types of weather. UGV’s that perform reconnaissance functions usually move with relatively large treaded wheels for speed and maneuverability. Usually logistical UGVs are have wheels in order to keep supplies close to maneuver units on the battle field. Legged robots like Boston Dynamics Legged Squad Support System, (LS3) otherwise known as Big Dog, attempt to achieve an all-terrain capability through the employment of a quadrupedal gait. The Big Dog program has been “shelved” by the US Marines.

Challenges with UGVs are mainly with maintaining reliable command and control links between the device and the operator. This critical link, requires the operator to gaze into a computer screen while interpreting everything the UGV sees with its usually limited optical sensor. While the operator is engaged in controlling the UGV the Soldier is unable to perform other security duties and has limited situational awareness. One way to handle this

problem is to make UGVs self-aware by installing automatic target recognition (ATR), algorithms that instruct the device on how to approach and defeat obstacles. Additionally the onboard data base is loaded with the most current map data and a satellite based navigation system in order for the device to move autonomously to its target. The link between robot and operator will not be completely severed in the near future as artificial intelligence is unable to build into the device’s electronics the ability to make decisions in a complex combat environment, so operators will still be needed to have a way to give commands and establish control when necessary.

Chapter 8: Logistics

This chapter provides the basic characteristics of selected logistics vehicle and trailers. This chapter provides the basic characteristics of selected trucks, maintenance vehicles, and other logistic equipment readily available to the OPFOR. It includes a representative vehicle from the light, utility, medium, and heavy truck categories. Later updates of this guide will include data on a wider selection of trucks, trailers, vans and other logistical equipment.

Chapter 9: C2 and INFOWAR

Command and Communications C2

This chapter provides basic characteristics of selected tactical command and control (C2) systems either in use or readily available to the OPFOR. Critical C2 equipment

Many foreign militaries are leveraging advances in automated technologies in order to use increasing amounts of data across all warfighting capabilities. Increases in processing power and broadband technologies through commercial research and development make real time situational awareness and communications on the move a tangible objective for many foreign forces. The emergence of rudimentary Integrated Battlefield Management Systems (IBMS) in tier three forces represents this global trend. Net Centric operations are viewed worldwide as a key element of modern military operations, an IBMS is a system that integrates multiple command and control formats as well as sensor data into one display that improves situational awareness through multiple sources.

There are a variety of technologies available to achieve improved situational awareness through network enabled battlefield systems. Foreign forces will incorporate various modern systems into the C2 structure and will rely on manual operators to fuse them to legacy systems.

Incorporating commercial telecommunications and internet service to meet strategic, operational and tactical objectives represents one of the most important aspects of the foreign forces information warfare (INFOWAR) campaign. In tier one and tier two forces, the level of automated interoperability can be integrated across many levels of command through domestically produced systems designed for military use. These systems are equivalent to friendly system capabilities. This selection of systems is not intended to be complete; rather, it is representative of the types and capabilities that are currently fielded or available.

Command systems in the WEG are initially limited to command vehicles, such as the listed BMP-1KSh.

While the focus of the communications equipment for this chapter is primarily tactical communications systems and the more recently fielded IBMS systems, this chapter does include limited information on satellite communication systems (SATCOMs), navigation (NAV) systems, and weather systems. Satellites have added a new dimension to the battle space in the past few decades especially in terms of SATCOM and NAV capabilities.

There are currently over a thousand operating satellites orbiting the earth, with more than half having a primary mission of supporting communication and navigation efforts both commercially and militarily world-wide. See the Tables 2-4 for specific information on examples of these satellites, their owners/operators, and users.

Table 1: Tactical Communications Systems

System Country of Origin Description Frequency Range (MHz) Digital? FH? Range (km) Power Output
Panther-V UK Vehicle/Manpack VHF/UHF 30-108 Yes Yes 50 50W
Jaguar-V UK Vehicle/Manpack VHF 30-88 Yes Yes 50 50W
R163-50U Russia Vehicle VHF 30-80 Yes No 40 30W
R173M Russia Vehicle VHF 30-80 No No 30 20W
M3TR GE Vehicle/Manpack 1.5-512 Yes Yes 50 50W
RF5000 US Vehicle HF 1.6-30 Yes Yes 75 400W
XK2000 GE Vehicle HF 1.5-30 Yes No 75 150W
R123M Russia Vehicle HF/VHF 20-52 No No 30 22W
Panther-P UK Hand-held Squad/Platoon 30-88 Yes Yes 10 5W
TRC5102 France Hand-held Squad/Platoon 30-88 Yes No 7 2W
ACH42 S. Afr. Hand-held Squad/Platoon 45-68 No No 7 2W
R31K Bulgaria Hand-held Squad/Platoon 44-54 No No 5 1W
RL402 Swe/Nor MMW Radio Relay 225-1850 Yes Yes Network N/A
R423-1 Russia Troposcatter Relay System 4400-4700 No N/A Network N/A
KSR8 Hungary Microwave Relay System 8000 Yes N/A Network N/A
R161-5 Russia HF Radio Station 1.5-30 No No 3000 5kW
Scimitar-H UK HF SPF Radio 1.6-30 Yes Yes 500 20W
PRC138 US HF SPF Radio 1.6-80 Yes Yes 500 20W
PVS5300 UK HF SPF Radio 2-30 Yes No 500 20W
PRC104 US HF SPF Radio 2-30 No No 500 20W

Table 2: Communication Satellites

Name of Satellite System Country of Operator/Owner Users Class of Orbit Comments
Amos Israel Military/ Commercial GEO C-band, Ku-band, and Ka-band transponders.
Apstar China Commercial GEO C-band and Ku-band transponders.
AsiaSat China Commercial GEO C-band and Ku-band transponders.
Chuangxin China Government LEO Prototype of advanced telecommunications satellite for LEO.
Express Russia Commercial GEO C-band, Ku-band, and L-band transponders.
Gonets Russia Commercial/Government LEO UHF.
Meridian Russia Military Elliptical C-band transponders.
Raduga Russia Military GEO C-band transponders.
Rodnik Russia Military LEO UHF.
Thuraya United Arab Emirates Commercial GEO C-band and L-band transponders.
Yahsat (Y1A) United Arab Emirates Military/ Commercial GEO C-band, Ku-band, and Ka-band transponders.
Zhongxing China (PR) Military/Government GEO Ku-band transponders.

Table 3: Navigation Satellites

Name of Satellite System Country of Operator/Owner Users Comments Class of Orbit
Beidou China Military Navigation/Global Positioning GEO
Compass China Military Navigation/Global Positioning GEO
Glonass Russia Military/ Commercial Navigation/Global Positioning MEO
Parus Russia Military Navigation LEO

Table 4: Weather Satellites

Name of Satellite System Country of Operator/Owner Users Comments Class of Orbit
Electro Russia Government Meteorology GEO
Haiyang China Government Meteorology LEO
Meteor Russia Government Meteorology LEO

Note: Additional information exists for all these satellites to include perigee, apogee, eccentricity, inclination, period, mass, power, launch site, and launch vehicle and is available on request.


INFOWAR is defined as specifically planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. The goal is to influence an enemy’s decision-making through his collected and available information, information systems, and information-based processes, while retaining the ability to employ friendly information, information-based processes, and systems to control the use of the electromagnetic spectrum at critical locations and times in the battle space or to attack the enemy.

All INFOWAR elements are mutually supporting. INFOWAR occurs through the combinations of seven elements:

  • Electronic warfare (EW).
  • Deception.
  • Physical destruction.
  • Protection and security measures.
  • Perception management.
  • Information attack (IA).
  • Computer warfare.

EW capabilities allow foreign forces to exploit, deceive, degrade, disrupt, damage, or destroy sensors, processors, communications, and command and control (C2) nodes. Information supremacy, delay, and denial, or distortions of the adversary’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum and information infrastructure are the objectives. Electronic warfare (EW) is a perfect example of the integrated nature of foreign forces INFOWAR elements. The EW section in this chapter provides basic characteristics of selected systems either in use or readily available to the foreign forces.

Computer warfare includes capabilities that allow the foreign forces to conduct network warfare (NETWAR) to attack and exploit information systems by attacking key information technology systems within cyberspace, and to conduct network operations (NETOPS) to establish and protect C4ISR networks and information. In NETWAR the foreign forces obtains access through social engineering processes such as phishing schemes but can also employ complex technologies to intercept communications through man in the middle (MITM) attacks and hack into a system remotely. Once access is obtained, foreign forces will attempt to degrade the system or to exploit the system to collect intelligence. Some forms of attack can be launched unexpectedly through a data driven attack known as a “drive-by- download” that is embedded into a website or uploaded to a commonly used system, the victim in these cases releases malware by attempting to access what is believed to be a legitimate site or program. There are various methods used to accomplish this for the purpose of releasing viruses and other malware designed to give the attacker control over the victim’s computer. The methods used to gain access involve highly developed social engineering techniques and or network attacks such as a spoofed email account or a false website.

Because these types of attacks are launched by the end user they are a concern since the attack is able to legitimately pass through various electronic defense systems such as firewalls. If access is obtained an electronic beachhead is established on the infected computer exposing the rest of the network to further attacks such as distributed  denial  of  service attacks that overwhelm internet servers. Attacks can include vandalizing or

sabotaging a website, downloading sensitive information or degrading a key war fighting function through the release of malware.

Cyber espionage describes those INFOWAR actions that involve collecting sensitive and proprietary information such as plans, capabilities or personal data. The threat will exploit poor information technology security that exposes sensitive data to risk of exploitation or manipulation.

Information attack is a type of action that focuses on the intentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner that supports accomplishment of the mission. Unlike computer warfare attacks that target the information systems, information attacks target the information itself. Attacks on the commercial Internet by civilian hackers have demonstrated the vulnerability of cyber and information systems to innovative and flexible penetration, disruption, or distortion techniques.

Computer warfare consists of attacks that focus specifically on the computer systems, networks, and/or nodes. This includes a wide variety of activities, ranging from unauthorized access (hacking) of information systems for intelligence-collection purposes, to the insertion of malicious software (viruses, worms, logic bombs, or Trojan horses). Such attacks concentrate on the denial, disruption, or manipulation of the infrastructure’s integrity. Terrorist organizations use a variety of encryption techniques such as embedding communications into innocuous computer applications in order to transmit data in a surreptitious manner. Other methods are the use of code words to conceal the meaning of topics and swapping Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards or cell phones to prevent electronic surveillance systems from identifying the user of a particular phone.

Evolving mobile technology has increased the portability of battlefield automated systems improving the integration and capabilities of many military functions. The proliferation of these capabilities increases the military’s dependence on mobile devices and the networks that support them. Referred to as the “edge of the network,” mobile systems provide improved situational awareness. However, the complexity associated with these enhancements in functionality, has introduced additional vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities associated with wireless networking, and the need to support an expanding list of military applications, make mobile technology an important, feasible and valuable target for INFOWAR operations. Mobile devices share many of the vulnerabilities of personal computers. However, the attributes that make mobile phones easy to carry, use, and modify as well as comparatively low security standards open them to a range of attacks.

This selection of systems is not intended to be complete; rather, it is representative of the types and capabilities that are currently fielded or available. Later WEG updates will include equipment for other elements of INFOWAR operations. For more information on the INFOWAR tactics techniques and procedures see chapter 7 of TC 7-100.2 OPFOR Tactics.

Table 5: Tactical Electronic Warfare Systems

System Country of Origin Description Frequency Range (MHz) Vs. GPS? Vs. FH? Range (km) Power Output
MEERKAT-S UK ESM/ELINT 2-40,000 No Yes 500km Passive
WEASEL 2000 UK ESM/ELINT .5-10,000 - Yes 500km Passive
EULe Germany ESM/ELINT .9-3,000 - Yes 450km Passive
MCS90 TAMARA Czech Rep ESM/ELINT 820-3,000 - No 450km Passive
R-703 /709 Russia ESM/ELINT 1.5-2,000 Yes n/a Unk Unk
CICADA-C Germany Mounted ESM/ECM HF/VHF/UHF .525-3,000 Yes Yes 100km 10kw
TRC274 France Mounted ESM/ECM HF/VHF/UHF 20-3,000 Yes Yes 150km 4kW

1.2kW on the move

GSY1800 S. Africa Mounted ESM/ECM HF/VHF/UHF 1-3000 Yes Yes 100km (ECM: 1kW)
PELENA-6 Russia Mounted ECM HF/VHF/UHF 20-1,000 No No 60 km 60W
R-330 ZH Russia Mounted ECM HF/VHF 100-2000 Yes No 60km 1kW
CICADA-R Germany Mounted ESM/ECM HF/VHF/UHF 6,000-18,000 No Yes 100km 1kW
LIMAN P2 Ukraine Mounted ECM VHF/UHF 225-1,215* Yes Yes 100km Unk
R-934B Russia Mounted ECM VHF/UHF 100-400 No No 50km 500W
BOQ-X300 Sweden Mounted ECM S/C/X/Ku/K 2-40,000 Yes n/a Unk Unk
CBJ-40 BOME France Mounted ECM S/C/X/Ku 2-20,000 Yes n/a Unk Unk
PELENA-1 Russia Mounted ECM S/C 1,000-4,000 Yes n/a 250 km Unk
SPN-2/4 Russia Mounted ECM X/K 6,000-17,500 No No 130km (ECM: 1kW)
SGS2000 Germany Mounted ESM/ECM HF/VHF/UHF 1.5-1000 No** Yes 100km (ECM: 1kW)
JN-1102 China Mounted ECM VHF (UAV Mounted) 20-500 No Unk Unk Unk
BARRAGE France Mounted ECM VHF (UAV Mounted) 1-3000 Yes No Unk Unk
AJ-045A Bulgaria Mounted ECM VHF (UAV Mounted) 20-100 No No 10km Unk
HUMMEL Germany Mounted ESM/ECM VHF 20-80 No Yes 100km (ECM: 1kW)
STORM-H France Manpack ECM HF/VHF/UHF/ SHF 20-470 No No 5km 1kW (est.)
EL/K 7029/A/B Israel Mounted ESM /VHF /UHF/ESM 116-400 - Yes 100km Passive
ORION Russia ELINT 200-18,000 - No 400km Passive
AVTOBAZA-M Russia ELINT 200-18,000 - No 400km Passive

*Liman does not DF in the 960 to 1,215 MHz range

**SGS 2000 frequency range can be extended up to 3000MHz

Chapter 10: Countermeasures, Upgrades, and Emerging Technology

Chapter 10 includes information on countermeasure techniques, weapon system upgrades, and emerging

technology. The section on countermeasures will detail how the OPFOR can employ a variety of countermeasures in order to secure the advantage over the enemy. The section on weapon system upgrades provides an overview of the types of upgrades common OPFOR weapons systems have. The section on emerging technology highlights advancements of weapon system technology for near- and mid-term time periods.


Countermeasures (CMs) are survivability measures to preserve the integrity of assets and personnel by degrading enemy sensors and weapons effectiveness. These measures often fit within the US Army term CCD (camouflage, concealment and deception) or within the OPFOR term C3D (camouflage, cover, concealment and deception). Decoys used by tactical units within branch operations are designed to aid survivability, and are considered to be countermeasures. Countermeasures can take the form of tactical CMs (or reactive measures), or they can be technical CMs. The variety of tactical CM changes with new unit tactics techniques and procedures (TTP), to adapt to a given situation, within rules of engagement. This document focuses on technical CM. In specialized branches new technical CMs continue to appear.

Modern forces will upgrade systems with selected countermeasures. Many CMs noted are intended to protect combat vehicles from anti-armor sensors and weapons. Although the below CM can be used to counter precision weapons, many were developed for use against conventional weapons. Priorities for countermeasures are dictated by the goals of survival, mission success, and maintaining effectiveness. The first CM priority is to avoid detection until you can control the events. Among goals for using countermeasures, the highest is mission success.

Survival ("Don't Be Killed") is defined holistically, including the following requirements in order of priority: operating system or network survival, vehicle survival, vehicle avoidance of major damage, crew survival, and vehicle avoidance of minor repair. A compatible suite of countermeasures may be limited to a more modest goal, to preserve a measure of effectiveness, even at the risk of system survival. Effectiveness in this context could be defined as - ability to effectively execute the immediate and subsequent missions, until system or subsystem failure interrupts this process. Effectiveness includes: crew effectiveness, mission success, operating system effectiveness, and vehicle/soldier readiness for employment.

Several factors must be considered when selecting countermeasures:

  • Countermeasures should be fielded and mounted on systems with a holistic and rational approach to assure survivability. The rational developer will focus his countermeasures with the highest priority given to assure protection against the most likely and most lethal threats. However, with changing threat capabilities over time, and conflicting priorities, the current CM mix may not be successful. Most CM are responses to specific perceived threats, and are limited by cost and weight budget concerns. With the modern reliance on precision weapons, military forces may develop complex and expensive countermeasure "suites" to degrade their effects.
  • Some countermeasures can degrade a variety of sensors and weapons capabilities. They can be grouped by threat to be countered, such as artillery or ATGM CMs. Others are more adversary and technology-specific, and may not be fielded until that technology is fielded. Driven by threatening technologies, designers may launch a short-response program to produce or purchase countermeasures for rapid mounting.
  • The R&D process has led to the development of counter-countermeasures, intended to negate the effects of CMs. However, at some level, these are also CMs. To avoid confusion on labeling, these will also be called countermeasures.
  • When countermeasures are added to a vehicle or within close proximity, they must be mutually compatible and compatible with other subsystems. Thus issues such as electromagnetic interference and self-blinding with smokes must be considered.
  • Although a variety of countermeasures are now marketed, many technical and financial factors can negate their advantages. Countermeasure development may be restricted due to resource, technology, and fabrication limitations, which vary by country and time frame. Budget limitations may limit fielding of feasible and valuable CM, or compel selection of less capable countermeasures. For instance, active protection systems can counter some weapons; but they are expensive, hazardous to soldiers, and ineffective against many weapons. Thus they may be unsuitable and unlikely for application to many systems. OPFOR users should consult the POC below for assistance in selecting CMs for a specific system.
  • Countermeasures will not replace the need for armor protection and sound tactics.

Lethality Component versus Countermeasure Responses

This table is intended to assist in selection of CM and understanding the categorization for use in upgrade schemes. Many of the more widely-fielded countermeasures are designed to degrade a variety of sensors and munitions, for minimal upgrade cost. Thus, countermeasure types may be repeated under several functions. Because new technologies are emerging rapidly, and systems are finding applications which can place them in several CM types, the placement of CMs can be somewhat arbitrary. Use against artillery vs ATGMs vs ground vehicle weapons will vary. The following list of CM can be used for artillery, air defense, antitank, armor, aircraft, theater missile, and other systems, depending on the platform, gun, sensor, and munition configuration of the system.

Capability to Be Degraded Type of Countermeasure
Detection and location Camouflage: nets, paints, fasteners for added natural materials Cover: entrenching blades, hole-blast device, underground facilities Concealment: screens, skirts, thermal engine covers, scrim, other signature reduction

Deformers, engine exhaust diversion, other signature alteration measures

Aerosols: smoke and flares, water spray systems Decoys, clutter, and acoustic countermeasures

Counter-location measures: GPS jammers, laser and radar warning systems

C2/sensor-shooter links See Information Warfare (IW) Chapter
Platform or weapon Counterfire: directional warning systems, laser radars, for rapid response

Directed energy weapons (DEW), such as high-energy lasers

System prioritization for hard-kill, e.g., anti-helicopter mines (See Ch 7)

Weapon sensors and fire control CCD as noted above.

Directed energy weapons, such as low-energy lasers (LEL) Electro-optical countermeasures ( EOCMs )

Submunition dispensing/activation Global positioning system (GPS) jammer

Fuze (laser/IR/RF), RF barrage jammers, acoustic jammers

Precision munition and submunition sensors CCD as noted above.

False-target generator (visual, IR, RF/acoustic)

Electromagnetic mine countermeasure system, to pre-detonate or confuse

Fuze jammers (laser/IR/RF), RF barrage jammers, acoustic jammers

Munition/submunition in-flight, and its effects Sensors to detect munitions: MMW radars, RF/IR/UV passive sensors Air watch and air defense/NBC warning net, to trigger alarm signal Active protection systems, for munition/submunition hard kill

Cover, additional armor to reduce warhead effects

Other system effects Miscellaneous CM (See below)

Countermeasures against sensors

Type Countermeasure Countermeasure Example Application
Camouflage Camouflage nets

Camouflage paints, IR/radar/and laser-absorptive materials/paints Fasteners, belts for attaching natural materials

Russian MKS and MKT Salisbury screen rubber epoxy

Chinese "grass mat" set

Variety of vehicles Variety systems Uniforms and vehicles
Cover Natural and manmade cover, civilian buildings

Entrenching blade to dig in vehicles

Hole-blast devices for troop positions, spider holes

Underground facilities, bunkers, firing positions

Tree cover, garages, underpasses

T-80U tank, BMP-3 IFV, 2S3 arty

Hardened artillery sites, bunkers

TELs, vehicles, troops

IFVs, tanks, SP arty

Infantry, SOF Iraqi and NK sites

Concealment Screens, overhead cover for infantry (conceal IR/visible signature)

Canvas vehicle cover, to conceal weapons Thermal covers, vehicle screens

Scrim, side skirts and skirting around turret

Colebrand netting Cover on Chinese Type 90 MRL

Kintex thermal blanket over engine

French "Ecrim" track cover scrim

Infantry, weapon, sensor

Truck-based weapons

For combat vehicles Combat vehicles

Deformers/signature modification "Wummels" (erectable umbrellas to

change/conceal shape/edges)

Exhaust deformers (redirect exhaust

under/behind vehicle)

Engine and running gear signature modification (change sound)

IR/radar deformers (in combination with RAM and RAP, etc)



Russian exhaust deflectors

Track pads, road wheel/exhaust change

Cat-eyes, Luneburg lens

Vehicles, sites, weapons

Combat vehicles

Tracked, other vehicles

Tracked, other vehicles

Aerosols Visual suppression measures, smokes, WP rounds

Multi-spectral smokes for IR and or MMW bands,

Flares, chaff, WP, to create false targets, disrupt FLIR

Toxic smokes (irritants to disrupt infantry and weapons crews)

Water spray systems (to reduce thermal contrast)

Smoke generators, fog oil, S-4, RPO-D

ZD-6 Smoke grenades (visual/IR)

WP rounds, Galix 6 flare system,

Adamsite and CN in smoke mix

Add-on kits for vehicles

Blinding, screening Vehicle protection Combat vehicles, arty

Smoke generators Recon, C, AD, arty

Decoys Clutter (civilian/military vehicles, structures, burning equipment)

Low to high-fidelity (multi-spectral) decoys Radar/IR decoy supplements (to add to visual/fabricated decoys)

Acoustic countermeasures (to deceive reconnaissance, sensors)

Log site, truck park, tank farm, derricks

IMT-72 “dummy tank”, Shape Intl

Corner reflectors, KFP-1-180 IR heater

Acoustic tape/speaker systems

Artillery, combat vehicles

TBM, vehicle decoys

Vehicle/site radar decoys Vehicles, sites

Counter-location measures Degrade GPS by jamming to reduce precision location capability

Jam radars/IR sensors

Laser, IR, and radar warning systems (to trigger move/CM)

Aviaconversia GPS jammer

SPN-2 truck-borne jammer set Slovenian LIRD laser warner

Infantry and others tactical/operational area

Combat vehicles

Countermeasures Against Weapons and Weapon Sensors

Type Countermeasure Countermeasure Example Application
Added protection (supplements to armor in reaction to specific capability) Armor supplements (ERA, screens, bar or box armor, sand bags)

Armor skirts over road wheels

Mine rollers, plows and flails

Vehicle belly armor, raised or redesigned belly design, skirt

Vertical smoke grenade launchers (to counter PGM top attack)

Barracuda, SNPE ERA

KMT-5, KMT-6

EOCM Use EOCMs such as IR jammer/IR searchlights to redirect ATGM KBCM infrared CM system Combat vehicles
False-target Generators Acoustic jammers and directed acoustic countermeasure

Laser false-target generator (against semi-active laser homing)

Electromagnetic mine countermeasure system, counters fuzes

In development, can be improvised

In development

To distract acoustic seekers Combat vehicles
Jammers Altimeter jammer (counters submunition dispersion altimeter)

Fuze jammers (to spoof RF proximity fuzes on munitions)

Incoherent infrared jamming (to jam IR fuzes on munitions)

GPS jammers to confuse navigation and course correction systems

SPR-1 armored ECM vehicle High priority sites, CPs etc.
Active countermeasures Active protection systems, for munition hard kill. High energy laser weapons to destroy munitions or sensors

Low energy lasers to blind or dazzle.

Radio-frequency weapons to burn electronics and detonate munitions

Directed MGs

Arena hard-kill system

ZM-87 laser weapon VEMASID counter-mine system

Tanks, recon vehicle, IFVs AT, AD systems
Counterfire/ Threat response warners Directional warning system (locate laser/radar, to direct weapons)

Employ sensors (RF/IR/UV - to detect munitions)

Acoustic directional systems (to detect munitions)

Laser radars (laser scanner to locate optics and direct weapons)

Directed energy weapons (against optics) Anti-helicopter mines (against aircraft)

Employ air watch/security, AD, NBC, nets to trigger alarm signal

Dazzle grenades (temporarily blind personnel)

Pilar acoustic detection system

Star-burst grenades

Miscellaneous CM Optical filters to degrade effect of battlefield lasers.

Pulse code/thermal CCM beacons on SACLOS ATGMs

(to counter EOCM)


Countermeasures By Functional Area And Type System

Functional Area System Type Countermeasure Countermeasure
Infantry, Special Forces, Reconnaissance,

Military Police/Security

Dismounted soldier, Utility vehicle troops Camouflage


Concealment Aerosols

CM Operational Technologies

Camouflage nets

Fasteners, belts for attaching natural materials Natural and manmade cover, civilian buildings  Hole-blast devices for troop positions, spider holes Underground facilities, bunkers, firing positions Screens, overhead cover for infantry (conceal

IR/visible signature)

Visual suppression measures, smoke grenades, WP rounds

Multi-spectral smokes for IR and or MMW bands,  Flares, chaff, WP, to create false targets, disrupt FLIR

Vertical smoke grenade launchers (to counter PGM top attack)

Toxic smokes (irritants to disrupt infantry and weapons crews)

Acoustic directed counterfire system

Dazzle grenades (temporarily blind personnel)

Mechanized Infantry, Reconnaissance, Military

Police/Security, Antitank

Armored personnel carrier

Armored scout cars (Less costly LAVs)

Light tanks

Self-propelled AT Guns(HACVs)




Deformers/signature modification


Counter-location measures

CM Operational Technologies

Camouflage paints, IR/radar/and laser-absorptive materials/paints

Fasteners, belts for attaching natural materials Natural and manmade cover, civilian buildings  Underground facilities, bunkers, firing positions Armor supplements (stand-off screens, bar armor, sand bags)

Thermal covers, vehicle screens

Scrim, side skirts and skirting around turret Exhaust deformers (redirect exhaust under/behind vehicle)

Engine and running gear signature modification

(change sound)

IR/radar deformers (in combination with RAM and RAP, etc)

Visual suppression measures, smokes, WP rounds Multi-spectral smoke grenades for IR and or MMW bands,

Flares, chaff, WP, to create false targets, disrupt FLIR

Toxic smokes (irritants to disrupt infantry and weapons crews)

Clutter (civilian/military vehicles, structures, burning equipment)

Laser, IR, and radar warning systems (to trigger move/CM)

Beyond line-of-sight modes

Remote-controlled missiles and guns

Mine rollers, plows and flails

Air watch/security, AD, NBC, nets to trigger alarm signal

Optical filters to degrade effect of battlefield lasers. Encoded SACLOS ATGMs (to counter EOCM)

Air Defense, Artillery, Radar units, Theater Missile Units, Aviation, Headquarters, Command  and communications vehicles, Radars, missile launchers, Aircraft

(High value targets)




Deformers/signature modification


Counter-location measures


CM Operational Technologies

Camouflage paints, IR/radar/and laser-absorptive materials/paints

Natural and manmade cover, civilian buildings  Entrenching blade to dig in vehicles

Underground facilities, bunkers, firing positions Canvas vehicle cover, to conceal weapons when not in use

Thermal covers, vehicle screens

Scrim, side skirts and skirting around turret

"Wummels" (erectable umbrellas to change/conceal shape/edges)

Exhaust deformers (redirect exhaust under/behind vehicle)

Engine and running gear signature modification

(change sound)

IR/radar deformers (in combination with RAM and RAP, etc)

Visual suppression measures, smokes, WP rounds Multi-spectral smoke grenades for IR and or MMW bands,

Flares, chaff, WP, to create false targets, disrupt FLIR

Degrade GPS by jamming to reduce precision location capability

Jam radars/IR sensors

Laser, IR, and radar warning systems (to trigger move/CM)

Clutter (civilian/military vehicles, structures, burning equipment)

Low to high-fidelity (multi-spectral) decoys

Radar/IR decoy supplements (to add to

visual/fabricated decoys)

Acoustic countermeasures (to deceive reconnaissance, sensors)

Anti-helicopter mines (against aircraft)

Beyond line-of-sight modes

Non-ballistic launch modes

Anti-radiation missiles

Low energy lasers to blind/dazzle optics on designators/aircraft

Encoded laser target designators to foil false target generators

Radio-frequency weapons - burn

electronics/detonate munitions

High energy laser weapons to destroy munitions or sensors

Laser false-target generator (against semi-active laser homing)

Altimeter jammer (counters submunition dispersion altimeter)

Fuze jammers (to spoof RF proximity fuzes on munitions)

Incoherent infrared jamming (to jam IR fuzes on munitions)

GPS jammers to confuse navigation and course correction systems

Optical filters to degrade effect of battlefield lasers

Information Warfare/ Deception Units IW vehicles Camouflage


Deformers/signature modification


Counter-location measures


Camouflage paints, IR/radar/and laser-absorptive materials/paints

Natural and manmade cover, civilian buildings  Underground facilities, bunkers, firing positions

"Wummels" (erectable umbrellas to change/conceal shape/edges)

IR/radar deformers (in combination with RAM and RAP, etc)

Visual suppression measures, smokes, WP rounds Multi-spectral smoke grenades for IR and or MMW bands,

Flares, chaff, WP, to create false targets, disrupt FLIR

Degrade GPS by jamming to reduce precision location capability

Jam radars/IR sensors

Laser, IR, and radar warning systems (to trigger move/CM)

Clutter (civilian/military vehicles, structures, burning equipment)

Low to high-fidelity (multi-spectral) decoys

Radar/IR decoy supplements (to add to

visual/fabricated decoys)

Acoustic countermeasures (to deceive reconnaissance, sensors)

All Units Combat support vehicles

(Light strike vehicles,  Tactical utility vehicles, Motorcycles, ATVs, Armored CSVs, etc), Trucks



Concealment Deformers/signature modification



CM Operational Technologies

Camouflage paints, IR/radar/and laser-absorptive materials/paints

Fasteners, belts for attaching natural materials Natural and manmade cover, civilian buildings  Underground facilities, bunkers, firing positions Armor supplements (ERA, screens, bar or box armor, sand bags)

Thermal covers, vehicle screens

Engine and running gear signature modification

(change sound)

IR/radar deformers (in combination with RAM and RAP, etc)

Multi-spectral smoke grenades for IR and or MMW bands,

Flares, chaff, WP, to create false targets, disrupt FLIR

Clutter (civilian/military vehicles, structures, burning equipment)

Air watch/security, AD, NBC, nets to trigger alarm signal

Acoustic directed counter-fire system

Equipment Upgrades

Armed forces worldwide employ a mix of legacy systems and selected modern systems. In the current era characterized by constrained military budgets, the single most significant modernization trend impacting armed forces worldwide is upgrades to legacy systems. Other factors impacting this trend are:

  • A need for armed forces to reduce force size, yet maintain overall force readiness for flexibility and adaptability.
  • Soaring costs for modern technologies, and major combat systems.
  • Personnel shortages and training challenges.
  • Availability of a wide variety of upgrade packages and programs for older as well as newer systems.
  • New subsystem component technologies (lasers, GPS, imaging sensors, microcircuits, and propellants), which permit application to platforms, weapons, fire control systems, integrated C2, and munitions old and new.
  • An explosion of consortia and local upgrade industries, which have expanded worldwide and into countries only recently introduced to capitalism.

The upgrade trend is particularly notable concerning aerial and ground vehicles, weapons, sensors, and support equipment. From prototype, to low-rate initial production (LRIP), to adoption for serial production, minor and major improvements may be incorporated. Few major combat systems retain the original model configuration five or more years after the first run. Often improvements in competing systems will force previously unplanned modifications.

Upgrades enable military forces to employ technological niches to tailor their force against a specific enemy, or to integrate niche upgrades in a comprehensive and well-planned modernization program. Because of the competitive export market and varying requirements from country to country, a vehicle may be in production simultaneously in many different configurations, as well as a dozen or more support vehicle variants fulfilling other roles. In light of this trend, OPFOR equipment selected for portrayal in simulations and training should not be limited to the original production model of a system, rather a version of the system that reflects the armed forces strategic and modernization plans and likely constraints that would apply.

The adaptive OPFOR will introduce new combat systems and employ upgrades on existing systems to attain a force structure that supports its plans and doctrine. Because the legacy force mix and equipment were selected in accordance with earlier plans and options, use of upgrades versus costly new acquisitions will always be an attractive option. A key consideration is the planned fielding date. For this document, the most widely portrayed OPFOR time frame is the current Contemporary Operational Environment. Only upgrades currently available (or marketed with production and fielding expected in the near term) are considered in COE Tiers 1-4. Also, system costs and training and fielding constraints must be considered. However, in the Emerging Technology Trends section of this chapter, we anticipate a wide variety of upgrades that could be currently applied to fielded systems.

The selection of equipment upgrades is not a simple matter. Most forces have limited budgets, competing upgrade priorities, and a substantial inventory of outdated equipment. A specific subsystem upgrade (gun, fire control system, etc.) may only slightly improve a generally obsolete system. Another option is an upgrade package, with compatible subsystem upgrades. The surest approach is to refurbish a system

into a new model with all application problems resolved. A critical factor is assurance that the modernized equipment is tested and successful. The best test remains performance in combat.

The following tables describe selected upgrades available for system modernization. The lists are not intended to be comprehensive. Rather, they are intended to highlight major trends in their respective areas. For instance, for armored combat vehicles, the focus is on upgrades in mobility, survivability, and lethality.

The category of survivability upgrades includes countermeasures (CM). The CM upgrades can apply not only to branch-specific systems (tanks, IFV, and artillery), but to general use systems subject to similar threats. An example of this is the proliferation of smoke grenade launchers on artillery and reconnaissance vehicles.

Implementation of all upgrade options for any system is generally not likely. Because of the complexity of major combat systems and need for equipment subsystem integration and maintenance, most force developers will chose a mix of selected upgrades to older systems, as well as limited purchases of new and modern systems. Please note that systems featured in this document may be the original production system or a variant of that system. On data sheets, the variants section describes other systems available for portrayal in training and simulations. Also, equipment upgrade options (such as night sights) and different munitions may be listed, which allow a user to consider superior or inferior variants. Within the document chapters, multiple systems are listed to provide other substitution options. Of course there are thousands of systems and upgrade options worldwide, which could be considered by an adaptive OPFOR.

An OPFOR trainer has the option to portray systems or upgrade packages not included in the OPFOR Worldwide Equipment Guide, to reflect an adaptive thinking OPFOR. In future WEG updates, the authors will expand on the upgrade tables with names and descriptions of upgrade options and specific systems applications which have been noted in the current document. Chapter authors are available to assist users in selecting reasonable upgrade options for system configuration in specific force portrayals.

OPFOR Antitank Weapon Upgrades

Improved AT and dual-purpose rifle grenades permit riflemen to supplement shoulder-mount grenade launchers.

Accurate low trajectory longer range grenades for shoulder launchers

Parachute-drop overhead camera grenades for shoulder/ground launch

Tripod, bipod, pintle mounts convert launchers for vehicle/ground use

Take-apart AT grenade launchers or disposable launch tubes

Larger, more lethal disposable AT grenade launchers supplement grenadier reusable launchers at critical times.

Reduced noise, smoke, and flash signature grenades for AT launchers

Improved reusable sights for disposable launchers, including ballistic

computer/laser rangefinder sights

Image intensifier/thermal night sights

Counter -charge AT grenades for firing from inside of buildings

Dual-purpose (HE/AT) longer range rounds

HE longer range rounds

Multi-purpose (HE/AT/anti-bunker) rounds

Tandem shaped-charge (HEAT) warhead

Thermobaric Frag-HE warhead

Guided (SAL-H) grenades for

shoulder/ground/vehicle launchers


Computer/LRF FCS

II night sights

Tandem AT grenades, HE/DP grenades, thermobaric grenades

Auxiliary propulsion unit for local movement

Take-apart capability for lighter guns

Improved gun and recoil system

Ballistic computer/laser rangefinder sights

MMW radar target auto-tracker day/night FCS

Image intensifier/thermal night sights

Automated battle management system with graphic flat panel display

Indirect fire rounds/FCS for fire support role

Increased DF range, new tank/AT gun rounds

Improved, heavier , more lethal , and longer range APFSDS-T round

Tandem or triple-charge HEAT round

Improve Frag-HE round and DPICM submunition

Canister/flechette round

New type lethalities (DPICM submunition, etc.)

Gun-launched ATGM (100 mm+) , including tandem HEAT


APU and take-apart for lighter guns

Improved gun and recoil system  Improved sights, 1st gen thermal night sights

Automated battle management system

Improved ammunition, inc ATGM.

Man-portable/ground launch and shoulder launch

Take-apart launcher and sub-systems

Pintle mount/dismount for variety of vehicles/platforms

1st or 2nd generation thermal night sights

Extended range missiles

Soft-launch for use from bunkers and buildings

Launcher countermeasures (CM), such as reduced noise, smoke, flash

SACLOS Guidance CCM, e.g., pulsed codes

Increased ATGM velocity/reduced flight time

New guidance modes: Semi-active laser beam rider and laser-homing, Fiber-optic guided missile (FOG-M) guidance, Fire and forget imaging infrared seeker, Radar homing, Multi-mode (FOG/IR homing, etc.)

Helicopter stand-off launch using ground guidance

High velocity MANPADS missiles used for AT

Larger warhead/tandem warhead HEAT ATGM

Sensor-fuzed EFP/HEAT top-attack

Thermobaric HE warhead, for new applications


Take-apart launcher, with pintle mount

Improved 1st gen thermal night sights


Reduced signature

Improved ATGMs (tandem HEAT, etc.)

OPFOR Light Armored Vehicle Upgrades

Used/adapted for various roles, e.g., infantry (less than squad), combat support, and support vehicles. Most are light, 4x4 wheeled, van or light utility vehicle; but auxiliary wheel, 6x6 or tracked versions exist.  Many of these are being converted to or replaced by mine-resistant vehicles.

Included are motorcycles, ATVs, and light strike vehicles (e.g., jeep-type 4x4 vehicles or recreational dune buggies).

Gun trucks, riot control vehicles, and amphibious/over-snow all terrain vehicles are used.

Add encrypted voice and digital data capability.

Graphic display battle management system

Central tire inflation system and/or run-flat tires

GPS hand-held or bracket mount

Ford capability, swim capability desired

Hybrid (diesel/electric) drive kits

Add-on light armor, mine protection desired

CM, such as multi-spectral smoke grenades

Laser warning receiver desired

7.62-14.5-mm MG or 20-40-mm automatic grenade launcher main weapon

Remote or overhead weapon station (RWS/OWS)

Individual weapons, RPG, MANPADS, or ATGM launcher for secondary weapons

Day sight and II or thermal night sight


Light armor and smoke grenade launchers

Remote MG or auto grenade launcher

Day/night (thermal sights), RPG

GPS, secure comms

Must be able to carry a squad

Higher horsepower diesel engine

GPS and inertial land navigation, graphic display battle management system, IFF

Swim or deep ford (due to armor increases). Amphibious conversion with compartments for high sea state capability.

Add-on armor, ERA, and improved mine protection. Fire and blast suppression

CM, e.g., multi-spectral smoke grenades, LWR

Firing ports (or forego due to armor increases,

use periscopes or side and rear view cameras)

IFV/IFSV: 20-100 mm stabilized gun, and 2-man turret.

Active protection system (APS) or defensive aids suite (DAS).

Upgraded FCS: Cdr's independent viewer, 2-plane stabilized TV sights, 1 - 2 gen FLIR.

Upgraded secondary MG or grenade launcher with

superior sights (integrated, high- angle, night). Additional remote MGs/AGLs for high-angle fires security.

Improved KE, HEAT, Frag-HE rounds, ATGMs

APC/IFSV: Includes truck/light vehicle conversions

Remote weapon station or 1-man turret with high-angle-of fires

7.62-23 mm MG, grenade launcher (some with 20-30-mm auto-cannon and ATGM launcher)


Add-on armor, ERA, LWR, new grenades

Add auto grenade launcher, upgrade ATGM, and KE round to APFSDS. FCS, stabilized sights, Imp 1st gen FLIR

Use APC/IFV wheeled/tracked chassis or tank chassis, with mobility and protection upgrades,

Side and rear-view cameras

Graphic display battle management system

CM, e.g., multi-spectral smoke grenades, LWR

Active protection system or other DAS.

1-2 man turret, or turretless design. Alternative design:  1- 5 pedestal/turret or mast- elevated ATGM launchers on remote or overhead weapon station (RWS/OWS)

Autoloader or manual loader under armor

Multiple ATGM launch and targeting capability

Improved ATGMs, as noted in above table, or RF, laser-beam rider, SAL-H/IIR ATGMs

7.62-12.7-mm MG secondary arms

FCS with commander's independent viewer, 2-plane stabilized sights, TV, and target tracking. Use 1st or 2nd gen FLIR

Most common ATGM vehicles are combat support vehicles with pintle-mount ATGM launcher (see above table for ground launcher).

Recent development: motorcycle with sidecar and pintle-mount ATGM launcher


RWS multiple ATGM launchers (APC/IFV/tank conversion), pintle-mount for light combat support vehicles (motorcycle, ATV, LSV, TUV, truck, etc.)

Stabilized sights and 1st gen thermal sights

Improved ATGMs

OPFOR Reconnaissance And Assault Vehicle Upgrades

Light recon vehicle: Combat support vehicle with light armor and TV, thermal sights, Add encrypted voice and digital data capability

Combat recon vehicle: See IFV upgrades, e.g.:

GPS and inertial land navigation.  Digital real-time link to subscriber map overlay display, IFF, force tracker battle management system,

Swim capability, winch, central tire inflation for wheeled

Upgraded FCS:  Cdr's independent viewer, 2-plane stabilized TV camera sights, 1 - 2 gen FLIR

Elevated battlefield surveillance radar/TV/FLIR sensor suite with TV, encrypted voice, and digital data transmission capability

Launch UAVs and/or robots (unmanned ground vehicles)

CM, e.g., multi-spectral smoke grenades, LWR, IR/radar skirts

Active protection system (APS) or other defensive aids suite (DAS).

20-100 mm gun with 2-plane stabilization, and 2-man turret.  Improved secondary MG or automatic grenade launcher and sights.

Man-portable SAMs (MANPADS) for self-protection

Named and targeted areas of interest link to indirect fire and missile units for real-time targeting. Laser target designator guides munitions.

Sensor vehicle:

APC/IFV or combat support vehicle and mast- mounted sensor pod: radar, thermal and TV

Encrypted voice SATCOM/digital data systems


Add higher HP diesel engine

Add-on armor, ERA, LWR, new grenades Imp 1st gen FLIR, gunner and commander,

Add auto grenade launcher, upgrade ATGM, and KE round


Elevated sensor suite and transmission capability.

Distinction among heavy recon, infantry fire support, assault gun, light tank has blurred

APC/IFV chassis with increased armor and higher horsepower diesel engine.

GPS and inertial land navigation, graphic display battle management system, IFF

Swim or deep ford capability

Add-on armor, ERA, improved mine protection, fire and blast suppression.

CM, e.g., multi-spectral smoke grenades, LWR Side and rear-view cameras for security

Active protection system (APS) or other defensive aides suite (DAS).

76-125 mm tank gun with 2-plane stabilization,

Improved MG or auto grenade launcher, sights

FCS with commander's independent viewer, 2-plane  stabilized sights, TV, and target tracking. Use of 1st or 2nd generation FLIR.  Side and rear-view cameras

Improved KE, electronic fuzed Frag-HE, and tandem HEAT rounds

Gun-launched ATGMs (100+ mm)


Add higher HP diesel engine Add-on armor, ERA, LWR, new grenades

Imp 1st gen FLIR, gunner and commander,

Larger stabilized gun, gun-launch ATGM, and KE round to APFSDS.

Higher horsepower diesel engine power packs and add-on reserve fuel tanks

GPS and inertial land navigation, graphic display battle management system, IFF

Deep ford snorkel capability

Welded turret, blow-out panels, ERA, improved mine and turret protection, fire and blast suppression.

CM suite, including multi-spectral and vertical smoke grenade mix, LWR, VEESS capability

Active protection system (APS) or other defensive aides suite (DAS), self-entrenching blade

Side/rear-view security cameras

Tank gun with 2-plane stabilization

FCS with commander's independent viewer, 2-plane stabilized sights, TV, and target tracking. 2nd or 3rd generation FLIR.  Auto-tracker. Hunter-tracker FCS.

Heavier and longer range APFSDS-T rounds, electronic fuzed Frag-HE, and tandem HEAT rounds

Gun-launched ATGMs and IR homing rounds (100+ mm).  Semi-active laser homing munitions permit ATGMs to deliver indirect fire precision strikes.

Improved remote-firing MG, high-angle AD sights


Add higher HP diesel engine Land navigation and deep ford snorkel

Add-on armor, ERA, CM suite Imp stabilization and FCS, 1st gen FLIR,

Remote MG,

Imp ammo (sabot, Frag-HE, and HEAT)

Gun-launch ATGM.

OPFOR Artillery Upgrades

Automated secure digital joint C2 network with SATCOM, linking artillery, air, EW, and reconnaissance units

Integrated artillery recon vehicle with sensor mast

Reconnaissance strike and fire complexes

Forward air controllers linked to artillery units

Artillery surveillance vehicles with ground surveillance radars, sensor suite and networked

Observation teams with goniometers, thermal sights, digital comms, and laser target designators

Artillery links to selected special purpose forces

Acoustic vehicle detection and location

Phased array counter-battery radars, networked to automated artillery net, with increased range, lower probability of error, windows-based man-machine interface

Target-acquisition UAVs, networked to artillery net

Automated battle management equipment use for towed and SP guns, mortars and MRLs

Navigation system with GPS/inertial update, linked to automated net


Integrated artillery recon vehicle, sensor mast

Reconnaissance strike and fire complexes Target-acquisition UAVs, networked Observation teams, radars, acoustic sensors

Conventional munitions, e.g., controlled fragmentation, proximity and multi-option fuzes, special munitions, and propellant s (modular propellants)

Artillery delivered high precision munitions e.g., SAL-H, sensor-fuzed, course corrected, terminal-homing IR

Self-Propelled:  Automated fire control with barrel cooling and thermal warning systems

Auxiliary power unit

Mobility and weight improvements,

Muzzle velocity analyzer

CM, such as smoke grenade launcher and LWR

Upgrade to 52-caliber cannon for longer range

Truck-mounted high-mobility systems with long-range cannons

Towed: Addition of auxiliary propulsion unit

On board technical fire control computer

Reduced weight and emplace/displace times

Muzzle velocity analyzer

Onboard or portable digital linked fire control computer

Upgrade to 52-caliber cannon for longer range


Mobility and weight improvements On-board navigation and fire direction systems

Use of modular propellant Procurement of ADHPM Overall range and accuracy improvements

Mobility and weight improvements, truck-based launchers which conceal the MRL signature

Rapid emplace-displace and response capabilities

CM, such as smoke grenade launcher and LWR

On-board computer-based fire direction and land navigation systems, which permit autonomous launcher, platoon, and battery operations

Tube-launched UAVs linked to the launchers and to the fire control network for real-time acquisition

Improved lethality improved conventional munitions and special purpose (mines, jam, etc,) munitions

Extended-range and course- corrected rockets, as well as addition of artillery/cruise missiles

Computer-based fire control system for electronically-fuzed rockets

Artillery delivered high precision munitions (ADHPM), e.g., sensor fuzed, laser- homing rockets

Special munitions, such as FASCAM, chemical warhead, RF jammer rockets

Mine clearer and fuel-air explosive rocket MRLs


Autonomous/ semi- autonomous launcher Countermeasures Improved munitions, e.g., extended range,

DPICM and thermobaric ADHPM, e.g., sensor-fuzed munitions and course

corrected rounds or rockets

Emerging Technology Trends

In order to provide a realistic OPFOR for use in Army training simulations, we must describe the spectrum of contemporary and legacy OPFOR forces in the current time frame, as well as capabilities in emerging and subsequent operational environments (OEs). This chapter does not predict the future, rather notes emerging adversary capabilities which can affect training.

The OPFOR timeframes for emerging OPFOR are: 2015-2020 (Near Term) and 2021-2028 (Mid-Term). The subsequent time frame is "future" OPFOR time frame. Time lines were determined in part to assist in building OPFOR systems and simulators and for use in Army training simulations. The timeframes are arbitrary and selected for ease in focusing and linking various trends. However, they also generally match force developments for U.S. Army forces, as well as thresholds in emerging and advanced technologies which will pose new challenges to military force planners and developers.

In these time frames, the mix of forces will continue to reflect tiered capabilities. The majority of the force mix, as with all military forces, will use legacy systems. Periods 2015 and after will also see new OPFOR systems and whole new technologies. The most notable difference between the OPFOR force mix and U.S. forces is that the OPFOR will have a broader mix of older systems and a lower proportion of state- of-the-art systems. Rather, OPFOR will rely more on adaptive applications, niche technologies, and selected proven upgrades to counter perceived capabilities of their adversaries. Force developers for OPFOR will retain expensive legacy systems, with affordable upgrades and technology niches. A judicious mix of equipment, strategic advantages, and sound OPFOR principles can enable even lesser (lower-tier) forces to challenge U.S. military force capabilities.

The OPFOR systems must represent reasonable responses to U.S. force developments. A rational thinking OPFOR would study force developments of their adversaries as well as approaches of the best forces worldwide, then exploit and counter them. Thus worldwide and adversary equipment upgrades will trigger OPFOR forces to modify their equipment and tactics to deter, match, overmatch, or counter those changes.

OPFOR Technologies And Emerging Operational Environments

As noted in Chapter 1 on COE OPFOR, the adaptive OPFOR will introduce new combat systems and employ upgrades on existing systems to attain a force structure which supports its plans and doctrine. Because a legacy force mix and equipment were historically selected earlier in accordance with plans and options, upgrades versus costly new acquisitions will always be an attractive option. A key consideration is the planned fielding date. To project OPFOR capabilities in the future, we should look at the technologies in various stages of research and development today, as well as those in the concept stage for applications in the Future OPFOR time frame. Military engineering experience has demonstrated that the process of formulating military requirements, as well as technology, engineering, and budgeting factors can dramatically affect equipment modernization time lines. In addition, scientific discoveries and breakthroughs in the civilian sector have greatly contributed to the so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs", which has increased the capability for battlefield awareness, integration, timeliness, and lethality. The table below shows OPFORs in emerging and Future OEs, and some considerations.

Considerations in Determining Emerging OPFOR Technologies by Time Frame

OPFOR Consideration Near-Term (2015-2020) Mid-Term (2021-2025)
Challenging OPFOR Emerging OPFOR Objective OPFOR
Technology Source Current marketed/fielded systems and subsystems Recent major weapons, upgrade applications
Budget Constricted but available for niche technologies Improved, some major system acquisitions
Implications for OPFOR equipment Many subsystem upgrades, BLOS

weapons, remote sensors, countermeasures

More costly subsystems, recent major weapons, competitive in some areas.
Implications for OPFOR tactics and organization, Implications for U.S. COE tactics with contingency TTP updates. Slight subunit changes add BLOS and AT systems for integrated

RISTA and strikes.

Integrated RISTA with remotes. Strikes all levels. Combined arms integrated in small units for increased lethality and


The information revolution has also decreased response time in which system developers in the military marketplace can seize a new technology and apply it in new systems or in upgrades to older systems. The following technologies and possible applications of those technologies will influence R&D as well as

fielding decisions for future force modernization and expected OPFOR capabilities to be portrayed in future operating environments.

Technologies And Applications For Use By OPFOR: Near And Mid- Term



Psychological Operations Mood altering aerosols Reproductive terrorism Non-lethal technologies Military and civilian targets, for short- term and long-term goals.
Information Operations: Sensors Higher-resolution multispectral satellite images New sensor frequencies for acquisition

New sensor frequencies operational security Use of other light bandwidths (ultraviolet, etc) Passive detection technologies and modes Auto-tracking for sensors and weapons Image processing and display integration Micro-sensors/imaging system miniaturization

Unmanned surveillance, target acq/designation Multispectral integrated sensors and Multispectral integrated transmission modes Precision navigation (cm/mm three-dimension) Undersea awareness (sensors, activity)

Underground awareness (sensors/mines)

High-intensity use of LITINT (internet, periodicals, forums) Increased use of information from commercial, industrial, scientific and military communities

Increased use dual-use technologies

Information Operations: Computers and Comms Low-Probability-of-Intercept communications New power sources and storage technologies:

Micro-power generation Energy cells

Advanced Human/Computer Interface Automatic Language Translators

New communities (Blogs, flash mobs, etc, to coordinate and safeguard comms)

Secure encryption software

New communications tools (internet and subscriber links)

Electronic Attack Anti-Satellite weapons for RF, EMP, Hard kill Wide area weapons (EMP graphite bombs, etc) EMP Precision (small area) weapons Computer Network Attack

Worms, viruses, trojan horses Net-centric warfare

Spoofing sensors

Spoofing/Intercepting data stream/ spyware

Attack electronic grid or nodes at critical times
Chem/Bio/ Radiological Attack Dirty bombs

Genetic/Genomic/DNA tagging to assassinate Genetic/Genomic/DNA targeting for Bio attack Designer Drugs/Organisms/Vectors Biologically based chem (Mycotoxins)

Anti-materiel corrosive agents and organisms

Agricultural attack (animal and plant stocks and supplies)

Use of tagging to incapacitate political leaders.

Physical Attack Mini-cruise/ballistic missiles for precision, surgical strikes, and widespread use

Atk UAVs (land, sea, undersea-UUV, Micro-aerial vehicles-widespread use Swarming for coordinated attack

Notebook command semi-autonomous links Vehicle launch for NLOS attack/defense

Multi-mode guidance: pre-programmed/ guided/homing

New types of warheads

Wider area/different effects Tailorable warhead effects

Precision Munitions

Course-corrected/guided/homing Widespread - almost all weapons Loiter/IFF


Blinding/high energy lasers

RF Weapons against electronics

RF against people, vs structures/systems Directed acoustic weapons

Sustainment, Protection New battery/power cell technologies Neurological performance enhancers Better lightweight seamless body armor

Personal actuators, exoskeletons, anti-RF suits Active armor and active protection systems Countermeasures to defeat rounds and sensors Counter-precision jammers, esp GPS

All-spectrum low observable technologies Anti-corrosives

Biometric prosthesis and cybernetics

Robots assist dismounts, sensors, and logistics Robotic weapon systems

Battlefield fabrication of spare parts Airborne/ship borne refineries Potable water processing systems Transportable power generation systems

OPFOR Capabilities:  Near-Term And Mid-Term

The next table provides projected system description and capabilities for analysis of the OPFOR environment facing U.S. forces in subsequent time frames. Data for the first timeframe (2013-2019) reflects generally known systems and subsystems, with their introduction to the emerging OPFOR adversary force. Timelines reflect capability tiers for systems which may be fully fielded (not Interim Operational Capability or First Unit Equipped) in brigade and division unit levels during respective time frames.

The systems projections are not comprehensive, and represent shifting forecasts. They may accordingly shift as we approach the specified time frames. Once we get beyond the turn of the decade, our current view of the future trends becomes less specific. Therefore, the second column (Mid-Term 2021-2028) focuses more on technologies¾less on defined systems.

The columns can be treated as capability tiers for specified time frame OPFOR. Please note: No force in the world has all systems at the most modern tier. The OPFOR, as with all military forces worldwide, is a mix of legacy and modern systems. Thus the emerging OPFOR force comprises a mix of COE time frame Tier 1-4 systems and newer systems. One would expect that some Near- or Mid-term adversaries with lower military technology capabilities could move up one or two capability tiers from (for instance) current COE capability Tier 4, to COE Tier 2. The most likely upgrade for emerging OPFOR used in most training simulations would be to move the OPFOR from COE Tier 2 to Tier 1, with added niche emerging systems.

We have previously stated that an OPFOR force can portray a diverse force mix by separating brigades and divisions into different tiers. The OPFOR also has the option of incrementally adding higher tier systems to lower tier units, as selective upgrades.  Because most of the below systems in the 2015-2020

column are currently fielded, an adversary might also incrementally upgrade COE Tier 1 or 2 units by adding fielded assets from 2015-2020 as described in that column. However, until that time frame, we cannot assure beforehand when all of those technologies will appear. Again, the tables are not predictive. The OPFOR force designer may choose a middle road between current Tier 1-4 and future systems; in many countries they are upgrading legacy and even recent systems to keep pace with state-of-the-art systems.  Thus they may look to subsystem upgrades such as noted in Chapter 15.

If a specialized system for specific role is missing from the table below, continue to use the OPFOR system noted in Tiers 1-4. Please remember that these projections reflect "possible" technology applications for future systems. They incorporate current marketed systems and emerging technologies and subsystems, may be combined in innovative ways. The table below is not a product of the US intelligence community, and is not an official US Army forecast of future "threats". It is approved only for use in Army training applications and simulations.

Future OPFOR (2028 and after) is described in various portrayals. But it is generally FOUO or classified and is not included in the WEG.

OPFOR Capabilities:  Near- And Mid-Term

Infantry Assault Rifle Rifle 6.8mm to 600 m day/night, w/EO LRF/pointer computer sight. Fire around corner sight EO link. Under-barrel grenades 600 m (CS gas, HEDP, EO recon, starburst, HE airburst, concussion).

Rifle grenades 400m: HEAT, DP, smoke

On-bipod range 600 m. Sight on all weapons link to laptop/PDA/NVG/ helmet viewer w/real-time RF link. Multispectral smoke, TV/II recon/ atk rd, tandem HEAT grenades. Remote

fire platform, 60m link.

Thermobaric grenades and Magazine grenade launcher 43-mm 4-round hand-held launcher for urban fight to 350m. Thermobaric

grenades, also for hand throw, underbarrel.

Range 600 m for hand-held and under-barrel launchers, night sight. Add flechette, TV/II recon grenade.
AT/AP Hand Grenade HEAT/Frag, 165-mm penetration, 20 m

Frag radius, 20 m range, weighs 1.1 kg. Rifle grenades:  HEAT 150mm to 300m

Hand grd to 40 m.  Dual purpose

bullet-thru rifle grd, no recoil, 150mm/Frag 20 m, 3 in belt pack.

Squad Machinegun 7.62x54 mm, frangible/sabot rds 1,300m.

EO/3 gen II computer LRF sight 1,500m.

Add MMW radar, 5 km detection.
Combat  Shotgun (replace one assault rifle) 12-gauge pump or semi-auto, 12 rds. Short and long change-out barrels, day/ night sights. Variable choke. Shells: HE, AP-sabot, door-buster, starburst, slug,

concussion, frangible, flechette/anti-UAV

Time fuzed focused fragmentation airburst rd for use against dug in personnel, aircraft and UAVs.

Multispectral smoke, CS grenades. TV/II recon rounds to 400 m.

Sniper Rifle Light Bolt action, 7.62 mm rd, 15 lbs max weight

with ammo. 10X optic w/2 gen II night channel. Range to 1000m.

Ballistic EO holographic LRF sight. Fused IR/FLIR channel 1,500m.

Remote fire robot. Laser designator

Anti-Material Rifle (AMR)


Sniper Rifle (Heavy)

Semi-auto .50 cal. Weight 25 lbs. AMR/ anti-armor range 1,800 m.  Armor pen

20 mm. As sniper rifle, range 1,000-1,500

m.  Frangible multipurpose rd (AP 11 mm,

incendiary 20 fragments). EO sight (20x) with 3 gen II night channel.

Ballistic EO holographic laser range- finder sight. Night sight fused IR/FLIR. Range 2,500+ m. Remote fire platform-60m link or weapon robot option. Laser


Automatic Grenade Launcher (AGL)-Light 35mm man portable launcher with 6/9/12- round drums. HEAT grenade range 600 m 80mm penetration.  Frag-HE grenade

range 1,500m. Buckshot grenade. EO day/ 3 gen II night sights. 1 per infantry squad

Air-burst munition (ABM), ballistic sights. EO and Fused IR/FLIR sight. Remote fire.  Multispectral smoke

grenades. Recon, HEAT/HE TV- guided atk grenades to 1,000 m

Automatic Grenade Launcher (AGL)-Heavy

Weapons squads and vehicles

40 x 53 mm weight 17 kg. Range 2,200m. Ballistic fire control computer w/ EO sight. Dual-purpose grenade, HE with 60mm armor penetration.  Buckshot round.

Electronic fuzed HE air-burst munition (ABM). 32/48-round cans. Thermal night sight, range 2,200 m.

HEAT rd defeats 200+ mm armor. EO/ fused IR/FLIR sight.

Multispectral smoke, unattended ground sensor (acoustic, seismic RF), and comms jam grenades. Robot option. Mount on all maneuver/recon vehicles. TV/IR

attack grenades.

Multi-purpose Grenade Launcher (disposable) 76mm thermobaric HEAT, 250m range, 440 mm penetration. Reusable II sight. Range to 400m. Fire from enclosed spaces.  Nil smoke, little noise.
Antitank Grenade Launcher (disposable) 125mm tandem HEAT 300m range, 1000+ mm.  Shoulder fired. Nil smoke. Multipurpose DP effects, 500 m. Reduced recoil-enclosed spaces.
Antitank Grenade Launcher (ATGL - medium range)

Mid-Term: Expand to AD/AT Missile Launcher

60mm launch tube, from enclosed spaces. Tandem warhead (1,150 mm to 600m), dual purpose 1700m. Ballistic LRF/3 gen II night sight to 1,500 m. Remote launch tripod. Nil smoke.  High velocity 57-mm DP

high vel rocket 1,000m, 300 mm pen

SAL-H, TV/IR-guided grenades to 1,000 m. Fused IR/FLIR night sight. ADAT KE dart fits converted launcher. Range 4 km. Laser designator 5 km, including artillery

and mortar rounds.

Antitank Grenade Launcher (long range)

Mid-Term: Expand to AD/AT Missile Launcher

125mm tandem HEAT 800+m range, 1100+ mm. HE-Thermobaric grenade to 1700 m. LRF computer sight. EO day/3 gen II Night sight.  Nil smoke. Remote-fire

platform option. Tripod and bipod.

SAL-H/TV/IR-guided: HEAT and HE grenades 1,200 mm. ADAT SAL/LBR KE dart to 4 km. EO and fused IR/FLIR sight, laser designator to 5

km for arty/mortar rds.

Remote-fire Platform and Weapon Robot or Laser Target Designator (LTD) Robot Man-portable, <15 kg, 60m Laptop/PDA link. EO/3 gen II sight. MG/AGL/rifle.

LTD robot TV/2nd gen FLIR, 10km range

Tracked, 24 kg, 2 hour charge, fused II/FLIR 10 km, 10 km rg RF link.

LTD has 3rd gen FLIR, range 15km

Acoustic Targeting System (ATS) Backpack/vehicle triangulates on aircraft, vehicle weapons to 6 km, MGs 2.5 km. Helmet mount to 800 m.  Light display. Increased range (10 veh weapon, 5 MG). Add auto-return fire for MG. Link to veh weapons/nets auto-slew
General  Purpose  and Air Defense Machinegun 12.7mm low recoil on ground tripod. Chain gun version on light vehicles, ATV, motorcycle, etc. TUV/LAV use RWS. Remote operated ground or robot version. Frangible rd 2 km, sabot 2.5 km.

RAM/RAP/IR camouflage/ screens. TV/FLIR fire control. Lightweight MMW radar 5 km. Display link to AD azimuth warning net. Emplace in 10 sec. RF/radar

DF set. ATS control option.

Stabilized gun and sights. Remote- operated computer FCS with PDA or laptop. Fused FLIR/ II to 5 km.

Frangible, sabot rds to 3 km. Laser dazzler blinds enemy. Micro-recon/ heli atk UAVs. Robot version.

Some light/AD vehicles replace w/ 30-mm recoilless gun on RWS.

AHEAD round 4 km, FCS 10 km. Add-on ADAT missile launcher

Man-portable attack UAV (NLOS Backpack Munition) 2.5 kg tube launch with PDA, CCD/IR image, 10 to km and 155 m altitude, at 100-160 km/hr, with 10 min loiter, in-flight

arm for HE charge, NLOS dive attack vs moving/static targets

Ranges to 20 km with 40 min loiter. Remote, air, ground, water craft, vehicle launch. 3rd gen thermal view. AT/AP remote sensor mines.
Infantry Flame Weapon Reusable thermobaric 90-mm grenade (2/lchr) to 800 m. Effects = 152mm artillery rd. Targets personnel, bunkers, LAVs, etc. Nil smoke. EO/II night sight Precursor (200 mm pen) DP grd. Computer LRF day/night sight. SAL- H guided. Remote fire and robot option. Use in enclosed space
Vehicle/Man-portable Close Protection System (CPS) Smoke grenade launchers can use multi- spectral smoke, CS smoke, Frag-HE

grenades, range 3-40 meters, depending on angle.  ATS control. Man-portable.

Man-portable remote control launcher.  Quick load 3-6 grenades.

Other Grds: CS gas, HE, AT/AP mines. 2-4 pods/vehicle.

Infantry Weapon Night Sight (Night Optical Device- NOD) 3d gen II night vision goggles/sights/ IR pointers for riflemen range 1,000. AGLs, MGs, sniper rifles/AMRs, ATGLs to 1,500m. FLIR recon sensors 3,000 m. Uncooled 3rd gen FLIR (thermal and II combined) NVGs and weapon sights infantry 600m.

Priority weapon sights 2,000+ m.

Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) 8x8 wheeled chassis. Add ERA. 30-mm gun (and imp rd), coax MG. FOG NLOS ATGM lchr 4 km. Thermobaric ATGM. FLIR. 2 remote 7.62-mm MGs and 40 mm

ABM AGL. CPS and ATS. Attack UAV launch

10x10 wheeled hybrid drive. Box ERA. CPS. Fused FLIR/II sight 13 km. 30-mm recoilless chain gun, RWS. Air-burst rds. ADAT KE missile

and NLOS ATGM to 8 km. TV/IR attack grenades.

APC Fire Support Vehicle

(Weapons Squad APC or Infantry Support Vehicle [1/ pltn or company], or Company Command Vehicle in Mech APC Bn)

Wheeled 8x8 chassis with ERA. 100mm & 30mm guns, 40 mm ABM AGL, auto- tracker, hunter-killer FCS. Gun-launch ATGM NLOS (SAL) 8 km fire on move.

30 and 100-mm HE elec fuzed rd 7 km. Imp 30-mm rd. 12.7 mm AD MG, 2 remote

7.62 MG. ADAT KE msl lchr 7+ km. Laser designator 10 km.  CPS, ATS.

Above chassis & drive, ERA, fused FLIR/II sight. 100mm KE/600 CE protection. Cased telescoped gun 45-mm. ADAT KE dart rd 4 km, SAL/LBR ATGM 8-12 km. CPS.

Micro-UAVs recon/attack. Tunable laser designator to 15 km. Radar/

MMW radar. SATCOM.  Atk grds

APC Air defense/Antitank

(ADAT) Vehicle

APC Bn and Bde MANPADS btry,

selected other units

Infantry Fighting Vehicle 2-man turret, amphib tracked. Add ERA. 30mm gun (sabot, 110+mm pen). Frag-HE Electronic-fuzed ammo 5 km. Buckshot rd for UAVs. 40-mm ABM AGL, 4 x fiber-optic guided ATGM 8 km launch on move, 2nd gen FLIR. Auto-track, hunter-killer FCS. Remote MGs 12.7mm, 2 x 7.62.

Laser designator 15 km. CPS/ATS

Hybrid drive. Box ERA 100mm KE

/600 CE.  45-mm CTG. Fused FLIR

/II sight 13 km. ADAT dart rd 4 km. SAL/LBR ATGM 8-12 km. MMW

radar. Micro-UAVs recon/atk. Radar warner, laser radar. Tunable

LTD 15 km.  CPS. 2 remote MGs, 1x

12.7.  TV/IR attack grenades

IFV ADAT Vehicle


IFV chassis and APC ADAT weapons and upgrades See AIR DEFENSE, APC ADAT for

weapons and upgrades

Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle

(Heavy IFV in Heavy Bn, Infantry Fire Support Vehicle, or IFV Company Command Vehicle, as Required)

2-man turret, amphib tracked, Box ERA. Auto-track, hunter-killer FCS, ATGM lch on move. 100 and 30mm guns. 100 mm HEAT, DPICM rounds. 40mm ABM AGL, NLOS (LBR/SAL) ATGM 8+km lch-on-

move. 30/100-mm HE electronic fuzed rd 7 km.  30-mm buckshot rd for UAVs. AD

12.7mm MG, 2 remote 7.62 MG. Laser designator 15 km. CPS/ATS

Hybrid drive. Armor and box ERA protects 300mm KE/800 CE. 45-mm CTG, KE, HE, ADAT rds. KE missile 8 km. Micro-UAVs recon/ atk. CPS. Fused FLIR/II sight 13 km. ATGM 8- 12 km. Tunable laser designator to 15 km.  Radar/ MMW warners.  AGL,

2 remote MGs, 1x 12.7. TV/IR atk grds


HIFV and Amphib Bn/Bde

HIFV chassis with APC ADAT weapons

and upgrades


weapons and upgrades

Main battle tank Welded turret, 3rd gen ERA, more armor. 125mm gun, bigger sabot (800+mm pen), LBR ATGM 6 km. SAL/IR-homing rd to 5 km in 1 sec, SAL-H ATGM 8 km..

Improved 2nd gen FLIR (7 km) and 50X Day/night sights. ATGM fire on move. Auto-tracker, laser radar, laser dazzler blind sights. Focused frag HE rd for heli, light AT targets. HEAT-MP, DPICM sub munitions rds. IR/MMW CM. Active suspension.  CPS/ATS. Controls robot

Reduced remote turret, compartmented crew, electronic/ceramic armor, 500 mm top/mine armor. Laser/radar warners. Hybrid drive. CPS/ATS/APS. Sabot defeats 1000 mm KE. KE ATGM to 12 km. Tunable LTD to 15 km. ADAT msl 8 km.  Fused 3rd gen FLIR/II sight 100 X to 13 km. MMW FC. Atk/recon micro-UAV, atk grds.

Controls a robot tank.

Tank Robot (Near Term)

Robotic Tank (Mid-Term)

Tracked LTD tank robot fits on platoon cmd tank when unused. Light armor, MMW/ IR screens - no signature.

It designates SALH ATGMS and rds.

1/2 size MBT. Driver seat for pre- battle. Armor, weapons, mobility/ survivability (CPS/ATS/APS) same as tank. ATGM launch veh version
Tank ADAT Vehicle Tank Bn/Bde MANPADS Tank chassis and APC ADAT weapons and upgrades See AIR DEFENSE, APC ADAT for

weapons and upgrades

Armored Tactical Utility Vehicle (TUV) 4x4 swims, 1/4 mt amphib trailer, Remote 12.7-mm MG and 40-mm AGL). Multirole (mech/recon/C4/AD/AT/security/ log).

Run-flat, central tire inflation. CPS/ATS

6x6 hybrid drive, mine protection. 30- mm gun, RWS (see APC). Recon masted radar/fused FLIR/II sights.

Smoke, recon/atk grenades. CPS.

Armored TUV ADAT Vehicle Infantry, SF, other units 12.7-mm MG, 2x lchr FOG/ IR-homing ATGM, EO/FLIR sight, manpack ADAT lchr. AD net azimuth warning. CPS/ATS See above. Tunable laser designator, range 15 km. Radar warning receiver. MMW radar.
MANPADS Vehicle Bn/Bde, insurgents. Truck, TUV, ATV. Remote launch, EO/thermal sight.

Azimuth warner. Smoke/ATS

See Air Defense
Light Strike Vehicle 4x4 rear engine, 4-person, 2 m ford.

35-mm AGL, 12.7-mm MG, and 40-mm ATGL. ATS

Light armor/mine shields. Hybrid drive. Amphib (Bladders). 30-mm gun RWS (see APC). ATGM 8 km.
Light Strike Vehicle ADAT 4x4 rear engine, 4-person, 2 m ford.

35-mm AGL, 12.7-mm MG, KE LBR Msl. FOG/IR-hom ATGM 4 km. ATS

Light armor/mine shields. Hybrid drive. Amphib (Bladders). 30-mm gun RWS (see APC). ATGM 8 km.
Tactical Motorcycle Motorcycle ADAT version Low noise diesel engine, 35-mm AGL Swim sacks. MMW/IR camouflage and screen. ATS Continuous rubber track. FOG/ IR- homing ATGM, imp MANPADS. Track conversion in snow/swamp.
All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV) and ATV ADAT 6x6, 4-person capacity, 3.5 mt payload. Swim. Has 12.7-mm MG, 35-mm AGL. ADAT, AT, other roles. Amphib trailer. Track conversion in snow/swamp. ATS 8x8. Mine protection. Hybrid electric/diesel drive. Snap-on cab for cold weather etc. 23-mm light chain gun on pintle mount.
Binocular Laser rangefinder and Goniometer Handheld 20km detection, 5-7km recognition, GPS.  Thermal channel

(below) goniometer, computer - digital transmit

See Thermal Binoculars (below). Heads-up display links to terminal. Transmit images to net.
Helmet Cam Soldier camera link to laptop/PDA 2 km. NVG feed. Remote mast-mount. Improved night viewer with 3 gen II or thermal.  Nigh range 2 km.
Thermal Binoculars Uncooled 2 gen FLIR. 2x electronic zoom (EZ), image stabilization. Detect 9 km (13 EZ), recognition 3.5 km (5.5 EZ) Add LRF, laser pointer, internal GNSS. Fused FLIR/II camera. FOs call indirect fires 10-13 km, 6+ with

precision, direct fire 5.5 km+. IDs heli at 7 km w EZ,  detects at 13 km

Laser Target Designator/ Rangefinder (Manportable) Man-portable, encoded, designate SAL-H

rounds, bombs, ATGMs to 10 km. 2 gen thermal sight.  Mounts on sensor robot

Tunable laser designator with

encoded pulse to 15 km. Mounts on sensor robot

Observer Sensor Suite

For Recon, SPF, Security, Anti- tank, Air Defense,

Artillery (Dismount, ATV, Motorcycle, Vehicle)

Goniometer/laser designator base. Laptop or radio link. GPS, thermal laser range-finder binoculars, manpack radar.

Aircraft azimuth warner. Net with UGS, remote camera, micro-UAVs.

Mount on Sensor Robot. Increased range, encryption, SATCOM. Fused FLIR/II night sight.  Tunable encoded

LTD to 15 km designates for all SAL- H munitions.

Laptop Computer for Digital Sensor Network System accesses sensor links: video cameras tactical units, UGS monitor, maps/unit status displays, azimuth and alert nets. Digital data links, microphones for discussion, ground station terminal. Access encrypted internet links, long- range cordless and SATCOM phones.

Terminal to remote-detonate mines and control minefields.

Personal data assistant for dismount use or for mounting in or linking to weapon FCS. Solar rechargeable batteries, extended range on links with retransmission UAVs. Use for hand-off control of UAVs, in-flight munition retargeting. Fuse UAV, weapons, cameras, TV recon grde

image, battle management data.

Surveillance radar Man-portable low probability of intercept GS radar to detect/classify

vehicles 30km, detect personnel 18km. Netted digital/graphic display.

Remotely operated, on a mast, with man-portable day/night EO sensor suite or from concealed base.
Mortar and Grenade Recon Rounds

TV/IR attack grenades: Mid-Term

82 mm mortar round with a CCD TV camera to 5,700 m, aerial NLOS zoom view to laptop for 20 sec. Rifle/hand- held/AT grenades with TV cameras send video to PDA or laptop on descent. Mortar rds (81/120), grenades with slewable fused FLIR/II and zoom. 40mm AGL grd 2,200 m. Shotgun grds. Recon, TV/IR attack grenades (HEAT/HE) from vehicle 82-mm

smoke grenade launchers to 1,000m

Unattended Ground Sensor Set Netted, acoustic, seismic, magnetic, IR. Acoustic sensor UGS array extends 12 km, for accuracy within 3m. Robotic sensors with sleep mode, underground concealed hide position (self-relocate, dig in). Nil

visual/IR/MMW signature.

Remote Cameras and Sensors Motorized, masted, with constant-on, command-on or acoustic/seismic wakeup. 20-30km link range.  CCD measures and

in-ground mount. 2 gen FLIR day/night passive scan.

Robotic sensor entrenched and concealed.  On wake-up, mast rises to RISTA mode. Integrated net digital

display, link to sensor robots and robotic weapons.

Smart Dust Rocket/UAV/aircraft scattered crush sensors emit for 1/2 hour. Scatterable, attach to metal. Acoustic/crush/seismic. Emit 1 hour.
Sensor Robot Man-portable tracked robot w/cameras in multi-sensor pods (acoustic/EO/

seismic) w/wake-up. Transmits image to monitor. Camera range 3 km. RAM.

Laser designator direct munitions 10 km

Solar charge and vehicle quick charge, longer charge capability. Camera/link range 20-30 km. Self- entrench.  Composition chassis and

RAM is undetectable to sensors.

Acoustic sensor vehicle Vehicle mounts microphones or dismount array, DFs/acquires aircraft, vehicles, or artillery. Rapid queuing and netted digital display. Range 10 km, accuracy 200m. Three vehicle set can locate artillery to 30 km with 1-2% accuracy in 2-45 sec. DF/

cueing rate 30 targets/min.

Range extends to 20-30 km with 10 m accuracy. Micro-UAVs with microphones to supplement the network in difficult terrain. Track and engage multiple targets. Range and accuracy SAB.  Hybrid electric/diesel


Wheeled Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV) 4x4 and 4 aux wheels, low profile. 12.7- mm AD MG.  NLOS FOG ATGM 8 km

Multi-sensor mast, 2nd gen FLIR. GS radar classify vehicles 30 km, detect person 18km, laser designator 15 km, UGS, laser radar, MANPADS, ATGM.  CPS/ ATS.

Conformal MMW-IR net, MMW/IR grds. Canister UAV 10 km.

Hybrid drive. IFF.   Fused FLIR/II to 24 km. Micro-UAV range 35 km. 30 mm recoilless chain gun on RWS (see APC). SAL/LBR ATGM 8-12 km.

Tunable LTD 15 km. Multi-spectral smoke launcher and recon and TV/IR

attack grenades to 1,000 m. Sensor robot. CPS.

Tracked Reconnaissance Vehicle 2-man turret, 30-mm gun, 12.7-mm AD MG, MANPADS, ATGM. Masted multi- sensor suite, 2 gen FLIR, laser radar, auto- tracker, laser target designator direct arty

/mortar rds/bombs, ATGMs 15 km. GPS/ inertial nav, digital data. Radar detects vehicles 30 km, personnel 18. UGS net. Canister UAV. CPS/ATS

Hybrid drive. Fused FLIR/II to 24 km. IFF, Micro-UAVs to 35 km. 45 mm CT gun. ADAT KE round 4 km.

SAL/LBR ATGM 8-12 km. Multi-

spectral smoke launcher and recon and TV/IR atk grenades. Tunable laser designator 15 km. Sensor robot. CPS.

Long-range sensor vehicle Tracked vehicle with elevated sensor suite on pod. Day/night TV, MMW radar detect to 45 km vehicle, 20 km personnel. 2 gen FLIR Net to UGS, UAVs, etc. Digital links to arty, AT, AD, recon, etc. 12.7-mm AD MG.   Laser target designator to 15 km.


Longer range, increased target handling/transmission capacity. Manpack AD/AT LBR missile to 8 km. Fused FLIR/II to 24 km. Tunable laser designator to 15 km. Hybrid electric/diesel drive.  CPS. Recon

and TV/IR atk grenades.

Ground or Vehicle Launch Mini- UAV 2-backpack system. Man-portable ground launcher, and laptop terminal. Vehicle- launch from rail or canisters. TV/FLIR. Range 35 km, 3-hr endurance. IR auto-tracker. Laser designator. Cassette launcher for vehicles.

Signal retransmission terminal. Bus dispense micro-UAVs, UGS, mines

Micro-UAV Hand-launch 4-rotor, 4 kg, 5 km/1 hr, GPS map/view on PDA/netbook. Atk grenade < 1 kg for dismount sqd/tm, 2 km range.  Add grenade for atk UAV
Heliborne MTI Radar Range 200 km, endurance 4 hrs. Range 400 km.  Add SAR mode.
Commercial Satellite Imagery Resolution 5 m for IR, SAR also available.

<2 days for request.  Terminal on tactical

utility vehicle at division. Can be netted to other tactical units.

Response time reduction (to <6 hours).  1-m resolution.
Manpack Air Defense and Antitank (ADAT) Kinetic-Energy Missile Launcher

(also listed in Air Defense)

Co/Bn substitute for ATGMs and AD. Targets helicopters and LAVs. Shoulder launch missile with 3 KE LBR submissiles 8 km, 0 m altitude. Submissiles have 25- mm sabot/HE warhead. Nil smoke. Mount on robotic launcher (below).  FLIR night


Fits in 45-100mm guns. Defeats all targets up to 135 mm KE. Range 8 km, time of flight 6 sec. Fused FLIR/II sight 10 km. Launch from enclosed spaces. Can mount on robotic ADAT launcher or ADAT

Robot vehicle (below).

Man-portable ATGM Launcher (Also pintel/vehicle dismount) SACLOS guided to 3 km.  Tandem warhead defeats 1,200mm. Thermal sight. Jam-proof low noise/smoke. Fire from enclosed spaces.  Can mount on robotic

launcher (below)/vehicles.

Twin ATGM remote ground veh/ launch station with auto-tracker. Fused FLIR/II sight 5 km. NLOS /IIR homing missile to 4 km.  Can use

ADAT missile.  Laser dazzler

Ground Turret Ready-made hole mount turret for hoist installation, w/12.7 mm MG, 4 km ATGM launcher, thermal night sight, and radar absorbent/IR reflective paint on cover.

Invisible until activated.

Add remote/unmanned pop-up turret. FOG-M top-attack or IIR-homing attack 8 km. Tandem warhead 1,300 mm. Fused FLIR/II sight to 10 km.


Ground/ Vehicle Pintle Mount ATGM Launcher Combat support vehicle with portable robotic twin launcher (below). FOG-M top- attack or IIR-homing direct attack

4 km. Tandem warhead defeats 1,000+ mm. Thermal sight 5 km range. Low

noise/smoke, countermeasure-resistant.

Range increase to 8 km and 1300 mm penetration.  Thermobaric ATGM. Fused FLIR/II sight to 10 km. Launch from enclosed spaces. Laser dazzler. ADAT robot vehicle.
Robotic ADAT Launcher ADAT Robot Vehicle Pintle mount shoulder/ground/ATV/ vehicle launch. Robotic launcher-60 m link. Twin auto-tracker.  Operator in cover/spider hole. MMW/IR absorbent screen and net for operator, launcher and surrounding spall. CPS/ATS. Masted 4-launcher, hybrid drive to self-entrench, then move to launch point. Fused FLIR/II sight to 10 km. Remote link 10 km. Most AD and AT host vehicles have 2 control stations and 2 robots. ATGM same as above.


Towed Antitank Gun 125mm gun, larger sabot (700+mm), LBR/SAL-homing ATGM 8 km. Stabilized FCS sights, auto-tracker. Auxiliary propulsion unit. TV day sight with (32x). Combined MMW radar and 2nd gen thermal night sight (5-7 km). Add SAL-H/IR HEAT rd 5 km in 1 sec, HEAT-MP, DPICM

submunition round. ATS.

Remote unmanned gun with cassette, towed, dug into position, netted into AT net. Concealed position (retractable base and IR/MMW concealed). Fused FLIR/II sight to 10 km. KE ATGM (8 km), direct link to micro-UAVs and UGVs).

Laser dazzler

Heavy Recoilless Gun, 106 mm


Recoilless Gun Vehicle (RGV)

TOW or RGV on TUV. Tandem HEAT round 700+mm 3 km. SAL-H, tandem ATGM (1,000+ mm), 8 km dive attack. .50- cal spotter rifle to 2,500 m. Laser designator.  Computer sight, 2gen FLIR.

HE, flechette rounds.  RGV CPS/ATS.

HEAT rd 900+mm. Remote weapon system mount for APC, IFV, and TUV chassis. Fused FLIR/II sight to 10 km. Nil smoke/noise. Tunable laser designator for SAL munitions 15 km.

Hybrid drive for RGV.

Self-Propelled Antitank Gun Amphibious airborne tracked, 125 mm gun, larger sabot (700+ KE), SAL ATGM to 8 km. SAL-H/IR HEAT rd 5 km in 1 sec, DPICM submunition round , focus frag

HE rd. Stabilized TV day sight (32x), 2 gen FLIR 5 km, auto-tracker. Laser designator 15 km. CPS/ATS.

Hybrid drive. MMW FC radar, NLOS ATGMs (8/12 km), direct link to micro-UAVs, UGVs). Fused FLIR/II sight 10 km. Micro-UAVs recon/atk. Laser dazzler. Tunable LTD 15 km. CPS, TV/IR attack grenades
Tracked ATGM Launcher Vehicle Box ERA 300mm.  NLOS/IIR ATGM

launcher on IFV. 1,300 mm dive attack, 8 km. HE Thermobaric ATGM. Low noise/ smoke signature. 12.7-mm AD MG. Laser designator to 10 km. CPS/ATS. Manport ADAT KE missile launcher.

Imp ERA (300mm KE, 600 CE).

Hybrid drive. NLOS/KE ATGMs LBR/SAL defeats 1,300mm at 8/12 km. EMP option. Fused FLIR/II 13 km. 2-target auto-track. Launch on move. Laser dazzler. Micro-UAV atk/

recon.  2 robots.  Atk grds.

Wheeled ATGM Vehicle 4x4 Armored TUV with same launcher system as above. CPS/ATS. Same launcher as above. Hybrid drive. Robot vehicle.
Airborne Infantry ATGM Launcher Vehicle Airborne/amphib tracked light armored. Same launcher as above. CPS/ATS. Same launcher as above. Hybrid drive, ERA, atk grds.  Robot veh.
Heavy ATGM launcher Vehicle Tracked, 6 lchrs, SAL-homing ATGM 1,400mm dive attack, 10 km. Warheads HEAT, Multi-purpose (HEAT/Frag-HE).

12.7-mm MG. Jam-proof auto-tracker, Laser designator 15 km. CPS/ATS.

Hybrid drive. Add IIR homing, 12 km range, EMP, and thermobaric.

Warheads. Fused FLIR/II 13 km. Laser dazzler. Designator UAV 30 km range and 3-hr loiter.  Atk grds

Heavy ATGM Launcher Vehicle

(and Land Attack Cruise Missile - LACM)

Tracked vehicle with 16 x SAL-homing ATGMs, Hybrid drive. RF-guided phase, 40 km. Fused FLIR/II acq to 10 km. MMW TA radar to 40 km. Warhead:  28-kg Frag-HE=1,300 mm penetration. UAV to 40 km with LTD (15 km range). FW and boat mounts.  Anti-heli radar guided or SAL-homing. Atk grds. Hybrid drive. Guidance adds radar or IIR homing. Warheads:

Multi-purpose (HEAT/ Frag-HE) defeats 1,400mm),

Bus for sensor-fuzed sub munitions, EMP warhead.  Laser designator UAV range 100 km, 3-hr loiter time.

Attack UAV Hit-to-kill system. Day/night 60+ km, up to 2 hours. GNSS/inertial navigation, TV/FLIR, Frag-HE warhead. They include

an anti-radiation variant.

Cargo UAV 100 km dispenses IR/ MMW/SAL DP (600mm HEAT) sub

munitions, EMP munitions, SAL ATGMs – UAV LTD 30 km.

Attack UAV Launcher Vehicle Hit-to-kill UAV launch from modular launcher, 18 UAVs. GNSS/inertial nav, to 500 km. First version anti-radiation homing. Added TV guided and multi- seeker attack (hit-to-kill) UAV. Laser designator range 15 km. CPS/ATS. Hybrid drive. Bus reusable UCAV with 4 ATGMs to 10 km, SAL-H bombs, or bus dispensing 16 terminally-homing sub munitions (with MMW/ IR seekers, or laser- homing DP sub munitions). CPS.


Micro-Attack UAV Hand or canister -launch UAV with TV and FLIR guidance to 10 km, 100-600 m altitude, with .25-.5 kg warhead. Cassette/smoke grenade launcher launch for tactical vehicles. Recon and attack (top-attack) UAVs.
Mini-Attack UAV Hand or vehicle canister -launch UAV with TV and FLIR guidance to 35 km, 100-600 m altitude, 1-4 kg warhead. Cassette launcher launch for tactical vehicles. Recon and attack (DP with tandem 600 mm top-attack).
Man-portable Mortar Conventional munitions, 82mm FRAG-HE

6.7 km, RA 13.0 km. SAL-H 6.7 km.

Day/night direct/indirect fire sight. GPS. Prox fuze. Tandem ATGM 7 km.

Increased range and accuracy. Ballistic computer sight.  Fused FLIR/

II 10 km.Self-lay. Dual guided (diff GNSS course correct/SAL) 13 km

Towed Mortar Upgrade 120-mm FRAG-HE – 9 km. Prox fuze. ADHPM: SAL-H and IR-homing HEAT – 9

km, Sensor-fuzed – 7 km. Night capable direct/indirect fire sight, self-lay.

Improved range/precision. Ballistic computer sight.  Fused FLIR/II 10

km. Dual guided round (differential GPS corrected, SAL) to 12 km.

Towed Combination Gun GPS gun lay/nav system.  Frag-HE range

8.1 km (and prox), RAP 12.8, HEAT 1 km, SAL-H 12.8.  Mortar rds SAB.

Automated fire control, Fused II/ FLIR 13 km. Autonomous lay, diff GNSS. Auxiliary propulsion unit.
Self-Propelled Combination Gun 120-mm gun/mortar system. GPS gun lay. Cannon Frag-HE (prox fuze option) 13 km,

-RAP 18, HEAT 1 km. All mortar rounds. ADHPM: Mortar SAL-H and IR-homing 9 km, Sensor-Fuzed 7 km. Cannon SAL-H rd

9 km. CPS/ATS.

IFV chassis. Hybrid drive. Laser designator 15 km, diff GPS, automated FCS, autonomous lay. Fused FLIR/II 13 km.  SAL-H, GPS

rounds 12 km. SAL tandem HEAT ATGM to 20 km. APS

Towed Medium Gun-Howitzer FRAG-HE - 30 km, FRAG-HE BB - 39 km, Artillery delivered high precision munitions (ADHPM): SAL-H - 25 km, Sensor-Fuzed – 27 km.  GPS 40 km Autonomous lay/fire direction.  Enhanced lethality, differential GPS corrected munitions (and sensor-fuzed) 60 km.
Self-Propelled Medium Gun-Howitzer 45-cal gun. GNSS/inertial land nav, self emplace, FC.  Munitions:  FRAG-HE – 30 km, FRAG-HE base bleed - 39 km. ADHPM:  SAL-H - 25 km, Sensor-Fuzed –27 km, GPS-corrected 40 km. Automated fire control.  Barrel cooling, thermal warning systems.  Autonomous lay/fire direction.  Differential GNSS corrected rds (and sensor-fuzed) 60 km.
Self-Propelled Medium Gun-Howitzer Tracked Ford depth 5.5 m. 40-cal gun. GPS/ inertial land nav, self emplace and FC. FRAG-HE 23 km, FRAG-HE rocket ast 31.5 km. SAL-

H rd 25 km, Sensor-Fuzed rd 27 km, GPS corrected 40 km

Automated FC. Autonomous lay/FD. Barrel cooling, thermal warning systems.    Differential GNSS course

corrected rds (and sensor-fuzed) 60 km.

Self-Propelled Medium Gun Conventional munitions, FRAG-HE-BB –

30.5 km, FRAG-HE-RA–40 km. ADHPM: SAL-H - 25 km, Sensor-Fuzed – 24 km.

GPS corrected  40 km.

Automated FC, barrel cooling and thermal warning, autonomous fire direction.  Diff GNSS corrected

rounds (and sensor-fuzed) 60 km.

Manportable Single Round Rocket Launcher 122mm FRAG-HE – 10.8 km. SAL-H,

Sensor fuzed 10.8 km. On tripod

Increased range and accuracy. Enhanced lethality.
Rocket Launcher Pod (107mm)

For Use on Improvised/ Modified Launch Platforms

6-tube (2x3 rockets) pod mounts on cart, vehicle (e.g., amphibious/airborne APC), or ground stand. Remote launch fire control. Cart/vehicle 1-3 pods. GNSS. Range 8.5 km. Limited lateral launcher adjustment (move vehicle).  Mines and DPICM

warhead option.

Improved launcher mount with servo- motors and remote computer FCS and in-view GNSS data. Munitions include: EMP, smoke, UGS, SAL- homing HE, tandem HEAT, recon, chem. Use with laser designator.

Range 10 km.

SP Medium Rocket Launcher (100mm to 220mm) 122mm 50-tubes. Self-emplace (GNSS/ inertial nav). Onboard FCS. Munitions: Frag-HE 90° precision fall 40 km, GPS course-corrected DPICM and Frag-HE 36

km, RF jammer rd 18.5, SAL-H rkt 32 km, Sensor fuzed 33 km.

Extended range. Increased accuracy and lethality. Course corrected diff GPS/ inertial) in DPICM, multi-role (HEAT, HE, incendiary). Motorized spades for quick displace.
SP Heavy Rocket Launcher (220-240 mm) Self-locating launcher, 16 tubes. GNSS/ inertial nav. Onboard fire direction.

Rockets: 220mm FRAG-HE –43 km, DPICM, Chemical. Thermobaric – 43 km ADHPM: Sensor-Fuzed – 43 km

Increased accuracy. Enhanced lethality. MRL can launch cruise missiles, UAVs. Diff GNSS Course

corrected munitions (DPICM, sensor fuzed, mines) to 70 km.

SP Heavy Rocket Launcher (240-300 mm and larger) Self-emplace 300-mm 12-tube launcher. GNSS/inertial nav, onboard FCS. Inertial course-corrected rockets 100 km: mines, DPICM, Chemical, and Thermobaric.

Sensor-Fuzed 90 km, UAV rocket 90 km

Range (100+ km). Differential GPS lnchr, GNSS course-corrected rkts. Enhanced lethality. Launch cruise missiles (attack UAVs) and recon

UAVs to 470 km.

Weapon Locating Radar Vehicle (Counter Mortar/ Counter-Battery Radar) Detection range with low error rate Mortar: 30 km, Cannon artillery: 20-25km, Rocket: 40km,

Tactical Missile: 55km.

Faster computer processors with digital links, differential GNSS, and decreased radial error
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Command (RF, wire) arm/detonate. Also sensor armed/fuzed. Large shaped charge, EFP, daisy chain arty rds, large IED, mine converted to cmd/SF. Defeat RF

jammers, magnetic detectors.

Fuzes and radio links which can convert explosive devices and materials into intelligent IED fields (see intelligent minefield)
Minelayer, Towed Lays 10 to 12 mines per min.  Lines 20/40

m apart. Can also lay controllable minefields.

Advanced sensors. Target

discrimination. Can lay intelligent mines.

Minelayer Vehicle Armored chassis w/7.62mm MG, lays

1,000 m AT field with 5m between mines. Lay controllable mines. CPS/ATS

Add vehicle mount mine launchers. Also lays intelligent minefields.

Hybrid electric/diesel drive.

Infantry Portable Scatterable Minelaying System Remotely lays AT/AP mixed minefield 200- 400m square from a distance up to 1090m.

At platoon. 6 lb, 5 min set-up. Controllable mines.

Add intelligent mines. ATGL and AGL-delivered mines.
Scatterable Mines Deliver by artillery, cruise missile, UAV, rotary or fixed-wing aircraft. Non-metallic

case, undetectable fill, resistant to EMP and jammers, w/self-destruct.

Advanced multi-sensor mines with wake-up and target discrimination.

Prox fuze mines. Controlled minefields and intelligent mines.

Artillery Scatterable Mine Rounds and Rockets Cannon, MRL, mortar, gun/mortar. 122- mm MRLs can fire AT and/or AP mines and covers 24-81 hectares. Extended range. Controlled minefields (RF link)
Remote Mine Launcher Pod System

(Vehicle, trailer, ground)

APC w/180 x 140-mm pods, scatters mines, UGS, jammers, CS gas, and smoke grenades, 30-60m from pod. Can lay field AT/AP 1-1.2km x 30-120m. CPS/APS Multi-sensor mines with wake-up, target discrimination. Controlled minefields, intelligent mines. Prox fuze mines (up to 540) 2 km 10 sec
Off-Route Mines

(Side-Attack and Top-Attack)

Autonomous weapons that attack vehicles from the side as the vehicles pass. 125- mm Tandem HEAT (900+ mm). Target

speed 30-60 km/h, range 150m acoustic and infrared sensors.

Sensor-fuzed EFP 600mm KE top attack. Remote or sensor actuated (controller turn-on/off), 360-degree

multi-sensor array. Hand/ heli/ UAV/arty/ATGL mortar emplace.

Controlled Mines and Minefield AT/AP, machine emplaceable. Armed, disarmed, detonated by RF command. Chemical fills and non-metallic cases are

undetectable. With CM and shielding, negate jammers/pre-detonating systems.

Control may be autonomous, based on sensor data and programmed in decision logic, or by operators monitoring with remote nets.
Smart Mines Wide-area munitions (WAM) smart autonomous, GPS, seismic/acoustic sensors. AT/AV top-attack, stand-off mine. Lethal radius of 100 m, 360°. Hand-


Discriminate targets. Reports data to a monitor, evaluate target paths, built-in logic. Use GPS to artillery/ heli-emplace.  Non-nuclear EMP or

HPW options

Unexplosive Ordnance (UXO) Artillery cannon or rocket DPICM sub munitions in impact pattern. Unused blue remote-launch precision munition pods may be seized and

used against them.

Intelligent Minefields

(including Non-nuc EMP, Jam, and  HP Microwave)

Developmental programs and not proliferated Self-healing, autonomous monitoring of obstacle integrity. Advanced

sensors, target discrimination, built-in logic. Non-nuclear EMP or HPW.

Engineer Reconnaissance Vehicle Tracked IFV chassis. Amphibious- recon equip: sonar, NODs, rangefinder, soil

analyzer, gyrocompass, underwater mine detection. CPS/ATS

Hand-held and vehicle-mounted ground-penetrating radars for mine

detection. Hybrid electric/diesel drive. CPS

Obstacle Clearing vehicle Tank chassis, NBC-protected, dozer (3.8m), crane (2mt), scoop/ripper, and mine detonator. CPS/ATS Hybrid electric/diesel drive.
Vehicle or Towed Line Charge Mineclearing System Mounted on truck, IFV, APC, TUV or tank. Rocket launch 10 tubes HE or FAE, to 3km. Breach lanes 10x60m.
Line-Charge Mineclearing Vehicle Clears lane 6x9 m. 2 line charges. CPS/ATS. Hybrid electric/diesel drive.
Lightweight Mobile ESM/DF 0.7-40 GHz, ESM/DF SATCOM intercept capabilities
Electronic Warfare Radio Intercept/DF /Jammer System, VHF Intercept, DF, track & jam FH; identify 3 nets in non-orthogonal FH, simultaneous

jam 3 fixed freq stations (Rotary/fixed wing/UAV capable)

Integrated intercept/DF/jam for HF/VHF/UHF
Radio Intercept/DF HF/VHF/UHF Intercept freq range 0.1-1000 MHz. (Rotary/fixed wing/UAV capable) Wider Freq coverage. SATCOM

intercept. Fusion/cue w/other RISTA for target location/ID

Radio HF/VHF/UHF Jammer One of three bandwidths; 1.5-30/20- 90/100-400 MHz, intercept and jam.

Power is 1000W. (Rotary/fixed wing/UAV capable)

Increased capability against advanced signal modulations. UAV and mini-UAV Jammers.
Portable Radar Jammer Power 1100-2500W.  Jam airborne

SLAR 40-60km, nav and terrain radars 30- 50km.  Helicopter, manpack.

UAV and long range fixed wing jammers.
High-Power Radar Jammer Set of four trucks with 1250-2500 watt jammers at 8,000-10,000 MHz.

Jams fire control radars at 30-150 km, and detects to 150 km.

UAV jammer and airship jammer. Hybrid electric/diesel drive.
Portable GNSS jammer 4 -25 W power, 200-km radius.

Man-portable, vehicle & airborne GNSS jammers, airship-mounted jammers

Man portable, vehicle & airborne (UAV) GNSS jammers-increased range and power, and improvements in antenna design
Arty-delivered and ATGL-launch Jammer HF/VHF (1.5-120 MHz), 700m Jamming radius, est. (1-hr duration). 300 m for ATGL-launched version Increased capability against advanced signal modulations
Missile and UAV-delivered EMP Munition Cruise missiles and ballistic missile unitary warhead and submunition. Increased capability against advanced signal modulations
Artillery-delivered and Manpack

EMP Munition

Cannon (152/155-mm), rocket (122/220

/300-mm), and mortar (82/120-mm).

Increased power, capability, and


Cruise Missile Graphite Munitions and Aircraft "Blackout


400-500 kg cluster bombs/ warheads with graphite strands to short out transmission

stations and power grids.

Rocket precision and UAV-delivered munitions.
EMP Mine Larger EMP mine. Effective radius 350 m, irregular/ disruptive 500 m. See intelligent minefields and smart mines
Radio, VHF/FM, Frequency-hopping 30-88 MHz, 100 hps, channels: 2,300, Mix of analog and digital radios, tactical

cellular/digital phone, all nets digitally encrypted. Burst trans. UAV Retrans

Digital radios, tactical cellular/digital phone, and satellite phones, all nets encrypted
Radio Relay Station, VHF/UHF, 60-120/390-420 MHz, range 30-40km per hop LOS Digital communications networks. Network management station, automated battlefield management system
Command Post Vehicle,


(wheeled and tracked versions)

4xHF/VHF high power, 1x VHF, 75- 2000km. Digital comms, graphics, voice back-up. SATCOM digitally encrypted. Completely digital comms net thru all levels, fiber-optic cables. Networked automated, secure, and integrated

battle management system

Armored Vehicle Decoy, Mobile Towed trailers & decoy heater units, and flares. Used in concert with obscured target vehicle for positioning near target to divert homing munitions. Radar (and motorized) corner reflectors. Inflatables,

tethered, move w/air currents.

Acoustic decoys w/seismic effects. Multi-spectral (high-fidelity) decoys powered for acoustic and IR signatures. Linked to vehicle warning systems
Armored Vehicle Decoy, Stationary Multi-spectral (high-fidelity) erectable/ inflatable vehicle mock-ups, w/heaters &

motorized radar corner reflectors

Acoustic decoys w/seismic effects. Multi-spectral decoys powered

acoustic/IR signatures

Vehicle and Weapon System Camouflage and Concealment Tactical vehicles have MMW/IR paint and conformal nets, multi-spectral grenades, side skirts, thermal blankets, Thermal

screens, laser/radar warners, acoustic engine & track noise modifiers.

Add mist thermal image concealment systems.
Camouflage and Concealment for Dismounts Thermal screens and pop-up stands conceal from overhead, front, side visual/ thermal day/night vs MMW & IR. Face

masks/ gloves.  Foxhole blast devices.

Ready-made spider hole covers, invisible to visual/ MMW/ IR sensors. Remote control option
Air Defense System Decoy Manufactured and improvised decoys used with decoy emitter.  Covered by AD

systems in air defense ambushes.

Multispectral simulators of varied gun and missile systems mounted on

robotic chassis.

Air Defense System Decoy RF Emitter Expendable RF remote emitters with signal to match specific nearby radars, to trigger

aircraft self-protection jammers.

Mounted on robotic chassis.

(or Less Lethal ) Weapons

Acoustic directed energy system, sticky foam, rubber bullets, acoustic disrupters RF crowd disruption emitter. Water cannons. Laser dazzlers
Attack Helicopter 30-mm auto-cannon, 8 NLOS FOG/IIR- homing ATGMs, range 8 km. Two pods semi-active laser homing (SAL-H) rockets 80mm (20x 8 km) or 122mm (5x 9 km). 2x LBR KE ADAT msl (warhead w/3 KE submissiles, 8 km range).  Laser designator 15 km.  UAVs to 30 km.  2nd gen FLIR auto-tracker. Radar and IR warners and jammers, chaff, flares Tandem cockpit, coax rotor, 30-mm auto-cannon. 8 x RF/SAL-H ASMs to 18 km (28+kg HE=1300+mm), 2x

SAL-H rocket pods (80mm or 122mm), 2 ADAT KE msl 8 km, and 2x MANPADs. 1/3 have ASM to 100 km. Fire control with fused II/ FLIR to 30 km, and MMW radar, link to ground LTD. Radar jammer.  Atk and

LTD UAVs to 30 km.

Multi-role Medium Helicopter and Gunship 24 troops or 5000kg internal. Medium transport helicopter. Range 460km. 30- mm auto cannon, 8 FOG-M/IIR ATGMs to 8 km, 40 x 80 mm laser-homing rockets, 4 AAMs. ATGM launchers can launch mini- UAVs and more AAMs.  Mine pod option.

Day/night FLIR FCS.

Fused FLIR/II to 15 km. 6x SAL-H ATGMs 18 km, 2 AAMs, 2 x 80/ 122-

mm SAL-H rocket pods (20 or 5 ea). Laser designator to 15 km, and links to ground LTD.   Aircraft survivability

equipment (radar jammers and IR countermeasures).

Multi-role Helicopter and Gunship 12 troops (Load 400 kg internal, 1,600 external. Range 860 km. 23 mm cannon, 2 AAM, 4 SACLOS ATGMs to 13 km,

TV/FLIR, day/night.  Mine delivery pods

Launch 6x SAL-H ATGM to 18 km, 28+kg HE warhead. 2 x AAM Air-to- surface missile to 100 km. Pod w/7x SAL-H 90-mm rockets. Fused

FLIR/II to 15 km. ASE

Light Helicopter and Gunship 3 troops (Load 750 kg internal, 700 external). Range 735 km. 20 mm cannon, 1 x 7.62mm MG, 6 SAL-H ATGMs to 13

km, 2 AAMs. FLIR night sight. Laser target designator.  Mine pods

Launches 4x SAL-H ATGMs, to 18 km range.  Fused FLIR/II to 15 km.
Helicopter and Fixed- Wing Aircraft Mine Delivery System Light helicopter pod scatters 60-80 AT mines or 100-120 AP mines per sortie. Medium helicopter or FW aircraft scatters 100-140 AT mines or 200-220 AP mines

per sortie.

Controllable and intelligent mines for aircraft delivery. Larger aircraft can hold multiple pods.
Intercept FW Aircraft 30-mm auto-gun, AAM, ASM, ARMs TV/laser guided bomb. 8 pylons Range 3,300 km.  Max attack speed: Mach 4. Stealth composite. ASE. Max G12+ All weather day/night. Unmanned option
Multi-Role Aircraft 30-mm gun, AAM, ASM, ARM pods,

guided, GPS, sensor fuzed bombs, 14 hard points.  Thrust vectoring. FLIR

Improved weapons, munitions.

Unmanned option. ASE all radars. Max G12+ All weather day/night

Ground-Attack Aircraft Twin 30-mm gun, 8 x laser ATGMs 16 km 32 kg HE, 40 SAL-H 80mm rockets, ASMs, SAL-H and GPS sensor fuzed bombs, AA- 10 and KE HVM AAM. 10 hard points.

Range 500+km. FLIR

Stealth composite design. ASE. Unmanned option.  Max G12+

80-mm/122-mm rockets SAL-H, SAL- H ASM (28+kg HE=1300+ mm), to 40

km, 2 gen FLIR, radar jammer, day/night

High-altitude Precision Para- chute and Ram-air Parachutes High-altitude used with oxygen tanks.

Ram-air parachute includes powered parachute with prop engine.

Increased range and portability.

Reduced signature. Increased payload.

Ultra-light Aircraft. Two-seat craft with 7.62-mm MG, and radio.  Folds for carry, 2 per trailer. Rotary-winged, two-seat, MG, 1/ trailer. Auto-gyro, more payload.
UAV (Brigade)

It may also be employed in other units (e.g., artillery, AT missile,

and naval)

Rotary wing, TV/FLIR/auto-tracker, with LRF and LTD designates targets to 15 km. Flies 180 km/6 hours, 220 km/hr, 2- 5,500 m alt, 100 kg payload.  Can carry 2

AD/anti-armor missiles+MG for atk

Range extends to 250 km. Increased payload. Attack version can carry 2 SAL-H ATGMs (12 km range) or 1+ 4 70-mm SAL-H rockets (7 km, defeats

200 mm).

UAV (Divisional) Day/night recon to 250 km. GNSS/inertial nav, digital links, retrans. SLAR, SAR, IR scanner, TV, ELINT, ECM suite, jammer/

mine dispensers.  Laser designator 15 km.

Increased range, endurance. Diff GNSS. Composite materials, low signature engine. SATCOM Retrans

relay links. Attack sub munitions.

UAV (Operational) Day/night recon to 400+km. GNSS/ inertial nav with digital links. SLAR, SAR, TV, IR scanner, ELINT, ECM suite. Jammer

option. Mine dispense. Laser target designator 15 km. Retrans/relay

Increased ranges, endurance. Diff GNSS. High altitude ceiling (35 km) option. Retrans/ relay/SATCOM links.

UAV attack sub munitions. Laser target designators.

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (on Operational UAV platform) Medium UAV with 4 ATGMs (fly out 10 km), laser guided bombs. Laser designator 15 km.  Mine dispensers. GPS

jammer, EW jammers. Range 400+ km.

Stealth composite design. ASE. Twin dispensers (pylons) with 16 terminally-homing sub munitions,

MMW/IR seekers. Range 500+ km

Short-Range Ballistic Missile Transporter-Erector Launcher (TEL)


Cruise Missile (CM) Launcher

Twin launch autonomous vehicle (GPS/ inertial nav, self-emplace and launch). Range 450 km. Non-ballistic launch, separating GPS corrected reentry vehicle (RV) with decoys, CCD, 10-m accuracy. ICM, cluster, nucs. EMP warhead. CM option. TEL may convert to 6 x CM TEL (500 km, 3-m accuracy, below radar).

Vehicle decoys. Vehicle has visual/MMW/ IR signature of a truck.

Missile improve range (TBM 800 km, cruise 1,000), with 1-m accuracy.

TBM has GNSS-corrected maneuvering RV. Warheads for both include terminal-homing sub munitions, precision cluster munitions, EMP. Cruise missiles pre- program or enroute waypoint changes.  Countermeasures include

penetration aid jammers.

Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Autonomous vehicle. Separating maneuvering warhead to 1300 km. GNSS,10-m CEP. Warheads include ICM, cluster, EMP, nucs. Penaids include decoys, jammers. Visual/MMW/IR

signature of a truck.

Range 2,300 km, 1-m CEP. Differential GNSS, terminal homing, separating warhead. Warheads include EMP, terminal-homing cluster munitions.  Non-ballistic launch and


Land-attack SAM system (secondary role for system) The SAM system uses its EO sight and LRF (short/med range, strat “hittiles”) Range extends with SAM ranges. Passive operation with TV/FLIR.
Cruise Missile Launcher Vehicle (Multi-role)

Category includes specialized cruise missiles, long-range ATGMs, and SAM systems to

engage targets at 12+ km.

Includes truck with 24 missile launchers. Range is 40 km. 28-kg Frag-HE warhead

=1,300 mm penetration. Pre-program phase GNSS/inertial nav is used. LTD to 25 km range. Thermal night camera to 10 km. Support UAV with LTD is used.

FW, RW, and sea-launch options.

Range 100 km. Penetration aids (countermeasures). IR Terminal- homing warhead or IR-homing submunitions can be used. Armored/ tracked launcher will mount 16 x 40 km missile launchers.
Cruise Missile Cassette launcher Vehicle Off-road truck, GPS nav for autonomous ops. 16/lchr. Range 470 km; preprogram GNSS inertial guidance, with in-course correction, 10 CEP. Munitions include cluster munitions, thermobaric, chemical,

DPICM/mine submunition scatter.

Launcher fire direction. Supersonic missile Diff GNSS/ inertial nav, 1-m CEP. Range 900 km. EMP warhead option. Warheads include homing cluster munitions.  Penetration aids-


General Purpose and Air Defense Machinegun 12.7mm low recoil for ground tripod. Chain gun light strike vehicle, ATV,

motorcycle, etc, on pintle. TUV/LAV use RWS. Remote operated ground or robot option. Frangible rd 2 km, sabot 2.5 km. RAM/RAP/IR camouflage/ screens.

TV/FLIR fire control. Lightweight MMW radar 5 km. Display link to AD azimuth warning net.  Emplace 10 sec. RF/radar

DF set. ATS control option.

Stabilized gun and sights. Remote- operated computer FCS with PDA/ laptop. Fused II/ FLIR 5 km.

Frangible, sabot rds to 3 km. Laser dazzler blinds sights. Micro-recon/ heli atk UAVs. Robot mounts MG. Some light and AD vehicles replace gun with 30-mm recoilless chain gun on RWS, fires AHEAD round 4 km,

plus Add-on ADAT missiles.

Improvised Multi-role Man- portable Rocket Launcher (AD/Anti-armor) 4-tube 57-mm launcher with high-velocity dual-purpose rockets. EO day/ night sight. Blast shield.  Range 1,000 m. Penetration

300 mm, 10 m radius.

Prox fuze, 1,500 m range. Penetration 400 mm, 20 m radius.
Man-portable SAM launcher 6 km day/night range/ 0-3.5 km altitude all aircraft, velocity mach 2.6. Thermal night sight. Proximity fuze, frangible rod warhead (for 90% prob hit and kill).

Approach/ azimuth link to AD warning net. Twin launcher vehicle quick mount. Nil

smoke. Mount on robotic AD/AT launcher. RF/radar DF set on helmet.

Warhead/lethal radius increased air/ground targets.  Improved seekers

- not be decoyed by IR decoys/jammers. Fused II/ FLIR 10 km. Launch from enclosed spaces. Laser dazzler. Optional AD/AT LBR KE warhead missile – 8 km.

Mount on AD/AT robot vehicle

MANPADS Vehicle Conversion Kit

(Lt Stk Veh, Van, recon TUV, truck, etc)

Twin launcher and ADMG on improvised IR SAM vehicle. Day/night IR auto track FCS, MMW radar. Display link AD net. RF/radar DF set to 25 km. Camouflage Replace launcher with 3-missile launcher:  2x ADAT KE SAMs,

1x IR SAMs. Total 6 missiles, (3+3)

Manpack Air Defense and Antitank (ADAT) Kinetic-Energy Missile Launcher

(also listed in Anti-tank)

At company/Bn, can replace ATGMs and SAMs. Targets heli and LAVs. Missile has 3 KE LBR darts (submissiles) 8 km, 0 m altitude. Camo screen.  Dart is 25-mm sabot with HE sleeve. Nil smoke. Fits on robotic ADAT launcher.  Helmet RF/radar


Larger sabot kills all targets up to 200 mm (KE) armor. Range 8 km, time of flight 5 sec. Fused II/ FLIR 10 km. Launch from enclosed spaces. Can mount on 3x remote launcher w/ IR auto-tracker, which.  fits on AD/AT

robot vehicle

Towed/Portee/Vehicle Mount AA Short Range gun/missile system 2x23mm gun. MMW/IR Camou/screen. Frangible rd to 3,000 m (17mm pen).

Onboard radar/TV fire control, ballistic computer, 5 km MMW radar, thermal night sight, auto-tracker, net azimuth warner.

Add twin MANPADS. RF/radar DF set, 25 km.  RWS on veh hull/turret. CPS/ATS.

Replace with twin 30-mm recoilless chain gun, range. Frangible, sabot, AHEAD rds to 4 km. TV/fused II/FLIR auto-tracker 10 km. MMW radar, Twin MANPADS/ADAT KE missile 8 km) lchr. APU to 15-kph self relocation.  Robotic option.

Laser dazzler.

Air Defense System Decoys (visual decoy, decoy emitter) See DECEPTION & COUNTERMEASURE SYSTEMS
Brigade gun/missile turret for mount on tracked mech IFV, wheeled mech APC, truck (motorized) chassis Twin 30-mm gun, APFSDS/frangible rds 4 km. 30-mm buckshot rd for UAVs. Mounts 4x hyper-velocity LBR-guided SAMs to 8 km, 0 m min altitude. Passive IR auto- tracker, FLIR, MMW RADAR. 2/battalion. Track/launch on move.  Targets: air, LAVs,

other ground targets. RF/radar DF set with 25 km range. CPS/ATS.

Dual mode (LBR/radar guided) high velocity missile, 12 km, 0 m min altitude. Auto-tracker, to launch and fire on move. Phased array radars. Fused II/FLIR to 19 km. Twin 30-mm recoilless chain gun with AHEAD-

type rds to 4 km. Micro recon/heli atk UAVs. TV/IR attack grenades.

Divisional gun/missile system on tracked mech IFV,

wheeled mech APC, truck (motorized) chassis

Target tracking radar 24km. TV/FLIR. 8 x radar/EO FCS high velocity missiles to 18 km/12 at 0 m min altitude. Auto-track and IR or RF guided. 2 twin 30mm guns to 4 km. 30-mm buckshot rd for UAVs.

RF/radar DF. CPS/ATS

Hybrid drive. Missile 18 km at 0 m, can kill LAVs. Fused II/FLIR auto- tracker 19 km, launch on move.

Radar 80 km. Home on jam. Twin 30-mm recoilless chain gun with electronically fuzed air-burst rds to

4 km. Micro-recon/heli-atk UAVs. TV/IR attack grenades.

APC Air defense/AT Vehicle

in APC Bn (Company Command Vehicle, MANPADS Vehicle in Bn/Bde)

1-man turret on 8x8 chassis. 30mm gun, 30-mm buckshot rd for UAVs. 100-X TV, 2 gen FLIR. 2x LBR ATGM lchrs 6 km, 2x veh MANPADS lchrs. Two dismount teams. 1x MANPADS lchr, 1x ADAT KE lchr. Total 18 msls. 12.7-mm MG. RF/radar DF to 25 km. CPS/ATS. 10x10 chassis, hybrid drive, box armor. Gun 30-mm recoilless gun on RWS. Ammo includes AHEAD-type to 4 km. Add 2 veh launchers for 5 HVM AD/AT (KE LBR) missiles, 8 km. Anti-helicopter surveillance/attack micro-UAVs.

Fused II/FLIR 10 km. MMW radar. TV/IR attack grenades.

IFV ADAT Vehicle


IFV chassis with features noted above.

APC ADAT weapons and upgrades


weapons and upgrades

HIFV ADAT Vehicle HIFV Bn/Bde MANPADS HIFV chassis with features noted above. APC ADAT weapons and upgrades See AIR DEFENSE, APC ADAT for

weapons and upgrades

Tank ADAT Vehicle Tank Bn/Bde MANPADS Tank chassis with features noted above. APC ADAT weapons and upgrades See AIR DEFENSE, APC ADAT for

weapons and upgrades

Towed Medium Range AA gun/missile system 35mm revolver gun 1,000 rd/min. Gun rds: frangible, HE prox, electronic-fuzed. 4 SAMs/lchr, 45 km, 0 min altitude.  Radar 45 km for 4 tgts. Resists all ECM. 2 gen FLIR auto-tracker to 20 km. RF/radar DF 25 km.  SAM modes include active

homing, home-on-jam. RAP/RAM/IR camo. CPS/ATS

Hybrid-drive auxiliary power units for local moves. Improved FCS, phased array radar, low probability

of intercept, and acq to 80 km. Fused II/3rd gen FLIR auto-tracker to 35 km in day/night all-weather system.

Ability to track and engage 8 targets per radar.

Medium-range ground SAM system Tracked lchr. Radar to 150 km. 4 x radar- homing SAMs to 45km, 0 m min altitude (4 targets at a time). Home on jam. Use as cruise missile - priority ground tgts to 15 km, water 25 km. Fused 3rd gen FLIR

auto-tracker. RF/radar DF. CPS/ATS

Hybrid drive. Improved FCS with radars and EO fused II/3rd gen FLIR day/night all-weather system to range 50 km.  Radar range 200 km.
Strategic SAM System Cross-country truck launchers, 1 x track- via- missile SAMs 400 km, at Mach 7.

1x ATBM/high maneuver missile to 200 km. Also 8 x “hittile” SAMs to 120 km. Modes are track-via-missile and ARM (home-on-jam). All missiles 0 m to 50 km altitude vs stealth aircraft/UAVs/ ASMs. All strat/op missiles in IADS. Local IADS all AD. Battery autonomous option. Over-the- horizon TA radar veh to 400 km. Mobile

radar to 350 km. Site CM, decoys.

Off-road trucks and tracked with hybrid drive. All missiles Mach 7. 1 x “big missile to 500 km. OTH radar to 600 km range with 5-min emplace- displace. Targets include all IRBMs. Increased target handling capacity (100/ battery in autonomous operations).
Operational-Strategic SAM System Same as above on tracked chassis.

Mobile FOs all batteries. AD radars on airships.

Same as above on tracked chassis.
Anti-helicopter Mines

(Remote and Precision Launch)

In blind zones force helos upward or deny helo hides and landing zones. Range 150m. Acoustic and IR fuse, acoustic wake-up, or cmd detonation. Directed fragmentation.  Precision-launch mines use operator remote launch, proximity fuze

for detonation. RF/radar DF.

Stand-alone multi-fuse systems. Remote actuated hand-emplaced mines with 360-degree multi-sensor array, pivoting/orienting launcher, 4- km IR-homing missile. Operator monitors targets and controls (turns

on or off) sections, mines or net.

Helicopter Acoustic Detection System Early warning of helicopters. Acoustic sensors to 10km, 200m CEP.  IR sensors

can also be linked to air defense net.

Range 20 km, 50 m CEP. Track and engage multiple targets.  Digital link

to AD net, AD unit, IADS.

Military Technology Trends 2028

Year 2028 is a demarcation line for focusing on future military technologies. Even with the "Revolution in Military Affairs", most major technology developments are evolutionary, requiring one or more decades for full development. Subsystem upgrades can be added in less time. Most of the technologies noted below are in conceptual or early developmental stage or fielded at this time. Many exist in limited military or commercial applications, and can be easily extrapolated to 2028 and the near future time frame. Over this period and beyond, military forces will see some legacy systems fade to obsolescence and be replaced, or be relegated to lesser roles or lower priority units. Most will be retained and updated several times. New systems and technologies will emerge, be developed, become widely implemented, mature, and reach evanescence, requiring updates.

  • Infantry with improved weapons/sensors as primary lethal agent for combined arms
  • Weapon-delivered remotely-guided sub munitions and sensors for infantry weapons
  • Day/night sensors integrated, netted, with UAVs, robotics, and direct links to fire support
  • Visual/IR/MMW materials with signature management to avoid detection
  • Increased lethality weapons and precision for man-portable and vehicle weapons, robotic weapons
  • Increased range and effectiveness for use in Beyond Line-Of-Sight (BLOS) and MOUT operations
  • Tube launch UAVs, UCAVs, and remote overhead camera munitions for vehicles and dismounts limit collateral damage
  • Tank crew in hull, with insensitive ammunition, electromagnetic armor, and active protection systems
  • Hybrid (diesel/electric) drive, and MMW/IR signature management
  • Overhead guns and missiles, electro-thermal chemical gun, and cased telescoped rounds
  • BLOS precision 12+km, 1,500+ mm lethality, KE missiles, and sensor/attack UAVs and robots
  • Infantry carrier remote weapons manned by passengers for 360° all-aspect protection
  • Heavy combat support vehicles/Heavy IFVs option to accompany tanks/IFVs
  • Micro-UAVs, attack UAVs, and UCAVs for vehicle launch
  • Increased penetration (1,500+ HEAT/1,000+ KE), including lightweight capability for infantry
  • Infantry homing grenades with top-attack EFP or tandem
  • KE hypervelocity missiles/missile rounds 10+ km vehicles.  KE ATGMs for infantry
  • Laser designators on AT grenade launchers, also used for precision artillery/air/naval rounds/ATGMs
  • Attack UAVs and laser target designator UAVs for precision strikes throughout the battle zone
  • Autonomous operation/rapid self-emplace/displace with integrated netted FCS
  • Precision munitions:  laser/IR/MMW homing, EFP multi-sensor fuzed
  • Inertial/GPS/muzzle-velocity radar course-correction on conventional rounds/rockets
  • Combination guns integrate tactical unit BLOS fires and strikes
  • Multi-spectral immediate all-weather sensor transmission with real-time display
  • Remote unmanned sensors, weapon-launch and robotic sensors and manned sensors
  • Sensor nets integrated and netted from team to strategic and across functional areas
  • Micro-UAVs and remote overhead camera munitions for vehicles and dismount teams
  • Continued but selective use of FW and rotary wing for stand-off weapons, sensors
  • Aircraft critical for transport, minelaying, jamming, other support missions
  • Laser designators on AT grenade launchers, also used for precision artillery/air/naval rounds/ATGMs
Other Aerial Systems
  • High-altitude UAVs, long-endurance UAVs, and UCAVs seamlessly integrated with other intelligence and support systems
  • Recon/attack low-signature UAVs and UCAVs and stand-off munitions at all levels down to squads
  • Ballistic missiles with non-ballistic trajectories, improved GNSS/homing re-entry vehicles, precision sub munitions, EMP
  • Shift to canister launchers of tactical cruise missiles with precision homing and piloted option, cluster warheads, EMP
  • Laser designators on AT grenade launchers, also used for precision artillery/air/naval rounds/ATGMs
  • Airships and powered airships for long-duration and long-range reconnaissance, and variety of other roles
  • Increased use of ultra-lights and powered parachutes
Air Defense
  • Integrated Air Defense System with day/night all-weather RISTA access for all AD units
  • Improved gun rounds (AHEAD/guided sabot) and missiles (anti-radiation homing, jam-resistant)
  • Autonomous operation with signature suppression, counter-SEAD radars and comms
  • Shoulder-launch multi-role (ADAT) hypervelocity missiles/weapons immune to helicopter decoys and jammers,
  • Micro-UAVs and airships for multi-role use includes air defense recon and  helicopter attack
  • Acquisition/destruction of stealth systems and aerial munitions and ground rockets to 500+ km
Information Warfare
  • Jammer rounds most weapons, electro-magnetic pulse rounds, weapons of mass effects
  • UAVs, missiles and robots carry or deliver jammers/EMP/against point targets and for mass effects
  • Multi-spectral decoys for most warfighting functions
  • Computer network attack and data manipulation
Access Denial
  • Use of nuclear/bacteriological/chemical weapons to deny entry, access to areas or resources
  • Use of media and public opinion for access denial
  • Remotely delivered RF-controlled, smart and wide-area remote delivered sensor-fuzed and mines and IEDs defeat jamming
Non-lethal Weapons
  • EMP/graphite/directed energy weapons to degrade power grid, information networks, and military systems
  • Space-based data manipulation to deny adversary use of satellite systems
  • Population control effects (acoustic devices, bio-chemical and genetic weapons, resources attack, dirty bomb)
  • Anti-materiel agents and organisms (microbes, chemicals, dust, and nanotech)
  • Countermeasures, tactical and technical, in all units to degrade enemy sensor and weapon effectiveness.

Chapter 11: Irregular Forces

The conflict spectrum in the Complex Operational Environment includes not only modernized systems in upper tier forces but also older systems in less developed forces. Forces all across the capability spectrum use older, cheaper or improvised weapons because that is what they are able to procure, afford or require to blend in with their environment. Generally, Irregular forces are lightly armed attack troops and their equipment is not based on what they want or in some cases need but what is available. The equipment of an Irregular threat actor tends to improve over time as they increase their lines of supply, which complements their usual strategy of lassitude.

Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces (JP 3-24). Irregular forces can be insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal organizations or any combination thereof. Any of those forces can be affiliated with mercenaries, corrupt governing authority officials, compromised commercial and public entities, active or covert supporters, and willing or coerced members of a populace.

Arms Procurement

To maintain a force that is prepared to deal with its security challenges requires an equipment program of acquisition and procurement. Irregular forces do not usually have the luxury of the acquisition methods available to states such as internal manufacture or purchase through international defense agreements. There are laws and regulations that govern the control of military equipment such as the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) specifically to stop Irregular forces and large criminal organizations from obtaining military grade equipment. Despite all the obstacles Irregular forces can acquire weapons from regional military sources, through purchase on the black market or fabricate them internally.

Regional Procurement

An Irregular force has a number of ways in which it can procure weapons and explosives regionally. The most dangerous Irregular forces are those that are supplied directly from an external country. Hezbollah are a recipient of support from Iran and Syria, and what began with caution and relatively small amounts of weapons in the 1980’s has become a strategic alliance that supplies short-range precision guided munitions such as the Fateh-100 or the M-600.

Areas of instability, corruption, state weakness and long running conflict can be awash with uncontrolled weapons that are easy to procure. In 2003, Iraqi forces abandoned their positions as the coalition forces advanced on Baghdad, they left military bases and storage depots unguarded. Millions of tons of weapons and explosives were left for the taking by anybody. These weapons fueled the insurgency that followed.

Weapons and explosives can be taken using force or guile from legitimate government sources in the Irregular actors AO. Much of Boko Haram’s (BH) military hardware is stolen from the Nigerian Army. BH fighters have conducted raids against remote military outposts and looted ammunition bunkers. In addition BH sympathizers in the Army have been accused of leaving armory doors unlocked which has left the militants well- armed.

Illicit Arms Trade

Insurgents, Guerrillas, armed gangs, and terrorists can all multiply their force through the use of illegally acquired firepower but an alternative to seizing weapons by force is to purchase them unlawfully through the Black Market. It is important not to underestimate the magnitude of the Black Market  as

it is possible to purchase top of the line tanks and radar systems with the latest technology. The illicit circulation of small arms, light weapons and their associated ammunition alone values around $1bn a year.

The arms market is a good example, for all the wrong reasons of increasing globalization. The illicit arms trade takes maximum advantage of all the open trade developments including minimized custom regulations and relaxed border controls which leads to easier movement. The faking of shipping manifests or end-use certificates, bribing officials and concealing arms as humanitarian aids are common practice. The structure of the small arms black market is complex and stretches across the globe and the activities of the black market arms dealer’s stretch to other trans-national criminal organizations, like drug and human traffickers.

Sources of small arms supplies to the black market are varied but most weapons start off the legal side and then get diverted to the illegal sphere. Small arms can enter illegal circulation through theft, leakage and divergence. The management of government’s stockpiles is an acute problem and a prominent source of the illegal weapons in circulation. Stockpiles consist of obsolete and surplus weapons that are often collected as part of a disarmament program and not destroyed. Much of the international focus and funding is on the destruction or containment of chemical weapons stockpiles and the destruction of post conflict and legacy mines and thus small arms stockpiles remain comparatively under the radar and uncontrolled.

Improvised Weapons

Improvised weapons can be everyday objects made from non-military materials utilized without alteration, such as machetes, pocket knives or baseball bats. These weapons are characterized as primitive but continue to be effective. Systems encountered in Vietnam such as punji stakes, Malayan Gates and blowguns are an example of using natural materiel in an innovative way for the accomplishment of a military task such as an obstacle to movement.

Some seemingly ubiquitous military systems can be missing from an Irregular threat actor’s arsenal because they are not suited to the fight. In Iraq heavy mortars were absent because coalition counter battery fire could quickly and accurately destroy the large caliber hard-to move equipment. Instead the Insurgents chose to repeatedly fire Type 63 107mm rockets at coalition bases. The Type 63 was self-stabilizing and could be fired from a simple ramp, it was easy to conceal and could be set on a timer thus reducing the danger to the shooter.

Improvised weapons include also include flame and incendiary devices to ignite fuels and ammunition supplies. Fuel-air-explosive IEDs or "Molotov cocktails" have been employed in almost all conflicts, and an air droppable version of incendiary devices known as “barrel bombs” have been seen in a recent conflict. These improvised bombs include large containers filled with flammable and shrapnel producing material and are pushed from a helicopter over a variety of military and civilian targets.

Improvised weapons are most associated with less robust forces, but they can also be the most effective method of accomplishing the mission. Military or non-military materials could be used to trigger major disasters such as forest or urban fires, breached dams or levees to initiate floods. The list of improvised weapons available and there methods of employment are limited only by human imagination.

The most populous class of improvised weapons is the improvised explosive device (IED). Any explosive devices can be used to make a type of IED, they can be of various design with differing amounts of explosive fill and different detonation mechanisms. Historically, the most numerous IEDs encountered on the battlefield use hand grenades, these can be rigged by wedging them into objects to act as camouflage or by tying them to trip wires. Often grenades are hidden on bodies, weapons, or objects to be picked up by soldiers. Artillery rounds are also favored for IED construction for their larger size, they can be placed in vehicles and delivered to target with

devastating accuracy, examples of Vehicle Bourne IED’s range in size from a bicycle to a dump truck. Mines have long had capability for sophisticated fuzing and remote control units seen in some IEDs. Both mines and IEDs can be converted for command-arming and detonation, and for precision sensor fuzing.

Many IEDs are not made from military munitions. Bulk explosives (such as Dynamite, TNT, C-4, etc.) are used in IEDs. Terrorists such as the shoe bomber and anti-Israeli groups used Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP), precisely because it is highly sensitive. The most common explosive in the US is ammonium-nitrate fuel oil (ANFO, an insensitive slurry mixed onsite with the bulk of the mix as common fuel oil) for mining and road construction. The slurry can then be poured or pumped deep into spaces where other explosives cannot fit. Explosives can be improvised from common materials. In 1995 domestic terrorist Timothy McVeigh created a home-made variant of ANFO in a VBIED (vehicle-borne IED, with “volumetric explosive” effects) to blow up the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City. Questions and comments on data listed in this chapter should be addressed to:

Chapter 12: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons

This section provides a basic primer for threat characteristics for selected CBRN Weapons/agents/platforms. This portion also discusses the following topics: overview of OPFOR’s rational on CBRN weapons, CBRN Threats, and WEG sheets representative of blister agents, nerve agents, choking agents, biotoxins, and decontamination platforms. These types of threats discussed in this segment are either in the real world and or readily available and therefore likely to be encountered by US forces in varying levels of conflict in the future. CBRN weapons can be used by a hybrid threat and is not limited to regular actors, but also irregular and criminal elements.

The list of CBRN systems/agents within this chapter is not meant to be encyclopedic. This chapter will be further developed with additional agents in upcoming editions. This edition of the CBRN chapter provides the US training community with a list of representative capabilities that allow scenario developers and the rest of the training community to create a dynamic threat to prepare today’s warfighter for tomorrow’s battlefield.

The section is divided into two major categories¾The CBRN Primer and WEG Sheets on CBRN assets/systems. The CBRN primer provides insight into how the OPFOR composite views CBRN weapons. The second section of the primer address current CBRN threats. The WEG sheets (section) examine types of agents, and decontamination systems.

This portion of the WEG is broken into two distinct but connected narratives. The first section discusses the OPFOR’s rationale with regards to usage of CBRN systems. This OPFOR segment will not go into considerable depth on OPFOR tactics due to the fact that this subject is addressed in detail in Training Circular (TC) 7-100.2 chapter 13 (CBRN and Smoke). The second piece of this narrative discusses CBRN threats and has supporting CBRN related WEG sheets.

OPFOR and CBRN Issues

This section consists of a number of significant excerpts from TC 7-100.2 in order to provide a basic context for OPFOR CBRN related topics (for additional information on the subject of OPFOR CBRN and smoke tactics see the link in the above paragraph).

Key points on the OPFOR’s CBRN issues:

  • The OPFOR maintains a capability to conduct chemical, nuclear, and possibly biological or radiological warfare.
  • The OPFOR is most likely to use chemical weapons against even a more powerful enemy.
  • The OPFOR is equipped, structured, and trained to conduct both offensive and defensive chemical warfare.
  • The OPFOR is continually striving to improve its chemical warfare capabilities.
  • The OPFOR views chemical defense as part of a viable offensive chemical warfare capability.
  • The OPFOR use the threat of numerous methods of CBRN delivery systems as an intimidating factor.
  • The OPFOR could use CBRN against a neighbor as a warning to any potential enemy.
  • The OPFOR uses the fact that CBRN weapons place noncombatants at risk as a positive factor.
  • The OPFOR may threaten to use CBRN weapons as a way of applying political, economic, or psychological pressure by allowing the enemy no sanctuary.
  • The OPFOR might use CBRN weapons either to deter aggression or as a response to an enemy attack.
  • The OPFOR will use CBRN weapons on own troops in order to reach overarching objectives.
  • The use of INFOWAR at every echelon is a key component in the OPFOR’s CBRN program.
  • The OPFOR may develop and employ radiological weapons.
  • The OPFOR has nuclear capabilities.

CBRN Delivery Systems

The OPFOR has surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. Most OPFOR artillery is capable of delivering chemical munitions, and most systems 152-mm and larger are capable of firing nuclear rounds. Additionally, the OPFOR could use aircraft systems and cruise missiles to deliver a CBRN attack. The OPFOR has also trained special-purpose forces (SPF) as alternate means of delivering CBRN munitions packages.

The Effects of CBRN on the Battlefield

The use of CBRN weapons can have an enormous impact on the battlefield and in peacetime and wartime operational environments. These types of weapons are a subset of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). WMD are weapons or devices intended for or capable of causing a high order of physical destruction or mass casualties (death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people). The casualty-producing elements of WMD can continue inflicting casualties on the enemy and exert powerful psychological effects on the enemy's morale for some time after delivery. Conventional weapons e.g., precision weapons or volumetric explosives) can also take on the properties of WMD.

Real World Threats CBRN Primer

Classifying of chemical agents

  • Lethal agents
  • Nonlethal agents
  • Persistent: Agent that remains able to cause casualties for more than 24 hours to several days or weeks.
  • Non-Persistent: dissipates and/or loses its ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes.

Subcategories of agents as the following:

  • Nerve: Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) defines as highly toxic chemicals called "organophosphates" that poison the nervous system and disrupt bodily functions which are vital to an individual’s

Types and Characteristics Chemical Agents

NERVE GA,GB,GD 10 min-24 hr 2hr-3 days Very Quick Eyes, Lungs Eyes, Skin, Mouth
  • Blister agents: OSHA defines blister agents or "vesicants" are chemicals which have severely irritating properties that produce fluid filled pockets on the skin and damage to the eyes, lungs and other mucous membranes. Symptoms of exposure may be immediate or delayed until several hours after exposure.

Types and Characteristics Chemical Agents

BLISTER HD, HN 3 days ~ 1 wk Weeks Slow Eyes, Skin, Lungs Eyes, Skin
L, HL 1-3 days Weeks Quick Eyes, Skin, Lungs Eyes, Skin, Mouth
CX Days Days Very Quick Eyes, Lungs, Skin Eyes, Skin, Mouth
  • Biotoxins: OSHA defines as biological agents include bacteria, viruses, fungi, other microorganisms and their associated toxins. They have the ability to adversely affect human health in a variety of ways, ranging from relatively mild, allergic reactions to serious medical conditions, even death.

Properties of Selected Biological Agents

Properties of Biological Agents
  • Choking agents: The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) defines choking agents or pulmonary agents as chemicals that cause severe irritation or swelling of the respiratory tract (lining of the nose, throat, and lungs). Chart not available.
  • Systemic/Blood Agents: The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) defines blood agents as poisons that affect the body by being absorbed into the blood. Chart not available.


In addition to traditional chemical warfare agents, the OPFOR may find creative and adaptive ways to cause chemical hazards using chemicals commonly present in industry or in everyday households. In the right combination, or in and of themselves, the large-scale release of such chemicals can present a health risk, whether caused by military operations, intentional use, or accidental release.

Toxic Industrial Chemicals

Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) are chemical substances with acute toxicity that are produced in large quantities for industrial purposes. Exposure to some industrial chemicals can have a lethal or debilitating effect on humans. They are a potentially attractive option for use as weapons of opportunity or WMD because of—

  • The near-universal availability of large quantities of highly toxic stored materials.
  • Their proximity to urban areas.
  • Their low cost.
  • The low security associated with storage facilities.

Employing a TIC against an opponent by means of a weapon delivery system, whether conventional or unconventional, is considered a chemical warfare attack, with the TIC used as a chemical agent. The target may be the enemy’s military forces or a civilian population.

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